ORY OF DRAMA

DR. R. N.
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
THEORY OF DRAMA

A Comparative Study of Aristotle and Bharata

Dr. R.N. RAI

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Dedicated
to the Sacred Memory
of my revered father
Dr. Shiwa Mangal Rai

Foreword

There are not many means of fostering mutual understanding of cultures as effective as comparative studies of cultural and literary productions. Parallelisms and divergences disclosed by such studies can contribute to the evolution of a universal humanist cultural perspective of unity in diversity. Direct mutual influence in dramaturgy between ancient Greece and India is ruled out by cultural historians. Yet the similarity in approach to the central problems of the nature and structure of drama implict in Aristotle's *Poetics* and Bharata's *Natyasastra* is striking. Aristotle, 'the master of all who know' (Dante) was an encyclopaedic thinker ; Bharata's work is an encyclopaedia of dramaturgy. *The Poetics* is fragmentary and incomplete compared to the massive architectonics of the Natyasastra which elaborately deals with the minutiae of theatrical production as well as the basic principles of art appreciation. It is a typical example of the Indian genius for systemization and oversubtilized classification. Though condition of dramatic production and reception have undergone revolutionary changes down the ages, the grammar of gestures codified by Bharata forms the core of the expressive devices used by our traditional dancers even today.

In our academic and literary circles Aristotle has had more pervasive influence than Bharata. It is bad to develop a fixation on one's tradition ; but not to be aware of it is worse. Dr. R.N. Rai has enriched the steadily growing body of comparative critical studies by his contribution. In his *Theory of Drama : A comparative Study of Aristotle and Bharata* he has established remarkable parallelisms between the Greek and Indian theorists on the nature, structure, and function of drama. In order to make the study comprehensive he has made extensive use of

later interpretations. Dr. R.N. Rai's achievement is particularly laudable in view of the admitted difficulties in such a comparative study.

The difficulties are many. Aristotle's text is cryptic and has too many loose ends. The crucial phrase 'Catharsis of such like emotions' has been interpreted in as many ways as there are therapeutic systems. The *Natyasastra* text, with Abhinavagupta's commentary is notoriously corrupt and no authoritative critical edition has been prepared. The plethora of interpretations makes it difficult to keep the discussion within manageable limits. The tendency to read ready-made parallelisms into the texts is strong in most comparatists. Further, the urge to establish the superiority and sophistication of one's own tradition, even without cogent reasoning, will be irresistable. Readers of this book will find that Dr. R.N. Rai has succeeded in steering clear of these pitfalls.

Aristotle evolved his dramatic theories in the context of the efflorescence of the Athenian tragedy in the works of Aeschylus Sophocles and Euripides. The Greek idea of the tragic found a culmination in their works. The only other period of comparable achievement is the last years of the sixteenth century in Elizabethan England with Shakespeare as the noblest exponent of the tragic. Tragedy is a sublime and fulfilling experience because it cleanses the egoistic disturbing elements in our minds. For Hegal the conflict is between equal ethical claims. Marx historicized this concept and postulated tragedy in a conflict between social orders. For Bradley tragedy involves spiritual waste in the process of the 'self-restitution' of spiritual unity turn as under by evil.

The notion of the tragic, at least some of its implications, can be felt in the portrayal of *Karuna rasa* in Indian works through tragedy as a self-conscious genre did not develop in India. But as Aldous Huxley pointed out tragedy with its isolation and suppression of aspects of experience cannot encompass the whole truth. Had Vyasa intended to write a tragic poem he could have ended the Mahabharata with the gruesome

nocturnal revenge of Aswathama. Had he wanted to end it on a note of affirmation he would have left Yudishtira on the throne to live happily ever after. But for Vyasa life's ultimate end lies beyond the apocalypse and the coronation. Hence the Mahaprashthana which is a transcendence of the tragic and the comic.

Dr. R.N. Rai's intrpretations bring out the way in which concepts and categories used by Bharata and Aristotle to clarify facets of dramatic practice in their time have assumed fundamental significance in the history of art criticism in their traditions. While demonstrating parallelisms he points to differences in the projections of the two thinkers arising from the divergent cultural matrices within which they worked. His narrative of the vicissitudes the Aristotelian concepts have passed through down the centuries and his discovery of affinities in the works of the two seminal thinkers belonging to two different cultural traditions will be extremely useful to Indian and Western students of comparative criticism.

Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi-221 005
January 1992

G.B. MOHAN THAMPI
Former Vice Chancellor
University of Kerala
Trivendrum



Preface

The theory of drama is such a subject that it has attracted the minds of many of the most brilliant and outstanding literary critics and philosophers from the very dawn of theatrical art down to our present days. It is not very difficult to find out the reasons behind it. Drama is at once the most peculiar and the most delightful of all types of literature. It is perhaps the best means for the exploration of the nature of man. It is so deeply associated with the inner consciousnesness of the human race that it is capable of addressing and moving the people of far distant ages and of varying climes. It undoubtedly stands as the most interesting of all the literary of products of human endeavour. This has been felt throughout the ages and efforts have been made to find out the secrets of success of the dramatic arts upon the human mind.

Aristotle's *Poetics* and Bharata's *NŚ* (*Nāṭyaśāstra*) are such seminal and immortal works in World literature ; they are encyclopaedic in the range of their ideas on all possible subjects of dramaturgy. By virtue of their range and profundity of insight, they are rightly considered to be the decisive authorities on different aspects of the theory of drama. Aristotle's *Poetics* has been a never-failing source of inspiration to writers and critics in the West. No student of criticism can deny the great significance of *Poetics* as the first systematic, though limited, inquiry into the fundamental principles governing poetry and drama. It has exerted a tremendous influence on subsequent development of literary criticism, dramatic, in the Western World.

Bharata's *NŚ* is also the first systematic extant work on the subject in the history of Indian dramatic theory. It has been most frequently quoted and referred to by subsequent authors

on imitation, action, sentiment, diction, gestures, prosody, music, grammar and so on. It has also stimulated original compositions on different aspects of poetics such as alaṁkāra, rīti and rasa etc. The various commentators of different Sanskrit and Prākṛit plays amply used Bharata's insight in elucidating the diverse dramatic highlights. Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa, Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha—all have written commentaries on some aspect of Bharata's theory or the other. Modern criticism in different languages of the Indian sub-continent has always sought inspiration from Sanskrit Poetics whose illustrious originator is Bharata. In modern Hindi criticism Ram Chandra Shukla, Visvanath Prasad Mishra and Dr. Nagendra are the chief propounders of some important aspects of Bharata's theory. The impact of *NŚ* on Indian critical and aesthetic theory is of course very deep and far reaching.

The present work is based on my post-doctoral dissertation recommended for the award of D. Litt. Degree. Here I have meticulously analysed the two great theorists—Aristotle and Bharata and made a systematic comparative study of their theory of drama. Efforts have been made in this direction by some scholars and comparatists who touch on, in passing, the similitude between Aristotle and Bharata. But since no comprehensive analysis of the subject was yet available, there was need to undertake this work. Such a comparative study has yielded some valuable results and led to a healthy 'cross-fertilization' of ideas. It has illuminated certain areas which may be regarded as universals of dramaturgy. It has taken note of the differences also. It has been evaluated whether these differences are due to diverse cultural colorations essentially affirming the same fundamental principles, or they involve differences of the principles themselves.

The area of common interest that I have discovered in the present work is the nature of drama, function of drama, structure of drama, hero in drama, types of drama and the language of drama. In the first chapter I have given a brief introduction about the nature and scope of Aristotle's *Poetics* and Bharata's *NŚ*. From Chapter II to Chapter VII I have

dealt with the details of the topic in a comparative manner. I have analysed and explored the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical aspect of Aristotle and Bharata simultaneously and then made their comparative assessment. The results of the comparative investigation have been synthesized and certain further conclusions drawn in the last chapter.

I would like to express my sense of gratitude to Prof. J.C. Jha for his scholarly suggestions and unfailing courtesy. The credit of stimulating me to undertake this work goes to my teacher late Prof. Shiva M. Pandey who unfortunately could not see the completion of this work, though he had sharpened my awareness on so many aspects of this topic. I feel highly obliged to my other teachers Prof. T.N. Singh, Prof. G.B. Mohan Thampi and Dr. R K. Shukla who took the trouble of going through my manuscripts and suggested the modifications wherever necessary. I am also grateful to Prof. Bhola Shankar Vyas, Prof. Reva Prasad Dwivedi and Prof. Bishwanath Bhattacharya for their valuable suggestions from time to time. I shall be failing in my duty if I do not express my sense of gratitude to U.G.C. for giving me the Award of National Associateship which certainly expedited the process of my work. I am also very thankful to Classical Publishing Company, New Delhi, for undertaking the publication of my work.

R.N. Rai

Department of English
Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi-221 005

Contents

1

Introduction

Aristotle's *Poetics* is considered by the critics and commentators of different languages as the Bible of literary criticism. It has been quoted and annotated by the classicists as well as anti-classicists alike in the defence of their respective theories. Its inestimable value lies in the fact that by the time of the publication of Bywater's commentary in 1909 fifty five translations into various European languages had been published and since then translations, editions and commentaries on the *Poetics* have been constantly added to the earlier bulk of Aristotelian criticism. The *Poetics* of Aristotle, which had influenced Horace, Sir Philip Sidney, Ben Jonson, Dryden and Dr. Johnson, has found its reinterpreters in a respectable group of critics such as Ronald S. Crane, Richard McKeon, Elder Olson, Gerald F. Else and Hardison in the twentieth century. Efforts are being made every now and then to analyse and debate the validity of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian principles.

It is now an accepted fact that there has been no other work more influential than Aristotle's *Poetics* in the development of Western thought on critical and aesthetic principles of literature. Aristotle is undoubtedly the first propounder of a systematic literary theory. He formulated his principles on the basis of the existing models of the Homeric epics, Pindaric odes, Orpheistic lyrics and the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes. He is such a seminal Greek critic that he was imitated and emulated by the Roman, French, Italian, Arabic as well as English writers and critics.

Apart from its inherent merit Aristotle's *Poetics* has a double historical importance. It is the first inquiry into the nature of poetical art and has exercised an amazing influence upon the critics of the succeeding generations. However, it was not known to the Western world till the beginning of the twelfth century A.D. Even in the Middle Ages it was translated and amply misinterpreted by the Syrian and Arabic scholars. Its modern interpretation started in Italy towards the end of the fifteenth century. Eobertello's commentary on *Poetics* in 1548 and Castelvetro's in 1570 show the influence of Aristotle in the sixteenth century Italy. Since then a large number of translations and commentaries have been published by various scholars such as Bywater, Margoliouth, Butcher, Gudeman, Rostagani, Fyfe, Leon Golden, Else and Hardison.

Aristotle's *Poeties*, published in 330 B.C., is a systematic, though incomplete, inquiry into the nature of art and poetry. It devotes more space to the discussion of dramatic theory rather than to the enumeration of the process of poetic creation. It is not a manual of aesthetics ; it rather tells us how a good dramatic work can be produced and how its literary value can be ascertained. Though it is found in the form of ill written, incoherent lecture-notes, it provides a solid basis for an inquiry into the nature of drama. Prepared on the basis of a few extant Greek plays, its applicability is more or less universal. Its significance lies in the fact that it places before the readers such crucial issues as mimesis, catharsis, plot, character, style and tragic irony which demand perennial attention even from the present day scholars.

The text of *Poetics* is a very difficult and complex document and poses some problems to its readers. The first problem is due to the fact that the text was originally written in Greek. Hence the readers who are not well versed in Greek language, have to depend on translations, which are always in the form of disguised commentaries. Since several translations are available to us, no translation can be considered to be definitive and fully reliable. The second problem that we face, is whether we should interpret Aristotle's *Poetics* as an independent self-contained work or it should be considered in relation to his

other works such as *Rhetoric*, *Politics* and *Nicomacean Ethics.* The third problem is that Aristotle does not bother to explain some important terms such as *Catharsis*, *hamartia* and *anagnorsis* which are still puzzling to the modern readers. The fourth problem is the problem of the authenticity of the text. Should we consider the *Poetics* exclusively as the work of Aristotle himself or accept certain sections as interpolations by other scholars of late antiquity ?

Keeping all these points in my mind I have made Butcher's translation the basis of my research work ; but I have also consulted other translations wherever I thought them necessary. Aristotle's *Poetics*, as is suggested by Aristotle himself, originally consisted of two books—the second book being devoted to iambic poetry, comedy and perhaps catharsis also. Unfortunately, however, the second book seems to have been lost. The first book which is available, is commonly understood to be an answer to the charges levelled by Plato against poetry in the *Ion*, and in Books II, III and X of his *Republic*. It is not just a critical evaluation of the works that it refers to but a methodical, philosophical investigation into the nature of literary criticism. In the opinion of most of the critics it has become, says Elder Olson, "a repository of insights, perceptions, observations, to be interpreted ad libitum and picked over for occasional nuggets of profundity"[1].

There are twenty six chapters in Aristotle's *Poetics*. The first three chapters have been devoted to the discussion of his theory of imitation, putting emphasis on the means of imitation, object of imitation and manner of imitation. Chapter IV discusses the origin of poetry and its development into the forms of tragedy and comedy. Chapter V gives a brief definition of comedy and makes its casual comparison with tragedy and epic poetry. In chapter VI he gives a formal definition of tragedy and refers to its "six causally related and hierarchically arranged qualitative parts"[2], namely, plot, character, thought, diction, song and spectacle. From Chapter VII to XIV barring Chapter XII which seems to be an interpolation, Aristotle discusses the nature of plot and the process of its construction.

He also takes into account for exemplification the unity of plot, kinds of tragic plots, and the essential features of complex tragic plots such as hamartia, reversal and recognition. Again from Chapter XVI to XVIII he discusses various kinds of recognition, rules for the sketching of the events, principles governing complication and denouement and the unification of various excellences in the drama. Chapter XV has been devoted to the discussion of the essential requirements of character such as goodness, lifelikeness, appropriateness and consistency. The language of the drama has been analysed and its suitability considered in chapters XIX to XXII. In chapter XXIII he explains what epic poetry is and then in chapters XXIV and XXVI he makes a comparison between tragedy and epic poetry showing the superiority of tragedy over epic on the ground that it has all the elements of Epic+Music and Spectacle ; it is more concise and concentrated and it has greater sense of unity than epic. In chapter XXV he discusses some critical problems relating to tragedy and epic poetry.

Since the three elements of tragedy, namely, plot, character and diction will be discussed in greater depth and detail in the succeeding chapters, a brief evaluation of the remaining three elements is essential here. Thought, as we know, comes third in order of priority. It is, says Aristotle, "the faculty of saying what is possible and pertinent in given circumstances"[3]. Elaborating it further, in Chapter XIX of *Poetics* he says :

> Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in the Rhetoric, to which inquiry the subject more strictly belongs. Under thought is included every effect which has to be produced by speech, the subdivisions being, proof and refutation ; the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger and the like ; the suggestion of importance or its opposite[4].

Thought is infact the intellectual element which is implied in all rational conduct of the dramatic personae. It makes the intentions, convictions and views of the persons known to us. It is revealed when the characters express their specific point of view or enunciate general truths or maxims. It is the manifesta-

tion of reasoning and feeling in written language or speech. Roughly it is, says Eva Schaper, "What is implied, suggested, referred to, meant, or cognitively involved in an action"[5]. It is of course the intellectual dimension of the play.

The next element of tragedy is melody (melos) which is the greatest of the linguistic adornments. It is, however, not only an embellishment but an essential element of drama. Recognizing it as an element of drama Aristotle not only stresses the musical element of Greek drama but also the need for fine artistic presentation. In Aristotelian sense it should be understood as the structural feature which distances the action on the stage and highlights its character as a mimetic construct. It finds expression in the form of a chant, a rhythmic accentuation or a stylized speech.

Aristotle assigns the sixth place to the Spectacle and admits that of all the elements of tragedy it is "the least artistic and connected least with the art of poetry. For the power of tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors"[6]. He is of the opinion that tragedy can produce its proper effect even without being staged. Spectacle which refers to the costume, stage-scenery and painting, is not so much the concern of a playwright as that of a stage mechanist. Aristotle feels that the real tragic effect may be produced by the inner structure of the play even without the help of stage-scenery or other such extraneous elements. Drama produces its effect as much in reading as in its presentation on the stage. It depends for its peculiar effect on the artistic rather than the theatrical, histrionic and scenic elements. Eva Schaper, however, disagrees with his view and says that "Spectacle is an aspect which is usually taken for granted in a stage-play, for drama is normally being presented, in visual and auditory form, for our enjoyment and immediate perception. Presentation in spectacle—or the potentiality for being so presented—is as genuinely a formal requirement as the other five. To lack spectacle is to be unpresentable, and this would mean failure to achieve the distinctly dramatic mode"[7]. Aristotle infact does not dismiss spectacle altogether but considers it to be a minor part of the poetic art, though it has emotional attraction of its own.

Aristotle's *Poetics* contains many seminal points and pregnant ideas that no other work on literary criticism has. It has deviated from the earlier literary critical tradition in the sense that it does not consider poetic art as duplicative or photographic of reality and it does not confuse aesthetic values with moral judgements. It has aroused such a great curiosity among the critics and the commentators that it has been interpreted, elucidated and explored differently in different ages. It would be an error on our part if we assume that his literary principles fully conform to the practice of the Greek playwrights such as Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. It rather provides some criterian for the evaluation of artistic excellence which is based on a discriminating and selective principle.

Bharata's *NŚ*, on the other hand, is considered to be an encyclopaedia of Indian dramaturgy. It provides not only a theory of drama but also the guidelines for directors, actors, spectators and critics. It is a remarkable work of deep psychological insight. Referring to the aim of Bharata's *NŚ* K.C. Pandey has stated that its main purpose is to "instruct the dramatist, the stage-manager and actors in regard to the ways and means of producing the drama, to tell them the necessary constituents of the drama and the manner and material of their presentation"[8]. In Sanskrit criticism there is a long line of critics and commentators from Bhatta Lollata to Panditraja Jagannatha who have carried on the tradition of Bharata and elucidated his rules and precepts without adding anything substantial to it.

It is, however, unfortunate that the personal history of the mythical Bharata is not known to us. Not only this, but the date of his *NŚ*'s publication is also a controversial issue. Critics are still not unanimous regarding its actual date of publication. There is widest possible divergence of opinion ranging from 5th century B.C to the 4th century A.D. Whereas S.K. De[9] suggests its date of publication between 2nd century B.C. and 2nd century A.D., Prof. Manomohan Ghosh[10] considers it to be the publication of 5th century B.C. Whatever be its real date of publication, one thing is certain that it is the oldest work on Indian dramaturgy written at about the same time when

Aristotle's *Poetics* was written, though both the works are much different thematically as well as stylistically.

There is another difficulty regarding the availability of its authentic text. Indian as well as European scholars have faced so many problems in publishing the text of Bharata's *NŚ* on account of different oral traditions and endless variations in manuscripts. There are various Indian editions which are based on over more than forty manuscripts collected from different parts of the country. Though Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nayak wrote scholarly commentaries on Bharata's *NŚ*, their works are not available to us. The only available commentary is that of Abhinavagupta who has examined and anlysed the important aspects of Bharata's *NŚ*. In addition to Abhinavagupta, Dhanaṃjaya, Viśvanātha, Pt. Jagannatha, D,R. Mankad, V. Raghavan, R.K. Sen and B. Bhattachārya have written commendable commentaries on Bharata's *NŚ*. Commentaries, however, cannot solve the problem of the text.

Things remain uncertain regarding the number and sequence of chapters or even about the number of verses in each chapter. There are certain passages in the text which apper to be the products of gradual interpolation and recasting. The *NŚ* was discovered for the first time in 1865 by an American scholar Mr. Fitz Edward Hall who tried to publish its complete edition, but failed to do so due to the corrupt nature of the manuscripts. The German scholar W. Heymann and the French paul Regnand made some valuable contributions to the publication of Bharata's text. J. Grosset made an excellent effort in this direction but he too could not publish the complete edition of the text. The contribution of Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi to the study of *NŚ* is remarkable in the sense that he published the complete edition of *NŚ* in four volumes 1st volume (I-VII) of the Baroda edition in 1926, IInd volume (VIII-XVIII) in 1936, third volume (XIX-XXVII) in 1954 and the fourth volume (XXVIII-XXXVII) in 1964. So far as the complete translation of the text in English is concerned, the credit goes to Manomohan Ghosh who translated Bharata's *NŚ* with a scholarly introduction and critical notes. His translation was published in two

volumes by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The first volume came out in 1951 and the second volume in 1961. Dr. Ghosh is a distinguished scholar of Sanskrit and his translation displays his critical insight. However at certain places he is so literal that his translation becomes sometimes inadequate and misleading. Even then his contribution to the study of Bharata's *NŚ* remains unique in the sense that it is the only book in English that gives a complete picture of Bharata encyclopaedic vision of dramaturgy.

Bharata's voluminous and encyclopaedic *NŚ* consists of thirty six chapters. It is entirely in verse (about six thousand couplets) with a sprinkling of prose. There is an interesting story regarding the mythical origin of *NŚ*. Once the gods under the leadership of Indra approached Brahmā and said to him, "we want an object diversion, which must be audible as well as visible. As the (existing) of Vedas are not to be listened to by those born as Śūdras, be pleased to create another Veda which will belong (equally) to all the colour-groups (varṇa)"[11]. At their request Brahmā went into yogic meditation and them stated :

> I shall make a fifth Veda on the Natya with the Semi-historical tales (itihāsa), which will conduce to duty (dharma), wealth (artha) as well as fame, will contain good counsel and collection (of traditional maxims) will give guidance to people of the future as well in all their actions, will be enriched by the teaching of all authoritative works (śāstra) and will give a review of all arts and crafts.[12]

Keeping these things in view Brahmā created the Nātyaveda from his memory of the four existing Vedas. He took the recitative (pāṭhya) from the Ṛgveda, the song from the Sāmaveda, the Histrionic Representation (abhinaya) from the Yajurveda and the Sentiments (rasas) from the Atharvaveda. This Nāṭyaveda was intended to delight the people of all the four castes, including the lowest. Brahmā then asked Bharata to learn the Nāṭyaveda and train his hundred disciples in its art of pre-

sentation. Bharata did faithfully what he had been asked to do by the Holy One and thus the *Nāṭyaśāstra* came into existence.

Now let us discuss the contents of the *NŚ* briefly. Bharata takes up individual topics and discusses them in great detail. He treats all the possible subjects connected with the art of writing and presentation of drama. The meticulous care that the author shows in discussing each topic is of course astonishing. In chapters I and XXXVI he discusses the origin of drama and its descent on the earth. In chapter II there is the description of the play-house and in chapter III the ways of worship to the gods of the stage. Chapter IV has been devoted to the discussion of the chief characteristics of class dance, and chapter V to the preliminaries essential to a dramatic performance. Chap.er VI and VII deal with Bharata's most important theory of rasa and its elaborate elucidation. These two chapters are considered to be landmarks in the history of Indian Poatics and have far reaching impact in the field of aesthetics. Chapters VIII, IX, X, XI and XII are concerned with the explanation of *āngika abhinaya* (acting through limbs) such as gestures of minor limbs, gestures of major limbs, gestures of other limbs, *cāri* movements used in dance and fight etc. and mandal or cicular movements respectively. Bharata meticulously explains how even the minor limbs of the body -- eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips and chin -- may be employed to convey the subtlest reactions of the mind and the inner-most feelings of the heart like love, understanding, agony, distress, despair, fatigue and envy etc. Chapter XIII is devoted to the description of different gaits (manner of walking) and Chapter XIV to zones and local usages. In chapter XV Bharata discusses the *Vācika abhinaya*, that is, acting through voice, sound and possible metrical definitions and their illustrations. Thirty six lakṣaṇas or characteristics of poetic composition, four figures of speech, ten marits as well as ten demerits of poetic expression form part of chapter XVII, whereas use of languages as well as dialects and modes and manners of address have been discussed in chapters XVIII and XIX respectively. Whereas chapter XX is devoted to the classification of ten types of plays on the basis of which Dhanaṃjaya wrote *Daśarūpaks*, chapter XXI is concerned with

the analysis of plot-structure such as five stages of the Action, five elements of the plot, its five segments and the five Explanatory Devices. Chapter XXII gives an account of four kinds of vṛttis (styles of expression).

Bharata deals with the *āhārya abhinaya i.e.* acting through the costumes and make-up in chapter XXIII of his *NŚ*. Chapter XXIV is devoted to the discussion of *sāttvika abhinaya ie.* acting through involuntary responses such as tears, trembling horripilation and such other manifestations. Chapter XXV is concerned with the dealings with courtezans whereas chapter XXVI analyses *citra abhinaya i.e.* varied representation. It explains how gestural changes are to be made in response to environmental changes for displaying moonlight, sun and smoke etc. Chapter XXVII presents the criteria of success in the production of plays. It gives an account of the various blemishes that may hinder the dramatic performance. It also enlightens us on the chief qualities which an ideal spectator should possess. There is no such chapter in Aristotle's *Poetics* which gives even a hint regarding the characteristics of the spectator. Chapters XXVIII to XXXIII are devoted to the discussion of music, musical instruments, metres of song and talas (time measure) etc. Chapters XXXIV and XXXV are concerned with the elaborate discussion of various types of characters, both male and female, and the assignment of different roles to them.

Though there are digressions, repetitions and overlappings at various places in Bharata's *NŚ*, it gives us an account of 'the composite art of the drama', thati s, the drama as composed, produced presented on the stage. Aristotle's *Poetics*, on the other hand, is concerned only with the composition of drama and not with its production and presentation, as Aristotle believes that the production and presentation of the play are the responsibilities of the director and the stage-mechanist and not of the playwright. Aristotle's *Poetics*, except for a brief introduction about comedy and epic, is basically concerned with the art of tragedy, whereas Bharata's encylopaedic *NŚ* offers an elaborate and systematic discussion of all types of drama and their different parts. It throws light on the theory of imitation, transportation, unities, manners, etiquette, acting, dance, music,

spectacle, costume, make-up, limb-movements, diction, gestures sentiments, characters and several other pertinent topics. It is so comprehensive and extensive that it has rightly been considered as the fifth Veda in Indian classical literature, which was intended to impart Vedic wisdom in a delightful manner even to the common people. Whereas Aristotle's style of presentation is analytical, Bharata's style is descriptive and explanatory. In comparison to Bharata's complete and comprehensive account of all the aspects of drama, Aristotle's *Poetics* appears to be an incomplete and fragmentary treatise. Whereas *Poetics* barely runs into hundred pages, Bharata's *NŚ* is about thirty times bigger in size.

There are other vital differences between the works of two theorists. Whereas Aristotle just mentions the term 'catharsis' in his definition of tragedy and does not bother to explain it convincingly, Bharata's discussion of rasa theory is highly exhaustive and systematic and makes a monumental contribution to the study of aesthetics. P. Kale has rightly stated that 'the tranquillity' or the 'serenity' or the 'rapture' which rasa brings about in the spectator is different from the 'lysis' or 'equilibrium which is brought about when Katharsis restores the emotional balance of the spectator''[13]. Aristotle puts emphasis on the fable or the plot and believes that the proper effect of tragedy may be produced even without spectacle and merely by the systematic arrangement of incidents. Bharata, on the other hand considers spectacle to be integral part of drama and that is why he uses the terms *rūpaka* or *rūpa* (represention) and *prekṣaka* (spectator) rather than the *śrotṛ* (audience). The concept of *rupaka* puts due emphasis on the representational aspect of drama which is possible only through the process of *abhinaya* (acting). His emphasis on the representational aspect of drama, however, does not mean that he has ignored the literary aspect of drama. The later critics, says G.K. Bhat, "describe drama as a *dṛśya-kāvya* and the term *kāvya* is a sure indication of drama not merely as a piece of theatre production but also as a piece of literary composition"[14]. Bharata seems to be well acquainted with the close connections between the literary and technical aspects of theatrical production. He treats both the aspects in his *NŚ* with equal profundity and insight.

He is fully aware of the fact that drama in any form is primarily and essentially a spectacle and therefore it is the responsibility of the play-wright to have proper knowledge about the rules of its production too.

In addition to spectacle Bharata shows the dependence of Indian plays on dance (nṛtta), song (gita) and instrumental music (vādya). Since *NŚ* is highly informative on all these points, it has often been quoted and referred to by subsequent writers on poetics, prosody, gesture, music and grammar etc. In this connection Manomohan Ghosh has rightly stated that all "the later writers on dramaturgy depended greatly if not exclusively, on this valuable work, and acknowledged their debt to the mythical Bharata"[15].

Aristotle based his observations on the extant plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes. Bharata, on the other hand, appears to have based his observations on intuition and vast range of human knowledge. "The *Poetics*", says Pramod Kale, "is a critical inquiry into a specific phenomenon of the Greek theatre, its object is to provide a rational explanation. The *NS*, on the other hand, is a creative attempt to bring together all the known elements of theatrical activity into one mythic world-view"[16]. There are so many points in Bharata's *NŚ* which have not even been touched by Aristotle. These are the description of the play-house, puja to the Gods of the stage, characteristics of class dance, preliminaries of the play, gestures of major, minor and other limbs, cāri and mandal movements, different gaits, zones local usages, costumes and make-up, dealings with courtezans, varied representation, time-measure and the descent of drama on the earth. That is why P.V. Kane has stated that the *NŚ* "makes a valiant attempt to raise the status of the dramatic art, places it on a very high pedestal and infuses a spiritual and religious element in it"[17].

In spite of the divergences in nature and content of Aristotles *Poetics* and Bharata's *NŚ*, there are some points of common interest Though there is no evidence to prove that the ancient Indian thinkers were influenced by the Greek thinkers like Plato

and Aristotle or vice versa, it is not very difficult to find out affinities and parallelism between the two great theorists. A.B. Keith has rightly stated, "There is no doubt of the many parallels between the two theories"[18]. A comparative study between the two great theories is bound to yield some valuable conclusions. The area of common interest that I have discovered in my thesis is the nature of drama, function of drama, structure of drama, hero in drama, types of drama and the language of drama.

Prof A. Nicoll, a distinguished critic of drama, has also laid emphasis on the need for a comparative study, as it would enable us to solve so many problems of creative as well as critical writing. Nicoll traces the possibility of such a comparative study in the following lines :

> It is rather interesting to note that, in their insistence on impression, these modern critics were anticipated by the ancient writers on Sanskrit drama. According to them there were eight principal *rasas*, or impressions, which might be aroused by a dramatic poem .....Each of these may have many subdivisions, and in any one work various *rasas* may be employed, although the types of drama are determined by reference to that *rasa* which is most important and although it is recognized that every *rasa* is in agreement with some and 'hostile to' others. As will be observed, this system of critical approach is in essential agreement with that of those who emphasize as all-important the 'idea' or 'impression' received from witnessing a dramatic work of art[19].

If a systematic comparative study of *Poetics* and *NŚ* is made it would help us in understanding both Aristotle and Bharata in proper perspective and in solving some of the prolems of their theories. Both the theorists, when compared, will elucidate and supplement each other. Bharata's theory of rasa may solve the complicated issue of catharsis in Western criticism. Aristotle's classification of drama into tragedy and comedy and Bharata's classification into ten types of drama may help us in

understanding the true nature of drama. The opinion of both the theorists on the theory of imitation, plot-construction, hero in drama and the language of drama will enable us to measure their strengths and weaknesses. It may also provide us an opportunity for evolving a dramatic theory acceptable to both the Indian and the Western readers. Some critics are of the opinion that the principles enshrined in the old texts are not adequate enough to cope with the new literary consciousness and hence there is a need to evolve new critical norms. The present dissertation will try to examine how far their observations are valid and how far the principles of Aristotle and Bharata are relevant and practicable even in our own time.

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2

Nature of Drama

Both the theorists-Aristotle and Bharata-discuss the nature of drama and suggest the theory of imitation. Aristotle uses the word 'imitation' in chapter I of the *Poetics* and then discusses the means of imitation, objects of imitation and the manner of imitation. Bharata also uses the word 'anukrti' (imitation) in chapter I of *NS* and considers drama to be an imitation of the actions and conducts of the people. Bharata uses the term 'imitation' in the context of drama, whereas Aristotle uses it in general for poetry which includes dithyramb, epic, tragedy and comedy. Let us now discuss their views in detail and elucidate their resemblances as well as the differences.

I

While discussing the nature of drama we have to take into account Aristotle's use of the term 'imitation' that occurs in the first chapter of *Poetics* :

> Epic Poetry and Tragedy, Comedy also and dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms are all in their general conception modes of imitation[1].

The English word 'imitation' has been derived from the Latin 'imitatio' which is infact a translation of the Greek word 'imimesis'. 'Mimesis' originally meant the mimicking of a person through speech, song and limb movements. In different contexts it refers to 'imitate', 'represent', 'indicate', 'suggest'

and 'express', etc. "All of these", says D.W. Lucas "can be referred to the single notion of making or doing something which resembles something else"[2].

Aristotle is not the originator of the term 'imitation'. It most probably occurs for the first time in Plato's *Republic*. Plato uses this term in connection with the poets who, in their process of imitation, are 'twice removed' from truth and reality. He explains it through the well-known illustration of the three beds : the Form of bed made by the god, the actual bed made by the carpenter and the picture of a bed made by the painter or the poet. The painter or the poet is thus twice removed from true reality. Plato considers only Idea to be real and all other objects as shadows of that reality. It is evident from his allegory of the cinematic cave in Book VII of the *Republic* where people "sitting on a bench with their backs to an opening and a great fire beyond, see only the shadows of a sort of passing puppet show cast on the wall before them. Such is our own experience of what we think to be reality"[3]. Through the allegory of the cave Plato warns us not to accept the appearances as truthful and real representations of life. The artist can only imperfectly approximate to reality and the ideas can never be fully realized.

Plato in his *Republic* condemns Homer and other poets as they had failed to create a well-ordered purposeful society. The poets act under a kind of madness and fail to compose anything until they have been inspired and have gone out of their senses. Plato, therefore, banishes them from his ideal *Republic*, for they teach us how to 'tell lies skilfully'. They present a deceitful and revengeful picture of the deities and depict them as wicked and cowardly. In Book IV of his *Republic* Plato refers to the corrupting influence of poetry and music on society and in Book X makes Socrates say :

> Speaking in confidence, for you will not denounce me to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe, all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, unless as an antidote they possess the knowledge of the true nature of the originals.[4]

Poetry appears to have an immoral and irrational impact upon the public, as it affects the 'emotional' rather than the 'rational' part of human nature. This is evident from Plato's remark in Book X :

> ...it feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up ; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue[5].

Plato, therefore, is willing to allow 'hymns to the gods and praises of famous men' to be the subject-matter of poetry. He will be glad to admit poetry to his Republic if poetry proves to be not only 'pleasant' but 'useful' also.

Aristotle, who was the disciple of Plato, accepted the word '*imitation*' but gave a new interpretation to it. In order to understand the full implication of his concept of 'imitation' we have to take into account his total philosophy scattered in his writings. It cannot be denied that Aristotle's view of art and poetry is the natural and logical outcome of his total philosophy of man and the universe.

Aristotle retained the changeless eternal forms and idealistic principles of his teacher, Plato, but rejected their transcendence. In his opinion Forms are inherent in things and not transcendent. Aristotle's philosophy, like Sri Aurobindo's advaitism, neither rejects the spirit nor the matter but mitigates the duality through the processes of conversion of matter into spirit. He links up the higher with the lower for the teleological purpose of upward evolution.

Aristotle's conception of art is an antithesis of Plato's conception of art which is nothing but the rejection of the world as a mere shadow of reality. Aristotle's was more scientific and realistic and he considered the totality of human life as a fine blending of reason and emotion. Aristotle's contradiction to the Platonic philosophy paved the way for the reverential admission and re-establishment of poetry and the poets not as shadow-worshippers but as an integral part of reality itself.

There was a fundamental difference between the philosophy of Plato and that of Aristotle which ultimately led to their different attitudes towards the fine arts. Whereas Plato was rigorously abstract and transcendental, Aristotle was concrete, natural and empirical. For Plato Being was the ultimate truth and the world was merely a shadow of it. Aristotle, on the other hand, laid emphasis not on Being but on Becoming which "meant not an appearing and a vanishing away, but a process of development and unfolding of what is already in the germ, an upward ascent ending in Being which is the highest object of of knowledge"[6]. The poet, while giving expression to his ideas, sets aside the veil of Becoming, unfolds the realm of Being and tries to elevate the sphere of Becoming to the stage of Being. It may be regarded as Sri Aurobindo's Integral Advaitism or ascending and esemplastic Oneness. The fine arts, therefore, are no longer a shadow of reality but the manifestation of a higher truth.

The poet, according to Aristotle, imitates not only what has happened but what may or should happen also. It is evident from the statement in ch. xxv of *Poetics* :

> The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate one of the three objects—things as they were or are, things as they are said or, thought to be, or things as they ought to be.[7]

The poet places before him an unrealised ideal which gets expression through his work of art. When Aristotle said that 'art imitates nature', he did not mean that art imitates either the Platonic forms or Platonic appearances of nature but that art constructs its own creations which are semblances, and not merely replicas or copies. The poet surpasses nature by supplementing her deficiencies and completing what nature has left unfinished. It can be substantiated from Aristotle's other works such as *Politics* (IV, 17) and *Physics* (II, 8) where art is expected to fill up the nature's missing parts.

The poet does not produce a copy of the original but an idealisation of the original and the creation of a new beauty.

He combines a number of existing beauties into a more beautiful whole, as Zeuxis is said to have created his Helen out of the amalgamation of the five loveliest maidens of Croton. He makes a pursuit for the principle of coherence that ascends from the lowest to the highest and descends from highest to the lowest. In this connection W.H. Fyfe has rightly remarked :

> The artist holds a mirror upto nature. Neither does it exactly reproduce nor does it distort the objects which confront it; it presents a picture in which the confused and therefore unintelligible facts of life are reduced to coherence[8].

The poet, in fact, converts the apparent multiplicity into unity and coherence.

The poet is primarily concerned with what is universal and everlasting. In order to reveal the permanent features of human life he eliminates what is transient and accidental. He gives expression to "a purified form of reality" says Butcher, "disengaged from accident and freed from conditions which thwart its development".[9] At this stage the distinction between the real and the ideal gradually fades away, as the real, when it gets rid of its inner contraditions and inconsistencies, becomes the ideal. The poet tries to present a world which is something better than the real. He does not produce a copy of reality, but a 'higher reality' which is nothing but an idealised representation of human life.

Though Aristotle does not use the word 'creative imagination', his concept of imitation does imply an artistic process which amounts to 'creative vision'. For Aristotle creation means, says Gerald F. Else, "*discovery*, the uncovering of a true relation which already exists somehow in the scheme of things"[10]. If imitation is a creative act, it does admit the presence of creative mental faculty which may be considered to be either creative imagination or intuition. Intuition, which is a higher faculty of the soul, is infact a means for direct rapport with the highest truth and reality, that is the ultimate end of art.

After defining what 'imitation' is, we should concentrate on the factors which differentiate various kinds of art. In this connection Aristotle remarks :

> They differ, however, from one another in three respects—the medium, the objects, the manner or mode of imitation, being in each case distinct.[11]

After establishing the fact that poetry, music and painting are imitative arts, Aristotle draws our attention to the four causes or principles of imitation in poetry : the formal, the material, the efficient and the final. The formal cause is the object of imitation *i.e.* action, the material cause is the medium of imitation *i.e.* language, the efficient cause is the manner of imitation *i.e.* dramatic rather than narrative, and the final cause is the function of tragedy *i.e.* catharsis of pity and fear.

Let us first take up the medium of imitation which refers to the elements from which the work of art is created. Just as the carpenter uses wood as his material in order to make a chair, the poet uses language as the medium to describe a chair. Aristotle divides the imitative arts into various categories according to their means of imitation :

> For as there are persons who, by conscious art or mere habit, imitate and represent various objects through the medium of colour and form, or again by the voice; so in the arts above mentioned, taken as a whole, the imitation is produced by rhythm, language, or 'harmony' either singly or combined.[12]

For the imitation the means, mentioned above, are colour, form and voice. Voice is further analysed into rhythm, language or harmony used either separately or in combinations.

There is a fundamental difference between Plato and Aristotle in their approach to the means of imitation. Plato based his account of imitation on the paradigm of the painter who perceives colour and form in an object of art and gives a literal

representation to it. Aristotle however, considered painting to be the lowest kind of mimetic art. He gave importance to music which, in his opinion, was the highest mimetic art form.

Music uses 'rhythm plus harmony' as the means of imitation, as is evident from the music of the flute and the lyre. Aristotle considered music to be the most 'imitative' or representative of the arts, as it is "the express image and reflexion of moral character...Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character. Music in reflecting character moulds and influences it"[13].

Aristotle considered poetry also to be an art and its means of imitation is language *i.e.* words with their meanings. The distinction between the painter and the poet in connection with their means of imitation is quite obvious. Whereas the painter uses colour and form, the poet, as David Daiches has pointed out "uses words in their denotative, connotative, rhythmic, and musical aspects"[14]. Aristotle, however, finds that in his time there was no such common term which could convey the modern meaning of the word 'literature', and which could be applied to all the ways of employing language whether in prose or in verse :

> There is another art which imitates by means of language alone, and that either in prose or verse—which verse, again, may either combine different metres or consists of but one kind—but this has hitherto been without a name. For there is no common term we would apply to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues on the one hand; and, on the other, to poetic imitations in iambic, elegiac or any similar metre.[15]

In order to illustrate his point of view, Aristotle refers to different kinds of literary composition which had not so far been placed under a common category :—(*i*) The mimes of

Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues which were of course prose compositions of a dramtic or semi-dramatic character. Mime in ancient Greece was something like a *genre* picture, a depiction-usually humorous—of the scenes and characters of ordinary life. (*ii*) Verse compositions either written in a single metre or in different metres. What is the implicit suggestion of the passage quoted above? Aristotle clearly wants to suggest that "the meaning of the word 'poet' should be widened so as to include any writer, either in prose or verse, whose work is an 'imitation' within the aesthetic meaning of the term".[16]

The inclusion of 'Socratic dialogues' in the category of 'nameless art' is something very remarkable. Almost all commentators are of the opinion that 'Socratic dialogues' refer to the dialogues of Plato. Aristotle considered the dialogues of Plato to be a form of poetic art, as they use imitation. The reference to Platonic dialogues is certainly an ironic one in the sense that Plato had banished poets from his ideal Republic. Aristotle seems to suggest that instead of banishing poets from his ideal state Plato should rather have banished himself.

Aristotle, while discussing the nameless art, points out that people normally consider metre as a distinguishing feature for the genre of poetry. He, however, insists that it is not merely the use of metre that makes a poet :

> People do, indeed, aad the word 'maker' or 'poet' to the name of the metre, and speak of elegiac poets, or epic (that is, hexameter) poets, as if it were not the imitation that makes the poet, but the verse that entitles them all indiscriminately to the name. Even when a treatise on medicine or natural science is brought out in verse, the name of poet is by custom given to the author; and yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common but the metre, so that it would be right to call the one poet, the other physicist rather than poet.[17]

The essence of poetry, says Aristotle, lies in the 'imitation' of idea rather than the metrical composition. The use of metre

only serves to differentiate kinds of imitation. The dialogues of Plato, though written in prose, are considered to be poetry, whereas versification of physical and medical treatises by Empedocles, who was a famous Sicilian philosopher and scientist in the fifth century B.C., did not entitle him to the status of a poet. Aristotle later admits that though metre is not an essential feature of poetry, its use will certainly enhance the charm and beauty of poetry.

After classification of 'nameless art' into prose and verse and further subdivision of the verse into works using one metre throughout and those using a variety of metres, Aristotle considers some arts which use all the three means of imitation-rhythm, harmony and language. Whereas Dithyrambic and Nomic[18] poetry use all the three means simultaneously, tragedy and comedy u e them separately. The episodes of a Greek drama use language alone, but the choral parts require rhythm and harmony both. Aristotle concludes the first chapter of his *Poetics* by saying : "Such, then, are the differences of the arts with respect to the medium of imitation".[19]

(*ii*) Objects of imitation

Since the medium of imitation is not sufficient to differentiate the literary forms using the same means such as the mimes of Sophron and the Socratic dialogues or comedy and tragedy, the basic purpose of the second chapter is to show how works of art using the same means can be differentiated through the 'objects of imitation'. Aristotle points out the the objects to be imitated in all arts are 'men in action'—neither static men without any growth nor inanimate beings-in-action :

> Since the objects of imitation are men in action, and these men must be either of a higher or lower type (for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral differences), it follows that we must represent men either as better than in real life, or as worse, or as they are. It is the same in painting. Polygnotus depicted men as nobler than they are, Pauson as less noble, Dionysius drew them true to life.[20]

Poetic art imitates 'men in action', that is, human actions both physical and mental, the former being the external manifestation of the latter. It originates from human life in all its varieties and manifestations, its mental processes and spiritual movements. Aristotle does not consider the whole universe to be the raw material of art. Animals and landscapes are not supposed to be the objects of aesthetic imitation. They appear in a work of art only as a background in order to heighten and intensify the human interest.

The terms *spoudaios* and *phaulos* which occur in the first sentence of chapter II, in connection with the different categories of human beings, have been variously translated. They have been translated as *good* and *bad*, *noble* and *base*, or *serious* and *trivial*. Each translation has its own merits and demerits. *Good* and *bad* are the most appropriate translations if we presume that Aristotle's considerations are explicitly ethical. But then two problems arise. First, if we consider Aristotle to be ethical, it would ultimately lead to the false moralising of his *Poetics*. Aristotle nowhere suggests that dramas should preach morality. Secondly, and more importantly, many of the protagonists in Greek plays such as Ajax, Prometheus, Media and Oedipus are seldom *good* or *bad* in the moral senes of the term.

The translations *noble* and *base* became popular during the period of Renaissance when tragedy was supposed to be concerned with kings and princes and comedy with the lower and middle class people. This was not infact the intention of Aristotle. If these terms, however, are interpreted in the wider sense, they may convey the real meaning. *Noble* may stand for 'larger than life' or 'majestic' and *base* the opposite of it.

The terms *serious* and *trivial* refer to the general distinction between tragedy and comedy. Aristotle in chapter XIII is willing to consider *Iphigenia in Tauris* with a happy ending as an ideal tragedy, though many would prefer to regard it as a comedy on the basis of its ending. If the structure of the drama is not able to differentiate tragedy from comedy, then inherent qualities should do it. Tragedy and comedy are to be

differentiated on the basis of their objects of imitation. In tragedy 'men in action' are obviously 'serious', while those of comedy 'trivial'. In chapter IV Aristotle has rightly pointed out :

> The graver spirits imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men. The more trivial sort imitated the actions of meaner persons, at first composing satires, as the former did hymns to the gods and the praises of famous man.[21]

The translation as *serious* and *trivial* conforms to the Greek pratice to a very great extent, as though Medea may not be good, her involvement is definitely serious. No translation of these terms, however, is fully satisfactory, as, says Hardison, "Aristotle himself had no terms adequate to c pe with the complex mixture of qualities embodied in Greek tragedy. Lacking an adequate terminology, he had to be satisfied with an approximate description".[22]

There is another point of controversy which has been explored at some sustained length by an eminent critic Gerald F. Else. On the basis of both textual and historical evidence he is fully convinced that there is a systematic set of interpolation in chapter II of the *Poetics*. In his opinion Aristotle recognizes only two categories—"better than" and "worse than" and the "like" category had been added by Hellenistic scholars, which was ultimately incorporated into the text. Else's arguments are based on the fact that Aristotle generally ignores the "like" category in Chapter IV while discussing the history of poetic forms. Moreover in discussing his theory of moral character, Aristotle points out in his *Nicomachean Ethics* :

> It is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre players are produced .....This, then, is the case with the virtue also ; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust.[23]

Else, therefore, draws the conclusion that the objects of imitation are either good or bad. There is no third category

but only a dividing line between them. There are, however, other critics like Butcher and Bywater who accept the text as it is and do not consider the third category as an interpolation. They are of the opinion that Aristotle retains the third category while mentioning painting, dancing, music or 'nameless art' in chapter II. Referring to the painter's objects of imitation Aristotle says :

> Polygnotus depicted men as nobler than they are Pauson as less noble, Dionysus drew them true to life[24].

Or again, while discussing the object of nameless art's imitation Aristotle clearly states :

> So again in language, whether prose or verse unaccompanied by music. Homer, for example, makes men better than they are ; Cleophon as they are ; Hegemon the Thasian, the inventor of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Deiliad, worse than they are[25].

Since Aristotle refers to Cleophon who was known as a dramatic or an epic writer and who depicted the things as they were, it is quite reasonable to suppose that Aristotle had retained the third category.

(*iii*) **Manner of Imitation**

After discussing the means of imitation and the objects of imitation, Aristotle now turns to the exploration of the manner of imitation in chapter III of his *Poetics*. Even if the means and the objects of imitation are the same, the subject may be treated in different manners :

> There is still a third difference—the manner in which each of these objects may be imitated. For the medium being the same and the objects the same, the poet may imitate by narration—in which case he can either take another personality as Homer does, or speak in his own person, unchanged—or he may present all his characters as living and moving before us[26].

Aristotle introduces three manners of imitation—(*i*) one may assume another personality as Homer does in his epic; (*ii*) one may give expression to his feelings at the personal level without making any alteration throughout as in Dithyramb; (*iii*) one may represent the whole story dramatically so that his characters may appear as living and moving creatures as in tragedy and comedy.

Chapter III retains the same order as was earlier established in chapter I moving from narrative to dithyramb to drama. Aristotle, by retaining the same order, anticipates the brief history of drama which was to be discussed in chapter IV. Homer was the first Epic writer who discovered a dramatic method but gave a representation through recital. Dithyrambic poets composed their works "in their own persons", though their compositions were presented on the stage through a chorus Drama, as the most effective form of expression, emerged at last and combined Homeric dialogue technique with Dithyrambic way of presentation.

We, thus, see that these three—means, objects and manner—are the lines of differentiation which distinguish artistic imitation. Out of the six parts of tragedy three elements—plot, character and thought are to be determined by the object of imitation, two elements—diction and melody—by the means of imitation and the last element-spectacle—by the manner of imitation. It is, however, to be noticed that none of them alone is sufficient to differentiate a work of art. So far as the means of imitation is concerned, poetry is not different from the scientific treatise written in verse, as both imitate through language. We cannot differentiate epic from tragedy on the basis of the object of imitation, as both imitate higher types of character. Similarly we cannot distinguish comedy and tragedy on the ground of the manner of imitation, as both adopt the dramatic manner of presentation. We should, therefore, apply all three lines of differentation to a given work of art, as one line of differentiation alone is not enough. Elder Olson's remark is quite pertinent to recall : "A saw for instance, does not exist simply because of its metal, or because of the saw—

maker, or because of a certain shape although without these the saw would not exist."[27]

Aristotle in chapter IV of his *Poetics* deals with the origin and function of imitation. Poetry seems to have originated from two 'natural causes' which are lying deep in human nature :

> Poetry in general seems to have sprung from two causes, each of them lying deep in our nature. First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and t roug imitation learns his earliest lessons ; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated......Imitation, then, is one instinct of our nature. Next, there is the instinct for 'harmony' and rhythm, metres being manifestly sections of rhythm. Persons, therefore, starting with this natural gift developed by degrees their special aptitudes, till their rude improvisations gave birth to poetry.[28]

Man is the most imitative of all animals and his proneness to imitation leads him to the realisation of pleasure, which is the basic element of imitative art. Poetry or more strictly dramatic poetry, originates from two human instincts (*i*) the poet's instinct for imitation and (*ii*) his instinctive pleasure in harmony and rhythm.

When Aristotle says that the imitative faculty is innate in human beings, he is using the word 'imitation' in the sense of 'emulation'. We learn 'our first lessons' by emulating others. The instinct for emulation stimulates the acquisition of the wonders of the world. The word 'imitation' also refers to "a formal and intellectual appreciation of similarity in difference, which is also productive of wonder and pleasure."[29] In order to substantiate our argument we may quote a passage from *Rhetoric* :

> We naturally delight in works of portrayal such as painting, sculpture, and poetry, and every object that is faithfully portrayed, even though it is unattractive in itself,

> Thus we do not take pleasure in such objects for their own sake but because we identify them by a syllogistic process of reasoning (syllogismos) and to that extent increase our knowledge.[30]

The inner connection, suggested in the above passage, between mimesis and wonder, refers to the portrayal of a work of art as an intellectual pleasure. The pleasure that we derive from the imitative works, is not the gratification of the sensual urges but the satisfaction of the intellect. It occurs only when we perceive the universal in the particular. Hardison has rightly pointed out : "Even if we have never been to the seashore, we can learn a great deal about the seagull from looking at Audubon's illustration. At the same time, as everyone knows, Audubon's paintings are works of art. They give pleasure and the source of the pleasure according to Aristotle is their communication of the universal in the particular".[31]

The concept of art as an embodiment of universals occurs again in chapter IX where Artistotle discusses the superiority of poetry to history :

> ...it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity....Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history : for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular.[32]

The process of imitation in poetry is the process of universalisation. At every stage, the unintelligible is to be made intelligible as the total intelligibility of a work of art depends upon the successful process of universalisation. Anything that is unintelligible, confused and chaotic is converted into a logical and organic form in the process of imitation in poetry. Imitation in Aristotle is a creative process which requires not only a great artistic skill but also a deep understanding of human life. The poet is of course a creative artist and not merely a versifier.

II

After discussing Aristotle's views on 'imitation', we should try to understand Bharata's concept of 'imitation', as enshrined in the *NŚ*. While defining drama in the 1st chapter of his *NŚ*, Bharata says :

> The drama as I have devised, is an imitation[33] of the actions and conducts of people, which is rich in various emotions and which depicts different situations.[34]

When Virupaksha, the leader of the demons, made a request to Brahmā, the Almighty, not to create the *Nāṭyaveda* just to please the gods at the discomfort of the demons, Brahmā, in the process of pacifying them, enunciated the theory of imitation. The *Nāṭyaveda*, said Brahmā, was not created just to imitate the characters and actions of the gods and the demons. It would rather be an imitation of the emotions, situations and actions of the three worlds. Elaborating it further Brahmā pointed out that drama should imitate "the feelings, emotions, sentiments, situations and the actions of the seven continents"[35]. It is, of course, very difficult to find such a wide range of dramatic representation in the whole history of dramatic theory.

It is, however, unfortunate that no commentary on Bharata's *NŚ*—except that of Abhinavagupta is available to us. Though there are scattered remarks quoted or discussed by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhārati*, it is risky to build up a complete theory about those critics, as it is just possible that Abhinavagupta might have quoted those portions of their comments which would have served his purpose. But since these is no other alternative to know these commentator's views, we have to depend on *Abhinavabhārati*.

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, one of the earliest commentators on Bharata, admits that drama consists of an imitative activity. He seems to be a monistic Vedantic theorist and tries to give the suggestion of superimposition (*āropa*) in his theory of drama. He explains it by the perception of snake in a rope in the dim

light. Since there is much similarity between a snake and a rope, snakeness is superimposed upon the rope and it has all the effects of perception of a snake on the observers such as fear, trembling and running away, etc. Spectators visit theatres and are delighted at the sight of, for example, the love of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā. Though in the play house there are neither historical Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā nor the real bank of Mālini, actors imitate them with such competence that the spectators identify them with the originals. If the observer can perceive a snake in a rope under certain circumstances, why cannot the spectators take the actors to be real Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā for the time being and have the same sensations as the real persons would have aroused ?

Acārya Saṅkuka, the next commentator on Bharata, however, does not agree with the views of Lollata that imitation is an erroneous cognition. He points out that we cannot explain the dramatic experience by the experience of a snake in a rope and cannot compare aesthetic cognition with any other logical cognition. He asserts that there is difference between the dramatic experience and the experience of the real world, as the real world is either pleasant or painful or indifferent or mixed, whereas the dramatic world is a delightful experience. This delightful experience is brought about through the process of imitation as the actors imitate the Determinants through the power of the verse, the consequents through their skill and the Transitory Mental States through their ability to reproduce them on the stage. The spectators, however, do not believe at the time of the production of drama that the whole presentation was a false presentation. The presentation seems to them as if it is real, as they infer its reality from the skilful imitation by the various actors. Saṅkuka considers it to be the imitation (anukaraṇa) of reality in a work of art through the device of inference.

Abhinavagupta, who was the most influential commentator on Bharata's *NŚ*, does not agree with Saṅkuka's theory of imitation. In his opinion the relation of the actor with the character in the role which he plays, can approximately appear to be a resemblance, and resemblance is not necessarily an

imitation. We can, for instance, perceive a similarity between a real ox and an ox-like species (gavaya), but that is not on account of one's imitation of the other but due to their resemblance in certain physical features which they inherit in common. Only a resemblance of certain qualities of Rāma in the actor would not move the spectators at all. Moreover the statement that "That is Rāma" is not applicable to any specific actor as several actors may play the role of the same Rāma on different occasions.

Abhinavagupta points out that Bharata considers drama to be an imitation but not in the sense of replica or mimicry. Drama should neither praise the gods nor condemn the demons exclusively. It is, of course, a significant branch of the Vedas, known as the Nāṭyaveda, which tries to instruct the people in a pleasing manner. Drama, while illustrating the principle that governs the world, tries to utilize all the faculties of human knowledge, wise maxims, arts, crafts and learnings. It "teaches duty to those who go against duty, love to those who are eagre for its fulfilment, chastises the ill-bred and the unruly, promotes self-restraint in the disciplined, gives courage to cowards, energy to heroes and enlightenment to men of poor intellect, and so on"[36].

Abhinavagupta, therefore, points out that Bharata's concept of drama does not mean merely a replica or exact representation of a man's affairs, as it will not please the spectators who will consider it to be some one else's private affairs. Moreover, it would not be proper on the part of the dramatist to expose the personal life of an individual. That is why Bharata clearly says that neither the contemporary themes should be taken up for dramatic presentation nor the past events in their original forms should be represented on the stage.

We should not try to interpret Bharata's terms 'anukaraṇa' and 'anukṛti' in their literal contexts only. Drama is, of course, different from the literal transcript of the actions and events of the three worlds. It is, infact, a re-perception, a re-formation or a re-creation through the transformation of events in accordance with the principles of universalisation. The theme of drama may be non-ordinary but it should never be unnatural.

Abhinavagupta's comments on Bharata's *NŚ* clearly reveal that imitation in a work of art cannot mean a photographic reproduction of life, or a kind of copying or merely a display of similarity or resemblance. The dramatist, while conceiving and developing events, situations, characters and their physical and emotional reactions, has to depend on his own knowledge and the knowledge of the world as well. He imitates human conduct and the experiences of human life in order to make his presentation life-like and convincing.

The dramatist's observations and experiences, while passing through the alchemy of imagination, appear before us as a work of art. The dramatist, through the process of imitation, concretises his reactions to the world around him. Whatever he creates is a new thing although it is based on his knowledge and experience of the human life. The work of art, through the process of the fusion of the different sets of human experiences, finally emerges as a new creation which is instructive and delightful to the readers or spectators. Indian tradition, therefore, equates the poet with Brahmā, the creator of the universe-*Kavir manisi paribhu svayambhu.* Like the divine creator, poet can create a world of his own and his creation is not to be governed by the laws of Nature.

In the eighth chapter of the *NŚ* Bharata discusses the four-fold imitation of human life through Abhinaya or Histrionic Representation which makes the meaning of the drama clear and evokes aesthetic pleasure in the sympathetic spectators. Though here the term 'imitation' has been used in the context of the actor imitating the original character, some conclusions may be drawn as to the general concept of 'imitation' also. The fourtypes of Histrionic Representation are, namely, Gestures (āṅgika) words (vāchika), Dress and Make-up (āhārya) and Sattva (emotional states). Bharata's discussion of the gestural imitation continues upto the 13th chapter of the *NŚ*, the brief account of which is given below :

1. **Gestural or Physical Imitation.** Gestural imitation is of three kinds—the imitation of the limbs, the face, and the entire body including the various types of dance postures. These

gestural movements communicate the feelings and emotions to the spectators and help in making the meaning of the drama clear. Indian presentation of a drama is a fine blending of Nrtta, Nrtya and Nātya. Whereas Nrtta refers to the rhythmic gesture of the body and Nrtya to the gestural communication of emotion, Nātya is concerned with the creation of rasa through various devices including gestural imitation.

2. **Verbal Imitation** (Vāchika abhinaya)—Bharata has devoted five chapters (from 15th to 19th) to a systematic discussion of verbal representation. He emphatically asserts that words are the light and ultimate reality of the world as all the Sāstras and scriptures are made up of words and exist in words. Words make the language through which we think, speak or write. The supremacy and the significance of language cannot be doubted.

In the 15th chapter he refers to the appeal of language which is allied with script, letters and other grammatical rules and patterns. In addition to these rules he also discusses syllabic metres, rhythmic types and other possible metrical patterns. Bharata is of the opinion that the dramatic artists and the actors should be well-versed in these rules of prosody, as these would make them experts in verbal imitation.

In the 16th chapter Bharata discusses seventy five types of metrical patterns and cites numerous examples in order to substantiate them. Dramatists should try to cultivate ornateness, compactness and brilliance for the most affective expression of their feelings and emotions. Chapter 17 elaborates four types of figures of speech and thirteen types of metaphors. Besides these it discusses ten types of faults in dramatic construction and puts emphasis on the necessity of using different metrical patterns in order to express different moods and sentiments. Chapter 18 discusses Prakrit grammar and recitation. It also deals with the four varieties of language and seven major dialects. Dramatists should use them in accordance with the suitability of their contests.

Chapter 19 is concerned with into nation and linguistic etiquette. It suggests different modes of address to the people of different stature. The use of various devices such as accents, alaṁkāras, pauses and punctuations with rhythmic variations exemplify the process of imitative creation. We thus see that Bharata suggests various grammatical, linguistic, poetic, metrical metaphorical and prosodic principles for the proper and pleasant verbal imitation.

3. **Imitation through Costume and Make-up**—Since the successful production of a drama depends upon its extraneous representation, Bharata, discusses costume and make-up in the 23rd chapter which underlines the socio-psychological disposition and status of the different characters. The dramatic personae may communicate their feelings more effectively through these devices. Costume and make-up have been classified into four categories such as Pusta (model), alaṁkāra (decoration), angarachana (painting of limbs) and Sanjiva (utilization of living characters). Model costume includes the construction of hills, mountains, masques, shields and armours etc. While discussing the decoration of the body Bharata makes an elaborate survey of thousands of ornamental devices which are differently used in different situations and different cultures. In respect of the painting of the limbs he suggests that different colours should be used for different limbs, castes and creeds. Regarding the fourth category *i.e.* utilization of living characters, he points out that actors should try their best to identify themselves with the characters they are going to represent. It is pertinent to recall the following lines :

> As the soul casts off one body and enters into another taking the shape and temperament of the other, similarly the soul of the dramatic actor enters into the being of the person whose dress and costume he puts on.[37]

The success of the actor depends on his emotional and spiritual identification with the character whose role he is going to play. Only then can he make a character life-like and powerful. The allegation of the Western scholars that the *NŚ* is rigidly ritualistic and doctrinaire is based on their lack of pro-

per knowledge of the complete text. Bharata clearly points out that where the Shāstras are silent, public code of conduct should guide the pattern of dramatic representation.

4. **Sāttvika Imitation**—Sāttvika imitation is concerned with the psychological exploration of the insoluble mystery of human nature. In spite of the technological advancement, man has not yet been able to discover the depths of the human heart and know the relationship between mind and body. Bharata discusses the Sāttvika imitation or the imitation of psychological moods and sentiments in the sixth chapter and further elaborates it in the 24th chapter of his *NŚ*. Bharata points out that there are eight dramatic sentiments which correspond to eight sthāyibhāvas or durable psychological states. These durable psychological states are assisted by thirty three vyabhicāribhāvas or transitory emotional states in the proper realisation of aesthetic pleasure. The different emotional states lead to the different physical manifestations which reveal the inner states of their mind. The external manifestation of the eight Sattvikabhavas in the form of paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, choking or change of voice, trembling, fading or change of colour, weeping and fainting help us to understand the invisible mental states of different characters.

Bharata clearly points out that the success of a drama depends on the spiritual rapport of the actor with the character. The imitation of different rasas together with their physical manifestations is of course very significant for dramatic presentation, as the spectators experience different psychological states through introspection, inference, cultural education and racial tradition.

III

We should now compare and contrast the views of Aristotle and Bharata on the theory of 'imitation', as it would lead to a better understanding of the two great theorists. Both the theorists agree that the term 'imitation' does not mean merely a photographic representation of human life or a literal transcript of reality but a higher reality which is nothing but an

'idealised representation of human life'. Art moves through the reality of life but ultimately transcends it. The world of Nature is imperfect; the writer makes it perfect through his work of art. The beauty of Helen produced by Nature is gone but the beauty of Helen as painted by Homer, has become immortal. Poetry creates beauty, truth and goodness which is rarely seen in the world of Nature. The writer infact becomes a prophet or a divine seer. Imitation possesses all the essential features of creation as it is the imitation of the creative design which is not absolutely visible even in the world of Nature.

There are, however, differences between the two. Whereas Aristotle in his *Poetics* discusses poetry in general which includes dithyramb, epic, tragedy and comedy, Bharata in his *NŚ* discusses drama only. Aristotle points out that there are three modes of imitation—means of imitation, objects of imitation, and manner of imitation. Whereas the means of imitation is language, the object of imitation is 'men-in-action' and the manner of imitation is narrative or dramatic. Bharata discusses four types of imitation—(*i*) Gestural or physical imitation, (*ii*) Verbal imitation (*iii*) imitation through costume and make-up and (*iv*) Sāttvika imitation.

Let us first take up Aristotle's concept about the means of imitation. Aristotle just tells us that language is the means of imitation ; he does not try to elaborate it further. Bharata, however, does not only mention verbal imitation but devotes five chapters of his *NŚ* to its discussion at greater length. In these chapters Bharata clearly suggests various grammatical, linguistic, poetic, matrical, metaphorical and prosodic principles which are essential for the proper pleasant verbal imitation. In his opinion language is the ultimate reality of the world, as we cannot think, speak or write without language.

So far as the object of imitation is concerned, Bharata's concept has a greater scope than Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle's object of imitation is 'men-in-action', Bharata's object of imitation is the whole universe. There is nothing in the three worlds, the Earth, the Heaven and the nether world which the writer

cannot imitate. Referring to the distinction between Bharata and Aristotle in their object of imitation, A.B. Keith has pointed out :

> The doctrine that the drama is an imitation (anukrti) does not differ from the doctrine of Mimesis, but there is an essential distinction in what is imitated or represented; in the çāstra it is a state or condition, in Aristotle it is action, a distinction absolutely in accord with the different geniuses of the two peoples.[38]

The scope of Bharata's NŚ is very broad and his theory of imitation includes action together with situations and emotional states. Bharata's concept of *sāttvika imitation* refers to the imitation of the mental states of human beings. We thus see that whereas Aristotle's object of imitation is 'action', that of Bharata it is the 'emotional states' (bhāvas). There is still another difference regarding their concept of imitation. In the opinion of Aristotle drama is born of human instinct for imitation, whereas Bharata suggests that drama is a deliberate creation in order to provide an amusement and instruction to the people.

Referring to the manner of imitation Bharata is silent, as he discusses drama only whose manner of imitation is essentially dramatic. In addition to the verbal as well as sāttvika imitation Bharata mentions two other types of imitation *i.e.* Gestural or physical imitation and imitation through costume and make-up, which are essentially related with the theatrical presentation. Aristotle, however, does not consider spectacle to be an essential element of drama. In his opinion, spectacle "is the least artistic, and connected least with the art of poetry. For the power of tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors"[39]. Aristotle is basically concerned with the essential meaning of drama rather than with the techniques of conveying that meaning to an audience. Bharata, on the other hand, is highly technical and exhaustive in discussing the techniques of his four-fold imitation in a convincing manner.

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3

Function of Drama

While making a comparative study of Aristotelian theory of 'catharsis' and Bharata's theory of 'rasa' we have to bear in mind the basic thing that both the theories have been suggested by the ancient theorists in the context of the function of drama which is to give aesthetic pleasure to the readers as well as to the spectators. Aristotle explains the same phenomenon through his concept of catharsis that Bharata does through his theory of rasa. Aristotle uses the word 'catharsis' in chapter VI of *Poetics* and promises to explain it in the Second Book of *Poetics* which has unfortunately been lost. In chapters six and seven of *NŚ* Bharata makes a comprehensive study of his theory of rasa which is perhaps the greatest landmark in the history of Indian aesthetics.

I

Let us first discuss Aristotle's concept of catharsis. In Book X of *Republic* Plato had accused poetry of feeding and watering the passions instead of drying them up. Aristotle did not agree with this view and firmly stated that poetry, instead of nourishing the passions, provides for them a harmless and easy outlet. Aristotle, in order to justify his argument, suggested the theory of 'catharsis' which is supposed to be an answer to the Platonic indictment. His theory of catharsis, however, has led to a good deal of controversy among the critics and commentators in the Western world. As Gerald F. Else has pointed out, it is "one of the biggest of the 'big' ideas in the field of aesthetics and

criticism, the Mt. Everest or Kilimanjaro that looms on all literary horizons"[1].

Aristotle uses the term 'catharsis' in his definition of tragedy in chapter VI of *Poetics* :

> Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude ; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play ; in the form of action, not of narrative ; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.[2]

The catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy has generated a historic discussion, as in the last three hundred years we have had a great many and sometimes strange translations which have created a good deal of confusion among the readers. Since the formal discussion of catharsis, as promised by Aristotle in his *Poetics*, is not available to us, we may understand and interpret catharsis by making references to certain passages in Aristotle's other works or to the then treatises by other writers.

Some critics like Minturno, Thomas Twining, H. Veil and J. Bernays have interpreted 'catharsis' as purgation in the sense of a medical metaphor. Just as medicine operates on the body, tragedy operates on the mind to cleanse it. The German scholars Weil and Bernays drew attention to the passage on music in Aristotle's *Politics* which throws some light on the process of tragic catharsis. In chapter 7 of Book VIII of his *Politics* Aristotle considers catharsis to be one of the most important aspects in human life. There are certain emotions such as pity and fear which arise in some degree in every individual and sometimes take a disquieting proportion in some of us. Just as music has the soothing effect restoring people to a normal state of mind, those suffering from excess of pity and fear need a pleasurable relief from the excesses of these emotions. It is better to quote the original passage from the *Politics* :

> ...as we say that music ought to be employed not for the purpose of one benefit tha it confers but on account of

> several (for it serves the purpose both of education and of purgation—the term purgation we use for the present without explanation, but we will return to discuss the meaning that we give to it more explicitly in our trea.ise on poetry[3]—and thirdly it serves for amusement, serving to relax our tension and to give rest from it), it is clear that we should employ all the harmonies, yet not employ them all in the same way, but use the most ethical ones for education, and the active and the passinate kinds for listening to when others are performing (for any experience that occurs violently in some souls is found in all, though with different degrees of intensity—for example, pity and fear, and also religious excitement ; for some persons are very liable to this form of emotion, and under the influence of sacred music we see these people, when they use tunes that violently arouse the soul, being thrown into a state as if they had received medicinal treatment and taken a purge ; the same experience then must come also to the compassionate and the timid and the other emotional people generally in such degree as befalls each individual of these classes, and all must undergo a purgation and a pleasant feeling of relief ; and similarly also the purgative melodies afford harmless delight to people).[4]

The above passage which deals with the operation of tumultuous melodies, gives a hint to the meaning of 'catharsis' in his *Poetics*. In the opinion of Aristotle the objective of music is three-fold. It serves the purpose of education, relexation and purgation. Purgation is nothing but 'catharsis' which refers to a process of the cleansing of some baser elements, which, if allowed to stagnate, would lead to an unhealthy growth of the body. Hence the ancient theory of medicine suggested the expulsion of morbid humours from the body and that was known as catharsis. Bywater took a hint from it and connected it with the catharsis of tragedy "Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men they are present in a disquieting degree. With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity ; but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a *catharsis* to lighten

and relieve the soul of the accumulated emotion within it ; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief"[5].

Bernay's and Bywater's interpretations of catharsis, however, are not fully acceptable to the modern critics like Gerald Else[6] and Leon Golden[7] who raise some doubts regarding their authenticity or methodological accuracy :

(*i*) Does Aristotle want to suggest that tragedy is a sort of hospital meant for curing such patients who are suffering from an excess of pity and fear ? Is tragedy a greater requirement for such people who suffer from an excess of disturbing emotions of pity and fear rather than with normal and healthy people ? It is not infact convincing to us that tragedy is more appealing to a particular sort of people, those who are having a morbid temperament. There is not a word in the *Poetics* which suggests that the purpose of tragedy is to cure or alleviate pathological states. On the other hand, as Else has pointed out, "It is evident in every line of the work that Aristotle is presupposing *normal* auditors, normal states of mind and feeling, normal emotional and aesthetic experience."[8]

(*ii*) Bernay's concept of the *musical* catharsis and its application to the sphere of tragedy does not appear to be very convincing, as Aristotle does not give much importance to music while explaining the art of tragedy. Moreover whereas music can be enjoyed only when it is played in the theatre, there is no such restriction regarding the art of tragedy. Aristotle is fully confident that tragedy can be enjoyed even by reading and without its actual performance in the theatre.

(*iii*) Bernays's method of explaining the term 'catharsis' in *Poetics* in the light of its use in Aristotle's *Politics* is not very logical and convincing, as the mere use of the same word in different texts cannot ensure the identical meaning. Richard Mckeon challenges the procedure of Bernays very emphatically in the following lines :

> To cite what is said concerning art in the *Politics* in refutation or in expansion of what is said on the same subject in the *Poetics*, without recognizing that the one is a political utterance, the other an aesthetic utterance, would be an error comparable to looking for evolution or refutation between the statements of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, without recognizing that the one has reference to a perfect state, the other to a state possible to men as they are.[9]

Since the nature or objective of the *Poetics* and *Politics* is much different, it would be a fatal error to find out the identity of meaning between two different texts. Whereas the objective of *Politics* is utilitarian, that of *Poetics* is aesthetic.

There may be controversy over the total acceptance of their interpretation of the theory of catharsis, it is now an accepted fact that passions are aroused in order to be purged. But then the problem is as to how this purgation takes place. The Renaissance commentators on the *Poetics* were of the opinion that Aristotle, while suggesting the theory of catharsis, had in mind the ancient theory of homeopathic treatment, which is *similia similibus curanter*, i.e. like curing the like. John Milton also compares the process of catharsis with the process of homoepathic treatment, where heat is applied to reduce the fever and cold is used to relieve chills. It is evident from his statement in an essay on "Of that Sort of Dramatic Poem which is call'd Tragedy".

> Tragedy, as it was antiently compos'd, hath been ever held the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other Poems : therefore said by Aristotle to be of power by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such like passions, that is to temper and reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight, stirr'd up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion : for so in psychic things of melancholic hue and quality are us'd against melancholy, sowr against sowr, salt to remove salt humours.[10]

Plato too seems to have been aware of how music reduces morbid 'enthusiasm' under the same principle, as is evident from chapter VIII of his *Republic*. In ch. VII of *Laws* where he is discussing the rules for the proper nourishment of the infants, he suggests that nurses may lull their infants to sleep not by calm and peace but by perpectual motion in their arms. In his opinion an external agitation is needed in order to pacify the internal commotion. Plato's application of this principle was confined to music and the useful art of nursing only. Aristotle, however, enlarged its scope and applied his principle to tragedy also.

The idea of 'catharsis' as a medical metaphor was not unknown to the later Greek writers.[11] Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus used the term 'catharsis' in the context of music and Iamblicus and Proclus used it with reference to drama. Plutarch mentions the dirges at funerals, which, though initially excite the grief of the mourners, ultimately work off their agony. Aristides Quintilianus, who seems to be distinctly Aristotelian in approach, talks of the cathartic effect of music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries. Iamblicus, who tries to illustrate the Aristotelian theory of 'catharsis', does not by catharsis mean elimination but the moderation of the passions. He points out that the passions cannot be suppressed for a very long time as they need an occasional outlet for the calm and peace of mind. We like to see a drama as it helps us in working off our excessive emotions. Proclus discusses the dramatic catharsis in his commentary on Plato's *Republic*. In his opinion the drama serves a very useful purpose by providing an outlet for such emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their genuine claims are not satisfied with the help of theatrical performance from time to time.

The homoeopathic theory of catharsis became very popular in the twentieth century under the impact of modern psychology according to which suppressed feelings and emotions have to be given an outlet, otherwise they would lead to various complexes. Freud and Breur pointed out that patients can be cured of their neurotic symptoms by enabling them to recall their painful

and frustrating childhood experiences. They called this the 'cathartic' method, which leads to the 'purgation' of painful childhood experiences.

F.L. Lucas, a modern critic, is fully convinced that Aristotle uses 'catharsis' as a medical metaphor, as he was the son of a court physician. On account of later changes in medical thought, however, the word 'purgation' has led to a good deal of misunderstanding among the modern critics. In the context of modern medical concept, 'purgation' refers to the 'complete' evacuation of waste products. The question that naturally arises, is : Does 'catharsis' mean 'complete' evacuation of our passions and emotions in a tragedy ? It is neither practicable nor even desirable. Lucas, therefore, points out that Aristotelian catharsis does not mean 'purgation' in the modern context but in the older wider context which referred to the evacuation of 'excess' humours. Hippocrates had also stated that the health of body and mind depended on the proper balance of these humours. The purgation of 'superfluous emotional impulses' is therefore known as 'catharsis'. Aristotelian meaning of catharsis is properly conveyed through the statement of Shakespeare's Richard II : "Let us purge this choller without letting blood". Lucas takes further hint from Aristotle's disciple Theophrastus's application of catharsis to the prunning of trees and finally concludes that the catharsis of such passions does not mean that "passions are purified and ennobled, nice as that might be ; it does not mean that men are purged of their passions ; it means simply that the passions themselves are reduced to a healthy, balanced proportion"[12].

There are, however, some critics such as Corneille, Racine and Lessing who suggest the purification theory of catharsis and point out that catharsis is not a medical but a religious metaphor which refers to "the religious rite of purification whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin."[13] Those who advocate this purification theory, prefer to translate the catharsis clause as "catharsis of such (rather than 'these') emotion", which refers to the emotions of pity and fear as the representative of the whole range of emotions which may have an adverse effect, if not 'purified'.

The purification theory suggests that emotions should not be 'driven out'; they should rather be 'purified' for the healthy state of mind. The emotions are to be purified rather than purged in order to restore a healthy emotional equilibrium.

In the eighteenth century Lessing was the most distinguished exponent of this theory of catharsis, which is considered by Leon Golden[14] as the theory of 'moral purification'. Lessing[15] in *Hamburgische Dramaturgic* (1769) stated that in order to purify the emotions of pity and fear, tragedy, by the frequent excitement of these emotions, gradually tries to weaken their force and reduce them to just measure. Lessing got the support for his theory from a passage in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which is as follows :

> If therefore the way in which every art or science performs its work well is by looking to the mean and applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a perfect work or art, that you could not take from it nor add to it-meaning that excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue, for this is concerned with emotions, and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean. For example, one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience pleasure and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue.[16]

It is evident from the above passage that the function of tragedy is to purify us from both the extremes of pity, fear and similar other emotions, and enable us to adopt the mean and reasonable course of action.

Lessing's whole theory of purification, however, is open to many serious objections, as Bywater[17] has pointed out :

(*i*) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling.

(*ii*) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'.

(*iii*) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece ; the performance of tragedy was too occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers.

(*iv*) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling ; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (*e.g.* pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits, as Aristotle himself has stated in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, arise from corresponding activities :

> In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities. Hence it is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions.[18]

We would expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by tragedy would, if habitualised by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of catharsis is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher of morality.

During the Renaissance Robortello and Castelvetro suggested a different theory of purification[19]. They pointed out that tragedy enables us to harden or 'temper' our emotions. They compared the spectators in the theatre with the soldiers on the battlefield or the surgeons in the operation theatre. The emotions of pity and fear are reduced to moderation in the spectator, soldier or the surgeon, as they are accustomed to those piteous and fearful objects that occasion them.

Thomas Taylor in his introduction to the *Poetics*, published in 1818, gives expression to his concept of moral purification :

> .. according to the modern commentators on this treatise, the meaning of Aristotle is that the terror and pity excited by the tragedy purify the spectator from terror and pity. ...This cannot be the meaning of Aristotle, as it contradicts what he asserts in his *Ethics*...Aristotle meant to say, that *the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form catastrophe of the tragedy.* Thus in the Ajax of Sophocles, the terror and pity excited by the catastrophe purify the spectator from anger and impiety towards divinity ; and in a similar manner purification is affected in other tragedies.[20]

In the opinion of Taylor purification of pity and fear refers to the purification from those perturbations which happen in the fable and become the cause of fatal event in the drama. Sophocles first tried to excite pity and fear through the character of Ajax and thereby wanted a purification from anger and impiety towards divinity, as these had led to Ajax's misfortunes in the drama.

Though Butcher pays lip service to the theory of purgation, his leaning towards the theory of purification is clearly revealed. In his opinion there are certain morbid and disturbing elements in our emotions of pity and fear in real life. When we pass through the process of tragic excitation, we get an emotional relief as the disturbing elements of our emotions are thrown off. Butcher remarks :

> Let us assume then that the tragic *Katharsis* involves not only the idea of an emotional relief, but the further idea of the purifying of the emotions so relieved.... In order that an emotion may be not only excited but also allayed,—that the tumult of the mind may be resolved into a pleasurable calm,—the emotion stirred by a fictitious representation must divest itself of its purely selfish and material elements, and become part of a new order of things.[21]

Though Aristotle does not use the word 'catharsis' any more in the technical and special sense in which he uses it in chapter VI of his *Poetics*, he does mention it once more in chapter XVII also. While discussing the plot of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* he uses the word 'catharsis' for the 'purification' of Orestes which "means ceremonial purification from a religious impurity".[22]

I.A. Richards has added a new dimension to the purification theory of catharsis. In his opinion catharsis refers to the process of harmonization of two opposite human impulses—pity and fear in a work of art. The proper balance between the op osite—pity, the impluse to approach, and fear, the impulse to repel, leads ultimately to the restoration of mental equilibrium on the part of the reader or the spectator. "Their union in an ordered single response", says Richards, "is the *catharsis* by which Tragedy is recognized, whether Aristotle meant anything of this kind or not. This is the explanation of that sense of release, of repose in the midst of stress, of balance and composure, given by Tragedy, for there is no other way in which such impulses, once awakened, can be set at rest without suppression"[23]. The specific function of catharsis in a tragedy is realised only when it is capable of presenting a proper blending of the emotions of pity and fear or of other allied emotions. Pity alone will tend to make the play sentimental and fear excessively awful.

The problem with both the theories—theory of purgation as well as the theory of purification—is that they are concerned

with the psychological reaction of the readers or spectators, whereas Aristotle's *Poetics* is basically concerned with the art of poetry. The third interpretation to the catharsis—clause is suggested by Gerald". F. Else who translates it as the "catharsis of these incidents" He contradicts the earlier theories and suggests that there is enough material mainly in the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of the *Poetics* on the basis of which Aristotle's exact meaning can be reconstructed.

Else believes that catharsis is basically an artistic rather than a psychological process. He considers it as an element in the structure of the plot itself. In his opinion the use of the preposition in the catharsis-clause "can perfectly well mean 'through (a sequence of), in the course of', referring not to an emotional end-effect with which we leave the theatre, but to pity and fear as they are incorporated in the structure ('Built into the events', *i.e.* woven into the plot) of the play by the poet".[24] Catharsis takes place primarily in the tragedy when it is composed rather than in the spectator who sees it performed in the theatre. Else raises the question as to what now 'carries forward' the purification through the course of the play ? and himself gives the answer :

> Not the text, as a body of words, or the performance of the text in a theatre, but the *process of imitation* which tragedy essentially is...The purification, then, is carried forward by the plot, the 'structure of events' which is the poet's own indispensable contribution to the play.[25]

On the basis of these observations by Else we may draw the following ten ative conclusions in connection with catharsis :

(*i*) The purification in a tragedy is not the purification of pity and fear but the purification of the fatal or painful act which is the main ingredient of tragedy.

(*ii*) Purification is not brought about through pity and fear but through a sequence of pathetic and fearful incidents, as is evident from 13th chapter of the *Poetics.*

(*iii*) Purification does not occur through the text or the presentation of the text in the theatre but through the *process of imitation* which is the fundamental contribution of the dramatist.

Now the question is : what purpose does catharsis serve in the drama ? The purpose of catharsis is served when the reader or the spectator is convinced that the tragic act of the hero has been purified. Elaborating it further Else has stated :

> The purification, that is, the proof of the purity of hero's motive in performing an otherwise 'unclean' act is presented to him, and his conscience accepts and certifies it to his emotions, issues a licence, so to speak, which says : "you may pity this man, for he is like us, a good man rather than a bad, and he is free of pollution".[26]

There are so many characters in Greek tragedies such as Oedipus, Alomeon, Orestes, Medea and Heracles etc., who have killed their dear ones—father, mother or children. Their acts or even their intentions normally seem to be impure or even contemptible. Who can pity Oedipus who has killed his father and married his mother or Medea who has killed her children ? The tragic act of these characters gets purified when we find them placed in such circumstances where they are forced to commit it. We can pity them only when it is established beyond doubt that they committed the fatal crime on account of some *hamartia* in their character, though their intentions were never bad.

Now the question is : how does catharsis operate in the drama ? Else suggests that it operates with the help of the structure of the events. From the very development of the drama *Oedipus, the king*, it becomes evident that the hero does not willingly kill his father and marry his mother. The innocence of his motive is discovered when we find Oedipus blinding himself and bitterly repenting over what he had done. This ultimately convinces us about the 'purity' of his motive and we pity Oedipus for the misfortune which he does not really deserve. Recognition in a drama is the structural device which

enables the hero to prove that his intention was not impure or abhorrent. Else, therefore, points out that "the catharsis is not a change or end-product in the spectator's soul, or in the fear and pity (*i.e.* the dispositions to them) in his soul, but a process carried forward in the emotional material of the play by its structural elements, above all, by the recognition"[27]. The purification of the hero's fatal act is possible only when it is proved by the whole structure of the drama that his intention was pure and noble. Leon Golden, therefore, has rightly regarded this theory of catharsis as the theory of 'structural purification in which the development of the plot purifies the tragic deed of its moral pollution and thus allows the audience to experience the emotions of pity and fear"[28].

Aristotle repeatedly insists that the plot in a drama should be constructured in such as manner that the catharsis is 'built into' the plot itself so that the reader or the spectator may experience and enjoy it. Else's interpretation of catharsis makes it "a transitive or operational factor within the tragic structure itself, precedent to the release of pity, and ultimately of the tragic pleasure, rather than the be-all and end-all of tragedy itself"[29]. Else, thus, shifts the emphasis from the reader or the spectator to the structure of the drama itself.

Some objections, however, have been raised against the theory of Gerald Else also. The most serious objection against his theory is that he has tried to formulate it on the basis Aristotle's *Poetics* alone. Since Aristot e is a consistent thinker, we may take into account his other works such as *Politics*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric* etc. for the proper and fruitful understanding of his concept of catharsis.

Even the text of the *Poetics* too presents an obstacle to Else's interpretation, though he is fully convinced that his theory fits well into the text of the *Poetics*. There are atleast two important passages in the *Poetics* which contradict his theory of cotharsis. The first is to be found in ch. IX.

> But again, Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity.[30]

The second passage occurs in chapter XIV of the *Poetics* where Aristotle clearly says that "Fear and pity may be aroused by spectacular means..."[31]. Aristotle wants to suggest that even with the help of spectacle, pity and fear may be aroused in the spectators. Structural development of the drama is not essential for the arousal of pity and fear in the tragedy. Pity and fear may be aroused even when we visualise the spectacle of Oedipus blinding himself or Othello killing his innocent wife Desdemona.

In the light of Else's theory, certain acts such as patricide and incest which seem to be contemptible and intolerable in normal circumstances, are made tolerable and piteous under special circumstances with the help of the structural devices of the dramatist. In spite of the fact that Oedipus murders his father and marries his mother, he finally emerges as a man of integrity and he deserves our sympathy. Else's theory, however, is not applicable to all the Greek tragedies. Medea's killing of her children or Electra's urging of her brother to revenge is not ultimately purified or justified in our opinion. Milton, who had Aristotle in mind, had no intention to excuse or purify the slaughtering of God's enemies. He interpreted catharsis in the light of the reader's response and never tried to justify the fatal act, as Else has suggested. Clifford Leech has, therefore, suggested that "if Else is right, a non-Aristotelian *catharsis* has had more validity than the one that he himself devised."[32]

The later Aristotelian critics such as Golden and Hardison partly agreed and partly disagreed with Else's theory of catharsis. They agreed with Else in the sense that *Poetics* is basically concerned with the nature of tragedy and not with the reaction of the audience. They, however, disagreed with his theory of 'structural purification' and suggested the theory of 'intellectual clarification.'[33] In the opinion of Golden "tragic catharsis will emerge, convincingly, as that moment of insight and clarification towards which it is the essential nature of art to strive".[34] It is better to quote the comments of the Spanish scholar Pedro Latin-Entralgo who by his perceptive analysis has interpreted catharsis as clarification :

> Thanks to the anagnorisis the spectator knows and recognizes what *really is occurring on stage* and therefore is his own possible fate...... The *anagnorisis* represents, in short, the triumph of that deep demand for expression and clarification of the human destiny—a figurative, verbal expression and clarification—that, in the face of every possible purely musical and Dionysiac interpretation, beats deep within the breast of Attic targedy. The Poetics calls this "resolution" of the affective state of the spectator catharsis.[35]

Hardison traces the origin of this word 'clarification' in Butcher's commentary on catharsis which is concerned with the 'enhanced understanding of the events' delineated in tragedy. Its function is, says Butcher, "not merely to provide an outlet for pity and fear, but to provide for them a distinctly aesthetic satisfaction, to purify and clarify them by passing them through the medium of art"[36] The tragic writer tries to eliminate what is accidental or irrelevant so that the deeper layer of meaning may be revealed. He does this by selecting a series of pitiable or fearful incidents and then constructing the plots on the principle of probability and necessity—on the principle of what should be rather than what is. "When the spectator has witnessed a tragedy of this type", says Hardison, "he will have learned something—the incidents will be clarified in the sense that their relation in terms of universals will have become manifest—and the act of learning, says Aristotle, will be enjoyable"[37]. We are delighted to see a tragedy on account of its indwelling form of experience as well as it archetypal dimension.

Hardison in his commentary on the *Poetics* has pointed out some remarkable features of this 'clarification' theory. It is concerned with the technique of tragedy and not with the psychological reaction of the audience. It interprets catharsis in the light of Aristotle's theory of imitation discussed in chapters I-IV and the theory of probability and/or necessity as discussed in chapter IX. It also coincides with the modern aesthetic theory and there are parallels to be found in their

conclusions. The modern aestheticians like James Joyce and Austin Warren consider 'coherence' as an essential feature of a successful work of art and the aesthetic pleasure in the heart of the audience audience originates from the discovery of this 'coherence'. Aristotle's emphasis in chapter XIII of the *Poetics* on the tragic error (hammartia) reveals that tragedy enables the spectator to learn something about the relation between the hero's character and his destiny. "This will alleviate (if not eliminate)", says Hardison, "his pity and by the same token reduce his fear for himself. Note that the alleviation is a by product of the learning that produces the tragic pleasure, not its chief object".[8] Aristotle's comments in chapters IV, VI and IX refer to the experience of tragedy as a kind of "insight experience." or "clarification" which ultimately leads to the relaisation of pleasure that is known as catharis.

Without adhering to any specific school of psychopathology it is better to interpret catharsis as an aesthetic experience which, though it emanates from the work of art itself, has its reaction in the readers or the spectators too. Now the question is : what really gives us aesthetic pleasure in a tragedy ? Is it the portrayal of suffering of the hero or the painful account of the tragic events ? Neither of the two can give us aesthetic pleasure. It is rather "the presentation of a coherent action, made transparent and intelligible through artistic formulation",[39] which provides us an aesthetic pleasure. Tragedy gives us not only an emotional satisfaction but an intellectual enlightenment also. It is superior to the other forms of drama mainly because it leads us to a 'heightened awareness of life'. S. Radhakrishnan has rightly stated that "A tragedy that leaves on the mind an impression of disgust and dissatisfaction is a failure as a work of art"[40] Only a work of art which fulfils the requirements of a well structured tragedy with illuminative power can lead us to the realisation of catharsis. When we see the 'resolution at the end of the drama, we feel elevated rather than depressed. Tragedy depicts human dignity and elevation even in the midst of trial and tribulation, failure and frustration, depression and death. This sense of elevation and upliftment is the main function of tragedy which is known as catharsis.

II

While pointing out that the function of drama is to entertain as well as to instruct the spectators, Bharata mentions the word 'rasa' and explains it in chapters VI and VII of *NŚ*. It is the simplest as well as the most complicated word so far as its meaning is concerned. It is very easy to comprehend its meaning but most difficult to define it exactly. S.K. De has rightly stated that "this subtle conception of Rasa makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms 'flavour', 'relish', 'gustation', 'taste', 'geschmack' or 'saveur', for none of these renderings seems to be adequate."[41]

The word 'rasa' reveals different layers of meaning when used in different contexts. It ranges from the Aryan's drinking of the *soma* juice to the yogis' communion with the metaphysical Absolute, the Brahman. Though it frequently occurs in the vedas and the upanisads, Bharata is the first authority on the systematic study of rasa. Bharata, however, is not the original exponent of the rasa theory, as De has pointed out that "Bharata himself cites in chapters VI and VII several ślokas in the Āryā as well as is the Anustubh metres in support of his statements; and in one place, he distinctly quotes two Āryā-ślokas from a chapter of an unknown work relating to the discussion of Rasa."[42] Moreover, Bharata mentions the names of several scholars such as Kohala, Śāndilya and Vātsya etc. who had already expressed their views on the theory of rasa. Even then Bharata's *NŚ* makes a distinctly definite landmark in the history of the theory of rasa. The concept of rasa as an aesthetic principle was for the first time formulated By Bharata who suggested that the work of art has nothing to signify except the manifestation of rasa—"Nahi rasādṛte kaścidapyarthah pravartate."[43]

Let us see what Bharata says about rasa. When sages ask him, "what is this commodity called rasa" ?, he says—"That which is relished is rasa". Whether we take this work in the physical or metaphysical sense of the term, it refers to the

delightful experience of a work of art. Explaining the purpose of Bharata's rasa theory Pramod Kale has stated that it is "a framework of rules and regulations, to explain and achieve an effective communication, a rapport between the performers and the spectators"[44].

Referring to the question as to how rasa is produced, Bharata said :

'Vibhāvanubhāva - vyabhicāri - saṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ'[45]. Rasa is produced (rasa-niṣpattiḥ) from a combination (saṃyoga) of Determinants (vibhāva), Consequents (anubhāva) and Complementary Psychological States (vyabhicāribhāva). The 'saṃyoga' or combination mentioned in the Sūtra is not the combination of *vibhāva anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* among themselves, but it refers to their combination or union with the sthāyibhāva (Durable Psychological State) which has not been mentioned in the Sūtra but is to be found in the dialogue that follows it. Just as the taste results from a combination of various spices, vegetables and other articles, similarly the Durable Psychological states (Sthāyibhāva), when combined with other Psychological States, culminates into rasa wherein no constituent is experienced separately but all together are experienced as one whole having a relish different from that of any of them. In this connection S.K. De has rightly remarked :

> It is practically admitted on all hands that the Rasa is realised when a permanent mood or sthāyibhāva is brought to a relishable condition through the three elements. viz. the *vibhāva*, the *anubhāva* and the *vyabhicāribhāva*.... Those elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the sthayibhava are in poetry and drama known as vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva, although in ordinary world they may be known as mundane cause and effect (laukika kāraṇa and karya).[46]

Bharata has explained these terms —*sthāyibhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* in chapter VII of *NŚ* with full clarity and lucidity.

Sthāyibhāya (Durable Psychological State)

The word *sthāyibhāva* has been variously translated as a Permanent State[47], Durable Psychological State[48], Mental Affection[49] and Permanent Mood[50] etc. Though the term *sthāyi* does not occur in Bharata's definition of rasa, it is essential for us to elucidate it for the proper understanding of his rasa theory, as it figures in Bharata's elucidation of his Rasa-sūtra. Explaining Sthāyibhāva P.V. Kane has stated that "Sthāyibhāva (Durable Psychological State) is like the ocean which may be now and then disturbed by other *bhāvas* but always retains its own position ; so *sthāyibhāva* is that dominant mood which is not broken up altogether by other bhāvas and makes the other bhāvas subordinate to itself."[51] It cannot be subdued by another bhāva and it subsists in our mind for a long time. It is that impression in our mind which lasts even after the mental conditions have subsided. It does not lose its individuality and finally matures into rasa. In the opinion of Bharata it is like the king or the preceptor whereas other bhāvas are like subjects or pupils. It exists permanently in our mind, says R. Gnoli, "in the form of latent impressions (vāsanā) derived from actual experiences in the present life or from inherited instincts"[52] and as such it is ready to emerge into our consciousness at any moment. It gives structural unity to the whole work as it not only dominates but unifies also the entire work into an organic whole. In the opinion of Bharata there are eight Sthāyibhāvas (Durable Psychological States) :

(*i*) Love (rati), (*ii*) Laughter (hāsya), (*iii*) Sorrow (śoka), (*iv*) Anger (krodha), (*v*) Energy (utsāha), (*vi*) Fear (bhaya), (*vii*) Disgust (jugupṣā), (*viii*) Astonishment (vismaya).

Vibhāva (Determinant)

Explaining the term (*Vibhāva*) Bharata observes :

> The word vibhāva is used for the sake of clear knowledge. It is synonymous with *Kāraṇa*, *nimitta* and *hetu*. As Words, Gestures and Representation of the Sattva are *Vibhāvyte* (determined) by this, it is called *vibhāva* (Determinant).[53]

The word *vibhāva* is translated as 'determinant' as it determines the emotions and moods to be aroused in the reader or the spectator. It arouses emotions in a manner quite different from the emotions that arise in real life G.B. Mohan[54] is of the opinion that it may be described as 'objective correlative, a term used by T.S. Eliot in Western criticism. Krishna Rayan has rightly pointed out that "if Bharata's *vibhāvas* and Eliot's 'set of objects' are placed side by side, it may be difficult to recognize them as the same articles...Bharata's correlatives are the immediate sensory equivalents of the emotion—they are direct, explicit, public, conventional"[55].

There are two aspects of vibhāva—(*i*) Ālambana (Dependent) vibhāva (*ii*) Uddīpana (Excitant) vibhāva. Ālambana vibhāva is the person or the object which is primarily responsible for the arousal of emotion. If there is no Ālambana vibhāva the Sthāyibhāva, though present in its latent form, cannot confine itself on a particular object. The Uddīpana vibhāva is required only when the Sthāyibhāva has fixed itself upon a particular Ālambana vibhāva. The Uddīpana is the environment or the surrounding which stimulates the emotive effect of the focal point. An example from Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam* will make the distinction very clear. When Duṣyanta falls in love with Śakuntalā at first sight in the hermitage of Kaṇva, Śakuntalā becomes the Ālambana vibhāva and the entire scene of the forest with beautiful hermitage, pleasant breeze and fine sun-shine serves as Uddīpana vibhāva.

Anubhāva (Consequent)

Bharata explains the *anubhāva* in the following words :

> Because this *anubhāvayati* (the spectators) *i.e.* make them feel afterwards) (The effect of) the Histrionic Representation by means of Words, Gestures and Sattva, it is called anubhāva (consequent).[56]

Anubhāva is the external manifestation of the provocation of the Sthāyibhāva. It is so called because what is represented on the stage is made to be felt and experienced (anubhāvayati)

by the spectators. It is an indicator of the bhāva and communicates to the spectators the emotions felt by the characters.

Will the physical changes and movements which arise from the emergence of an emotion, are known as anubhāvas. They are of two types—(*i*) voluntary and (*ii*) involuntary. There are some changes and movements such as the movement of eyes and eyebrows which are supposed to be the voluntary or wilful expression of our emotion for its proper communication to others. There are, however, some changes such as the change of colour, horripilation and blush etc., which automatically arise following the emergence of emotion in our heart. The voluntary changes are simply known as Anubhāvas, whereas involuntary changes are considered to be the Sāttvikabhāvas. The Sāttvikabhāvas are so called as they arise from *sattva*, the very essence of our being They are of two types—internal and external. The internal Sāttvikabhāvas are regarded by Abhinavagupta as our 'chittavṛtti', whereas external Sāttvikabhāvas get revelation in the form of our physical manifestations.

Bharata[57] refers to eight Sāttvikabhāvas which are as follows : Paralysis, Perspiration, Horripilation, Change of Voice, Trembling, Change of Colour, Weeping and Fainting. Emphasizing the subtle distinction between Anubhāvas and Sāttvikabhāvas K.C. Pandey has rightly pointed out that the "eight Sāttvika Bhāvas, which are nothing more than Anubhāvas, but are classed separately, because they are involuntary, and therefore are unmistakable reflexions of inner emotive state"[58].

Vyabhicāribhāva (Complementary Psychological State) Bharata defines *Vyabhicāribhāva* as follows :

> *Vi* and *abhi* are prefixes, and the root *cara* means 'to go', 'to move'. Hence the word *Vyabhicārinah* means 'those that move in relation to Sentiments towards different (kinds of objects)'...Just as the sun carries this star, so is to be understood that the complementary Psychological State (carry the Sentiments)[59].

The *Vyabhicāribhāva* does not have an independent status of its own and it acts just as the *feeder* qf the Sthāyibhāva and strengthens it implicitly or explicitly. Its relation to the Sthāyibhāva has been compared to the beads on a thread. In the opinion of Dhanaṃjaya[60] Vyabhicāribhāvas function favourably towards the Sthāyibhāvas emerging out of, and submerging in, the Sthāyibhāvas like ripples on the surface of the ocean.

There are thirty three[61] Vyabhicāribhāvas (Complemetary Psychological States) which are follows :

Despondency (nirveda), Weakness (glāni), Apprehension (śaṅkā), Envy (asūya), Intoxication (mada), Weariness (śrama), Indolence (ālasya), Depression (dainya), Anxiety (cintā), Distraction (moha), Recollection (smṛti), Contentment (dhṛti), Shame (vrīda), Inconstancy (capalatā), Joy (harṣa), Agitation (āvega), Stupor (jaḍatā), Arrogance (garva), Despair (visāda), Impatience (autsukya), Sleeping (nidrā), Epilepsy (apasmāra), Dreaming (supta), Awakening (vibodha), Indignation (amarṣa), Dissimulation (avahitthā), Cruelty (ugratā), Assurance (mati), Disease (vyādhi), Insanity (unmāda), Death (maraṇa), Fright (tr sa). Deliberation (vitarka).

In order to illustrate) the nature of these Complementary Psychological States Haas has quoted an example from Shakespeare's *Hamlet* where the impact of Ophelia's separation on Hamlet has been vividly depicted by Polonius in Act (*ii*), scene (*ii*) :

And he repulsed—a short tale to make—
Fell into a sadness, then into a fast,
Thence to a watch, thence into a weakness,
Thence to a lightness, and by this declension
Into the madness wherein now he raves
And all we mourn for.

The frequent changes shown in the physical as well as the mental states of *Hamlet* are nothing but the vyabhicāribhāvas as described by Bharata in his *NŚ*.

We, thus, see that Bharata in *NŚ* has referred to three kinds of Psychological States—Durable Psychological States, Complementary Psychological States and Sāttvika States. There are in total forty nine Psychological States—eight Durable Psychological States, thirty three Complementary Psychological States, and eight Sāttvika States. Now the question is : why are the Durable Psychological States only converted into Sentiments and not others ? In this connection Bharata has rightly stated :

> Just as among persons having same characteristics and similar hands, feet and belley and celebrity some due to their birth, manners, learning and skill in arts and crafts, attain kingship, while others endowed with an inferior intellect become their attendants, in a similar manner, Determinants, Consequents and Complementary Psychological States become dependent on the Durable Psychological States. Being the shelter (of others) the Durable Psychological States become masters. Similarly other Psychological States (lit. feelings) reduced to subordination take shelter with them (i.e. the Durable Psychological States) due to superior marit (of the latter). Those becoming their retinue are the Complementary Psychological States.'[2]

There are some relevant questions in connection with Bharata's theory of rasa which create some difficulties in the satisfactory explanation of his Rasasūtra. Though Bharata tries to explain it clearly, it is so complex and ambiguous in connection with its central terms *samyoga* and *niṣpatti* that it has led to a good deal of controversy among the commentators. Since each commentator has given his own interpretation, it has naturally led to the emergence of a number of theories on rasa. Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, a Mimāṁsaka, has suggested the theory of *Utpatti-vāda*, Śaṅkuka, a Naiyāyika, the *anumiti-vāda*, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, a Saṁkhya, the *bhakti-vāda* and Abhinavgupta, a Shaiva, the *abhivyakti-vāda*. What is common with all these different theorists is that though they have propounded their theories in the context of poetry and drama, they have been in-

fluenced by the different schools of Indian philosophy. It is, however, to be regretted that their commentaries, except that of Abhinavagupta, are not available to us. Whatever information about the opinions of other commentators is available to us, it is available only through the contextual references of Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhārati.*

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, a commentator of 8th and 9th centuries, appears to be the earliest commentator on Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra,* though his original work has been lost. Except the brief review of his opinion by an adverse critic Abhinavagupta, nothing is known to us. We may, however, formulate his views on the basis of the existing exposition. In his opinion sthāyibhāva which is first generated by the vibhāvas, manifested by the anubhāvas and intensified by the vyabhicāri-bhāvas, finally becomes rasa. He further points out that rasa primarily exists in the original character and the actor, by his clever and successful imitation, imitates him in form, dress and action and thereby delights the spectator. P.V. Kane has beautifully summarized the views of Lollaṭa in the following passage :

> *Rasa* in the primary sense belongs to the hero, Rāma etc. (*i.e.* Rāma loves Sītā and the dramatist describes this love in appropriate words). The spectator ascribes to the actor, on account of the latter's clever acting, the same mental attitude that belonged to Rāma and the spectator's apprehension of imputed love in the actor brings to him delight. This is the meaning of the words vibhāva...... rasamiṣpaṭṭih. This view does not treat of *rasa* as a matter of the spectator's aesthetic appreciation of the inner meaning of the representation. All that Lollaṭa means is that the spectator is delighted by the fact that the actor cleverly represents by his acting that he is Rāma himself, feels the same love that the historic or legendary person Rama felt towards the heroine. The spectator is charmed by this.[63]

The actor, as Bhatta Lollata has further stated, can imitate the original character very well with the help of *anusaṁdhi* or

anusamdhāna which literally refers to the process of awaraness, recollection and reflection. The sthāyibhāva of the original character is thus superimposed on the actor and this superimposition gives pleasure to the spectator, as he is made to believe that the actor is no one but the original character itself. The actor with the help of his proper training and suitable environment on the stage so completely identifies himself with the character of the poet's conception that he moves, feels and behaves like the original character. Now the question is : why is Lollaṭa's theory known as the theory of utpattivāda ? Since rasa is produced as an effect and hence the word *nispatti* here means *utpatti*, Lollaṭa's theory is called theory of *utpattivāda*.

Some objections, however, have been raised by Śaṅkuka and others against the theory of Lollaṭa. The main objection is : how can a mental state which originally belongs to the hero, be superimposed upon the actor and how can the spectator be delighted by a feeling which is absent in his consciousness ? It is not possible for the spectator to have even a semblance of the original feeling imitated by the actor and be delighted by it. Since the spectator has never got an opportunity to see the original character, how can the sthāyibhāva of the original character be superimposed upon the actor and thereby how can the spectator realise rasa ?

The next objection against Lollata's theory is related to the distinction that he draws between sthāyibhāva and rasa. In his opinion the very sthāyibhāva becomes rasa when it is developed by vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. If the highest stage in the development of sthāyibhāva is rasa, then the problem is as to how can we believe that the Karuṇa rasa follows the same pattern ? "For, its basic emotion, the grief (śoka) by its very nature", says K.C. Pandey, "is such that it is most intense only in its first stage and diminishes with the passage of time. Therefore the talk of developing it to the highest pitch and thus converting it into Rasa is out of question"[63]. Hence Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory referring to the process of aesthetic relish is not acceptable.

In spite of its limitations there are some remarkable aspects of his theory which cannot be ignored. He is the first commentator to have given a clear, systematic and scientific interpretation to Bharata's rasa theory. His opinion that it is primarily the emotion of the original character in the drama that the actor tries to communicate to the spectator, is quite remarkable. His recognition of the importance of the actor's training, skill and equipment in the process of rasa realization is fully convincing.

Śrī Śaṅkuka, who is the next commentator on Bharata's Rasa-sūtra, most probably belongs to the 9th century A.D. In his opinion rasa-realisation is a process of logical inference. The spectator relishes rasa when he infers the mood of the original character in the actor. The actor through his skilful presentation is taken up for the original character on the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse *i.e. citraturaga-nyāya*. Just as while seeing a horse in the picture, we cannot say that it is a real horse but at the same time we cannot also say that it is not a horse at all, similarly, while seeing the gesticulation of the actor on the stage we cannot say that the actor is the original character but at the same time we cannot also say that the actor is altogether different from the original character. In fact the aesthetic experience resulting out of the blending of the two different situations—real and unreal—is something very unique and the distinction between the actor and the original character now disappears for the spectator P.V. Kane has rightly pointed out that "The actor who has been well trained in the art of gesticulation cleverly simulates the actions of real heroes and the spectator apprehends for the moment the actor as non-different from the real hero and infers love (of Rāma etc.) from the Anubhāva, vyabhicāribhāva presented by the actor and mutually contemplates such love and relishes it. Here *rasa* is no doubt spoken of in relation to the spectator ; but it is said to be a matter of inference due to clever imitation"[65] This inferred mood is certainly different from the ordinary perceptions, as it has its own distinct charm and beauty.

Since Śaṅkuka's theory of rasa-realisation is considered to be the theory of inference or anumāna, it is known as the theory of *anumiti-vāda*. K.C. Pandey has suggested that since Sankuka was a Naiyāyika, he recommended the theory of inference, as inference or anumāna is one of the four sources of obtaining knowledge in our Indian philosophy. In his opinion, as K.C. Pandey has pointed out, "the basic mental state is inferred from the situation etc., which are directly perceived, such as fire, hidden in a cluster of trees at the top of a mountain, is inferred from the rising smoke"[66] When we see that the sun changes its place, we infer that there is movement in the sun, though we don't perceive it directly. This is what is known as the theory of inference or *anumiti-vāda.*

Śaṅkuka's theory of inference, however, could not be acceptable to the later commentators like Bhaṭṭa Tauta and Abhinavagupta who raised the following objections against it :—

(*i*) The theory of inference ignores the well-established fact that the inference of a thing can never give the same aesthetic pleasure as its direct cognition.

(*ii*) The knowledge of inference is an invalid knowledge in the sense that it creates a wrong impression in the mind of the spectator that the actor is the real Rāma, the original character.

(*iii*) We cannot make rasa an object of cognition with the help of the ordinary means of knowledge. Since Rāma flourished in the past, how can his feelings and emotions be directly cognized by our present sense organs ? How can the spectator relish the particular feelings of a particular hero like Rāma who is certainly different or superior to himself, as his own ?

(*iv*) While witnessing a drama the spectator is so much absorbed in the object of dramatic representation like that of a yogin who enjoys the divine bliss that he does not desire for further inference as it will obstruct the proper realisation of rasa.

(*v*) Since imitation pre-supposes an originals and no one has seen the original character, how can anyone infer from the original ? To this objection it has been suggested that historical or mythological characters whether actually observed or not, are lying deep at the popular consciousness.

In spite of these limitations Śaṅkuka's theory made some positive contribution to the exploration of Bharata's theory of rasa. In comparison to Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka recognized the more active participation of the spectator in the process of rasa realisation. He for the first time gave a philosophical interpretation to the theory of rasa and provided a solid background for its analysis.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is the next important critic of 9th century A.D. on Bharata's theory of rasa. He refutes the earlier theories and gives a new interpretation to the controversial dictum of Bharata. Referring to the limitations of the earlier theories he points out that Rasa or aesthetic emotion can neither be produced nor inferred. Words in a work of art are different from those used in ordinary expression as they are endowed with three functions, namely, *Abhidhā*, *Bhāvakatva* and *Bhojakatva.* Abhidhā is not merely Denotation but is used in an extended sense of Indication or laksaṇa also. It gives expression to the vibhāvas as well as the sthāyibhāvas. Then comes the second function known as Bhāvakatva, which, as S.K. De has pointed out, "is derived apparently from Bharata's general definition of *Bhāva*, is described as the power of generalisation which makes the vibhāvas as well as the sthāyibhāva, sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties"[67]. It is through this process of generalisation (sadharanikarana) that Rāma in a drama does not appear as a lover of Sītā and Sītā as the beloved of Rāma but they appear as common lovers with their common pursuit of love. The spectator also rises above narrow individual self and forgets his mundane preoccupations. He is dissociated from all petty particular interests as the Bhāvakatva presents incidents and situations in their generalised forms. Then arises the necessity of the third function *Bhojakatva* which brings into

predominance the elements of sattva by throwing the Rajas and Tamas into the background. The mind then becomes steady and any kind of distraction ceases to exist. The preponderance of the Sattva element produces illumination and a state of perfect rest of the self within itself. In the words of K.C. Pandey, "that state is charactarized by the absence of all conscious physical, psychological and volitional activities and so by freedom from all attachment to and aversion from all that can enter into consciousness"[68]. This state of aesthetic experience is known as the state of perfect bliss and it is akin to the mystic realisation of Brahman.

We, thus, see that rasa resides in the *sthāvibhāva or the permanent mood which is experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama and enjoyed by one's own blissful consciousness which is very close to the philosophic meditation of Brahman.* Bhaṭṭa Nayaka interprets the term 'saṃyoga' as the cognition of things in a generalised form and 'niṣpatti' as the enjoyment (bhukti) of the sthayibhāva as rasa. That is why his theory is known as 'bhuktivāda'. It makes a significant contribution to the theory of aesthetic realisation. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka for the first time considered aesthetic realisation as a mental process, a subjective experience of a refined reader or spectator. In his theory we see a transition from objective to the subjective view of aesthetic experience and the rasa-realisation has been explained in terms of an inward experience. His other remarkable contribution in the field of aesthetics is his theory of generalization sādhāranīkaraṇa), which is acceptable to the critics even today.

Abhinavagupta, a major critic of 10th century A.D., and the writer of two important works *Abhinavabhārati* and *Dhvanyāloka Locana*, challenges the views of Bhaṭṭa Nāyak in two different stages and offers a new solution to the problem of aesthetic experience. He is regarded as the great exponent of the Kaśmirian Śaivism and a renowned critic of extraordinary calibre. He propounded the theories of rasa and dhvani so convincingly that he is considered to be one of the greatest authorities in poetics and dramaturgy.

In the first stage Abhinavagupta does not agr e with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's contention that rasa is neither produced nor inferred or apprehended. He asks how can rasa be enjoyed if it is not produced or apprehended ? If it is nothing but the relish of rasa, it is certainly an apprehension though it acquires different names on account of the different means. The same process of apprehension has been given different terminology such as direct perception, inference, analogy and intuition etc. Hence the question of rasa-realisation does not arise without apprehension or inference.

In the second stage while referring to Bhaṭṭa N yaka's suggestion of the three states of mind *i.e.* fluidity, expansion and dilation corresponding to the three gunas, *i.e.*, *sattva*, *rajas* and tams, Abhinavagupta points out that since the states of mind are endless, how can we restrict their number to three only ? He further suggests that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's reference to the process of *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* amounts to nothing but *vyanjanā* or suggestion. Since both the processes of *bhāvana* (generalisation of content through the dramatist's skilful representation) and bhoga (relishability of the emotion) are achieved through the process of *rasa-vyanjanā* only, there is no need to assume two separate processes.

Abhinavagupta considers *bhāvakatva* to be nothing more than the proper use of guṇa and alaṃkāra for the ultimate purpose of awakening rasa which the suggestive power of word and sense creates. Absence of poetic blemishes, introduction of excellences and the proper use of the four recognized types of acting in a drama set the mind of the spectator in such a state that the vibhāvas etc. appear automatically in their generalised forms. Referring to the process of bhojakatva Abhinavagupta points out that he has no knowledge of any other process called bhoga beyond the *pratīti* or perception of rasa. Bhatta Nāyaka's conception of *bhoga* infact consists in the asvada of rasa through the suggestive power of poetry. Hence there is no need to consider the function of *bhavakatva* and *bhojakatva* separately.

Explaining Bharata's theory of rasa Abhinavagupta now points out that rasa is *suggested* by the union of the sthāyibhāva

with the vibhāvas etc. through the relation of the suggested (vyanjya) and the suggestor (vyanjaka). In his opinion the sthāyibhāva or the permanent mood is lying deep in the subtle form of latent impressions in the hearts of the readers or the spectators. When they read a poem or see a drama, this sthāyi bhāva is suggested by the depicted *vibhāvas* etc. which are generalised in their mind and soon stripped of their peculiar conditions of time and space with the help of the suggestive power of word and sence and their skilful representation in drama. Similarly the *sthāyibhāva* wherefrom the rasa originates is also generalised and universalised as "the germ of it is already existent in the reader's soul in the form of impressions ; and this, together with the beauty of the generalised representation of the *vibhāvas* etc. removes all temporal and spatial limitations"[69]. This state of relish is known as rasa which is of course nothing but "an uninter-rupted, ceaseless enjoyment, bereft of all feeling of insatiety"[70] Abhinavagupta explains the rasa-realisation under the anology of a beverage. Just as the beverage which is made up of black pepper, candied sugar, camphor and other ingredients, gives us an entirely new taste from those of its constituents, similarly rasa gives us a unique and indivisible taste which is altogether different from its constituents. In the opinion of Abhinavagupta, since there is no other sensation of any kind to stand in the way during aesthetic experience, this rasa-realisation is called 'vītavighna pratītiḥ'.

Since Abhinavagupta explains the word *nispatti*, used by Bharata in his Rasa-sūtra, as *abhivyakti*, his theory of rasa is known as *abhivyaktivāda*. *Abhivyakti* is nothing but the *pratīti* or perception of rasa through the power of suggestion whose ultimate result is an extraordinary state of relish. This state of relish is of course a divine bliss and it cannot be compared with the ordinary pleasure or pain, as at this moment we are so completely lost in it that we never feel pain and if we ever feel it, it is a pleasurable pain. Pt Jagannātha too supports this view by giving an example. When a devotee listens to a description of the deity and is full of tears, his tears are not tears of even the slightest feeling of pain but of divine pleasure.

SEVEN-FOLD PSYCHIC OBSTACLES

After explaining the exact nature and apprehension of *rasa*, Abhinavagupta remarks that rasa can be relished only by those who possess a uniform residue of subliminal impressions in their hearts, as the dull grammarians and old Mīmāṁsakās can never relish it. He has drawn our attention to the seven-fold obstacles in the proper realisation of rasa.

In his opinion the first obstacle is the spectator's incapacity for rasa-realisation. If the spectator is not able to imagine the object of apprehension and is not even able to sustain his interest, he cannot relish rasa. Abhinavagupta has also recommended two remedies in order to get rid of this obstacle. The first remedy is that the spectator should enlarge the horizon of his knowledge and experience so that he may develop greater sympathy for and the wider perspective of the things. The second remedy is that the dramatist should make use of the well-known figures like that of Rāma and Sītā etc. so that it might be appealing and convincing to the spectators.

Abhinavagupta considers the lack of the proper aesthetic or psychic distance between the dramatic situation and the spectator as the second obstacle to the realisation of rasa. If the spectator identifies the dramatic feelings with himself or with some other person, it is certainly a hindrance in the proper apprehension of rasa. The solution to this problem, Abhinavagupta suggests, lies in the disguising or camouflaging the actor's personality so that "there is no apprehension that the happiness or sorrow is of this particular actor, or of this particular time or place..."[71]

The third obstacle to the apprehension of rasa is the spectator's over-absorption in his own personal likes and dislikes. In this situation the spectator is so much concerned with his private world that he cannot enjoy the incidents which are being represented on the stage. Abhinavagupta suggests a remedy for this obstacle. In his opinion various kinds of entertainment such as song, dance and accomplished courtezans are employed in order to enable the spectator to rise above his narrow per-

sonal self and enjoy the objects of representation through the process of generalisation (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa).

Abhinavagupta considers simultaneously the lack of the proper means of apprehension as the fourth and the absence of clarity as the fifth obstacle to the realisation of rasa, as their nature of difficulty is more or less identical. In order to get rid of these obstacles Abhinavagupta recommends the process of gesticulation which is "quite distinct from the process of verbal testimony and inference, and is at par with the process of direct perception. In other words, it creates a vivid impression on the minds of the audience which only a real event can, and it guarantees the apprehension of Rasa"[72].

Abhinavagupta refers to the *sthāvin* being given secondary importance in a play as the sixth obstacle to the realisation of rasa. The dramatist should not give priority to the set of *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* in comparison to the sthāyibhāva, as in his opinion, whose consciousness can find repose in an insignificant matter ? This obstacle can be removed by giving prominence to the sthāyibhāva under the impression that 'we shall carry the sthāyins to the state of Rasa'.

Abhinavagupta considers the creation of a doubt or uncertainty as to the exact nature of the sthāyibhāva (the permanent mood in an emotional atmosphere as the seventh obstacle to the relish of rasa. We cannot identify the exact nature of the *sthāvibhāva* simply by the anubhāvas like tears as they are occasioned by sorrow as well as joy. This obstacle can, however, be removed if we keep in view the assemblage of all the three factors such as vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva together. If the loss of relative is the *vibhāva*, lamentation and shedding of tears *anubhāva*, and anxiety and misery the *vyabhicāribhāva*, śoka or grief would certainly be the sthāyibhāva.

From the discussion of these seven obstacles and the means of their removal, it is evident that Abhinavagupta had the capacity of penetrating analysis and deep insight into all those dramatic aspects which lead to the ultimate realisation of rasa. He discusses, as Y.S. Walimbe has pointed out, "as to how each of the three human agencies involved in the process of *Rasa*—

the dramatist, the actor and the spectator or *sāmājika*—should try to rise to the best of his skill and ability, how all their individual efforts should converge towards to apprehension of Rasa, the collective experience of human emotion in the theatre"[73].

NUMBER OF RASAS (SENTIMENTS) AND THEIR DESCRIPTION

After defining rasa and the process of rasa-realisation, Bharata in chapter VI of his *NŚ* tries to explain the origin, colours, presiding deities and the meaning of these rasas (sentiments). In his opinion there are eight Sentiments (rasas) recognized in drama which are as follows : (*i*) Erotic (śṛṅgāra) (*ii*) Comic (hāsya), (*iii*) Pathetic (karuṇa), (*iv*) Furious (raudra) (*v*) Heroic (vīra), (*vi*) Terrible (bhayānaka), (*vii*) Odious (bibhatsa) and (*viii*) Marvellous (adbhuta). These eight Sentiments originate from four major Sentiments, as is evident from Bharata's own remarks :

> The Comic (Sentiment) arises from the Erotic, the Pathetic from the Furious, the Marvellous from the Heroic, and the Terrible from the Odious.[74]

These four major Sentiments (rasas) seem to have been intimately associated with four types of feelings which may arise in our mind under the impact of external objects. These four types of feelings are as follows :

(*i*) *Vikāsa* (Ardent desire) leading to the arousal of Śṛṅgāra rasa (Erotic Sentiment).

(*ii*) Vistāra (Amplitude) leading to the arousal of Vīra rasa (Heroic Sentiment).

(*iii*) Kṣobha (Agitation) leading to the arousal of Raudra rasa (Furious Sentiment).

(*iv*) Vikṣepha (Distraction) leading to the arousal of Vibhatsa rasa (Odious Sentiment).

Referring to the colours of these eight Sentiments Bharata has pointed out :

> The Erotic Sentiment is light green (śyāma), the Comic Sentiment white, the Pathetic (Sentiment) grey (Kapota), the Furious Sentiment red, the Heroic (Sentiment) yellowish (gaura), the Terrible (Sentiment) black, the Odious Sentiment blue and the Marvellous (Sentiment) yellow.[75]

Regarding the presiding deities of these eight Sentiments Bharata has stated :

> Viṣṇu is the god of the Erotic, Pramathas of the Comic, Rudra of the Furious, Yama of the Pathetic, Mahākāla (Śiva) of the Odious, Kāla of the Terrible, Indra of the Heroic and Brahmā of the Marvellous Sentiments.[76]

Bharata now explains the Sthāyibhāvas of eight Sentiments, their Determinants, Consequents, Complementary Psychological States and their nature of combination leading to the realisation of rasa.

1. The Erotic Sentiment (Śṛṅgāra rasa)

The Sthāyibhāva (Durable Psychological State) of the Erotic Sentiment is love (rati), which originates from the relationship between men and women and is associated with the fulness of youth. The Erotic Sentiment is usually associated with a bright, pure, beautiful and elegant attire. In the opinion of Bharata there are two types of Erotic Sentiment—that of union and that of separation. The Determinants in the Erotic Sentiment of union are the pleasant seasons, beautiful garlands, fine ornament, the company of the intimate fellows etc. Consequents in the Erotic Sentiment which is to be represented on the stage, are the clever movement of the eyes, eyebrows, glances, soft and delicate movement of limbs, sweet and pleasant words etc. Fear, disgust, cruelty and indolence should not be considered complementary Psychological States of the Erotic Sentiment in union. The consequents of the Erotic Sentiment in separation are such as "indifference, langour, fear, jealousy, fatigue,

anxiety, yearning, drowsiness, sleep, dreaming, awakening, illness, insanity, epilepsy, inactivity, fainting, death and other conditions"[77].

Whereas Bharata has mentioned two types of the Erotic Sentiment--Saṃyoga (union) and vipralambha (separation), Dhanaṃjaya has referred to the three varieties of the Frotic Sentiment—Ayoga (Privation), Viprayoga (Separation) and Saṃbhoga (union), the first two of which together correspond to the Vipralambha. Referring to the difference between the Pathetic Sentiment and the Erotic Sentiment in separation Bharata has stated that "The Pathetic Sentiment relates to a condition of despair owing to the application under a curse, separation from dear ones, loss of wealth, death or captivity, while the Erotic Sentiment based on separation relates to a condition of retaining optimism arising out of yearning and anxiety"[78].

2. The Comic Sentiment (Hāsya rasa)

The Sthāyibhāva of the comic Sentiment is laughter, which is aroused by the Determinants such as putting on unusual dress and ornament, impudence, greediness, quarrel, strange movement limbs, use of irrelevant words, uncouth behaviour and the like. This Sentiment should be represented on the stage by the consequents such as the throbbing of the lips, the nose and the cheek, opening the eyes wide or contracting them, perspiration, colour of the face, and taking hold of the sides. Complementary Psychological States in it are indolence, dissimulation, drawsiness, sleep, dreaming, insomnia, envy and the like.

There are six varieties of laughter which is the Sthāyibhāva of the Comic Sentiment—(*i*) Gentls Smile (smita) which refers to the opening of the eyes wide ; (*ii*) Smile (hasita) reveals the showing of the teeth to some extent ; (*iii*) Gentle Laughter (vihasita) refers to the making of a soft sound ; (*iv*) Ridiculous Laughter (upahasita) shows the shaking of the head ; (*v*) Uproarious Laughter (apahasita) is the laughter which is accompanied by tears ; (*vi*) Convulsive Laughter (atihasita) amounts to the shaking of the entire body. The first two varieties of

laughter belong to the superior, the next two to the middling and the last two to the inferior types of persons.

3. **The Pathetic Sentiment** (Karuṇa rasa)

The Sthāyibhāva of the Pathetic Sentiment is sorrow. It is aroused by the Determinants such as suffering under a curse, separation from or loss of dear ones, commotion caused by reversal of situation, death, captivity, fatal injury and such other misfortunes. This has to be shown on the stage by the consequents such as heaving of sighs, shedding of tears, paralysis, lamentation, dryness of mouth, change of colour and loss of memory etc. The Complementary Psychological States in the Pathetic Sentiment are epilepsy, depression, langour, indifference, anxiety, yearning, excitement, delusion, fainting, sadness, distraction, dejection, sickness, insanity, death, tremor, change of colour and loss of voice etc.

4. **The Furious Sentiment (Raudra rasa)**

The Sthāyibhāva of the Furious Sentiment is anger (krodha), It originates from Rākṣasas, Dānavas and haughty men and is caused by striking, cutting, mutilation and the fight in the battlefield. It is aroused by the Determinants such as indignation, rape, insult, false allegation, exorcising, jealousy, threatening revengefulness and the like passions. It is to be represented on the stage by the consequents such as biting one's lip, knitting of eyebrows, red eyes, movement of cheeks, trembling, frowning, sweating, drawing of the weapons and striking the earth etc. It is to be soon followed by the following Complementary Psychological States—indignation, excitement, intoxication, inconstancy, agitation, restlessness, fury, perspiration, trembling, horripilation etc. The Furious Sentiment, in the words of Bharata, "is full of conflicts of arms, and in it words, movements and deeds are terrible and fearful"[79].

5. **The Heroic Sentiment** (Vīra rasa)

The Sthāyibhāva of the Heroic Sentiment is Energy (utsāha). It is aroused by the Determinants such as good conduct,

detrmination, perseverance, courage, infatuation, diplomacy, discipline and aggressiveness etc. It is to be shown on the stage by the consequents such as heroism, firmness, patience, pride, energy and diplomacy etc. Its complementary Psychological States are pride, contentment, firmness of purpose, judgement, agitation, indignation and horripilation etc.

6. **The Terrible Sentiment** (Bhayānaka rasa)

The Sthāyibhāva of the Terrible Sentiment is Fear (bhaya). This is aroused by the Determinants such as loss of courage, sight of ghosts and death, hideous noise, terrible cry of jackals and owls, staying in an empty house or forest etc. It is to be represented on the stage by consequents like trembling of all the limbs, sweating, vomitting, spitting, fainting and the like. The Complementary Psychological States of this Sentiment are depression, distraction, agitation, paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, fear, stupefaction, dejection restlessness, palpitation of the heart and dryness of the lips etc.

7. **The Odious Sentiment** (Bībhatsa rasa)

The Sthāyibhāva of the Odious Sentiment is Disgust (Jugupsā). It is aroused by the Determinants such as disgusting sight, taste, smell and sound which create uneasiness and suffocation to the spectators. It has to be staged in the form of the consequents like contraction of the mouth and eyes, covering the nose, spitting, vomitting and shaking of the limbs in disgust etc. Its Complementary Psychological States are agitation, delusion, apprehension, sickness, death and the epilaptic fit etc.

8. **The Marvellous Sentiment** (Adbhuta rasa)

Its Sthāyibhāva is Astonishment (vismaya). It is caused by the Determinants like the supernatural things and seeing the illusory and magical acts. It is to be shown on the stage by the Consequents like exclamation of surprise, weeping, trembling, stammering, sweating, horripilation, perspiration, uttering words of approbation etc. Its Complementary Psychological

States are joy, agitation, perspiration, horripilation, hurry, choking voice, paralysis and death etc.

9. Śānta Rasa

The admission of Śānta as the ninth rasa has led to a good deal of controversy among the critics. Thera are only eight rasas mentioned in almost all the editions (Grosset, Kāvyamāla and Kāshi) of Bharata's *NŚ* where in the beginning of chapter VI he has given an elaborate account of these eight rasas and their corresponding sthāyibhāvas, vibhāvas, anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas. Kālidāsa too in his *Vikram.* ii. 8 has credited Bharata with eight rasas only. Those who do not accept the Śānta as the ninth rasa, give the following arguments :

(*i*) If *Śama* is the sthāyibhāva of the Śānta rasa, why does Bharata not mention *Śama* as one of the forty nine bh vas ?

(*ii*) Bharata gives an account of laya, svara, guṇa, alaṃkāra, vṛtti, etc. of the eight rasas only in different sections of his work, but he does not mention Śānta in this connection.

(*iii*) Bharata mentions the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas of the eight rasas only. He, however, does not mention them in connection with the Śānta rasa.

(*iv*) Śānta cannot be admitted as rasa because it is not possible for the people to exterminate *rāgı* and *devṣa* completely.

(*v*) Since the real nature of Śama refers to the state of complete inaction and the lack of conflict and tension, it cannot be represented on the stage.

It is, however, to be noted that in the Gaekwad edition of his *NŚ*, there is reference the Śānta as the ninth rasa at the end of chapter VI. Abhinavagupta in his commentary has tried to establish Śānta as the ninth rasa. In his opinion drama or

poetry cannot confine itself to *trivarga* only, but is sure to take into account the greater Purusārtha, *i.e:*, Mokṣa that is the highest goal of of human life. The attitude to Mokṣa is *Śama* which is the sathayibhava of Śānta rasa. Viśvanatha to accepts the Śānta rasa, as in his view, the attainment of *Śama* does not mean cessation from all activity. Even Śānta rasa is capable of being represented and appreciated by the spectators.

S.K. De also admits the validity of Śānta rasa in literature, as it is certainly appealing to the people of devout mind. In his opinion there has been "a continuous stream of literature which depicts Śānta as a Rasa. The non-mention by Bharata is at best a technical and trifling objction"[80] It is very pertinent in this connection to mention that in many of the greatest plays in the West Christ has been presented as the hero, whereas Buddha has been presented as the hero in many of the remarkable plays in the East. Theoretically both of them are infact the ideal protagonists of the plays which are mainly concerned with the Śānta rasa. In the opinion of Ānandavardhan the basic rasa of the *Mahābhārata* is the Śānta rasa, though it is full of conflicts and tensions. Śānta to him, says G.B. Mohan, "was not the absence of conflicts but the reconciliation of conflicts[81], which finally to the state of tranquillity.

If Śānta is accepted as the ninth rasa, the question is as to what then would be its sthāyibhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. The sthāyibhava of the Śānta rasa is *Śama.* Its vibhāvas (Determinants) are the persuit for spiritual knowledge and freedom from worldly desires. It is to be represented on the stage by anubhāvas (consequents) such as mediation, devotion, perception, recognition of truth, control and sympathy for all the creatures etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas (Complementary Psychological States) are courage, indifference, recollection and fixity etc.

So far we have considered Śānta as one of the nine rasas. We would now consider it as the most fundamental rasa in Indian aesthetics. Abhinavagupta considers it not only as a rasa but "as the mahārasa, a the basic mental state in which all

aesthetic experiences are realised and relished...all emotions in aesthetic experience emerge out of *Śānta* and are in the end submerged in it."[82] Śānta is a state of consciousness which is free from all tensions and turmoils. It is nothing but the tranquillity itself, which is the ultimate and of human life.

Frequent attempts, however, have been made to enlarge the number of rasas, though a majority of the critics feel that nine rasas are capable of meeting the requirements of the large number of literary productions. Bhānudattā in his *Rasa Taraṅginī* has mentioned four more rasas (*i*) vātsalya (*ii*) Laulya (*iii*) Bhakti and (*iv*) Kārpaṇya, though he too does not give them an independent status. Referring to the acceptance of nine rasas by Abhinavagupta K.C. Pandey has rightly pointed out that he admitted nine rasas only simply because "no other closely state admits of so interesting a presentation, nor is so mental connected with the objectives of human life.[83]

Now two more fundamental issues remain yet to be resolved in connection with Rasa-realisation. The first issue is as to whether Rasa realisation is always pleasant or otherwise too ? This issue has generated a good deal of controversy among the critics and commentators. Bharata in chapter VI of his *NŚ* has stated that we derive pleasure and satisfaction from rasa-realisation :

> ...just as well-disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spice, enjoy (asvadayanti) its tastes, and attain pleasure and satisfaction, so the cultured people taste the Durable Psychological States while they see them represented by an expression of the various Psychological States with words, Gestures and the Sattva, and derive pleasure and satisfaction.[84]

Abhinavagupta, however, has analysed the nature of nine Sthāyibhāvas and thereby proved that the nature of eight Sthāyibhāvas out of nine, is pleasant as well as painful whereas the nature of *Śama* (which leads to the realisation of Śānta rasa) is always delightful. It means that the nature of four Sthāyibhāvas such as *rati* (love), *hāsa* (mirth), uts ha (energy) and vismaya (astonishment) is mainly pleasant through it is not free

from pain. Similary the nature of the remaining four Sthāyi-bhāvas such as *Krodha* (anger), *bhaya* (fear), *śoka* (sorrow) and *jugupsā* (disgust) is mainly painful but not devoid of pleasure altogether. Viśvanātha, a famous adherent of Bharata's theory of rasa, however, feels that rasa realisation is always pleasant and never painful. He argues :

> ...if there were pain in these, no body would turn his face thither and the reading of books like the *Rāmāyana* would become a source of pain, instead of pleasure as it is at present.... People may experience sorrow and joy from situations so far as they belong to this work-a-day world, but pleasure along is produced from them when they are delineated in poetry and attain the position of hyper-physical excitements ; there is nothing illogical about the phenomenon.[85]

Jagannātha also agrees with his view and says that even the shedding of tears is the result of a pleasant experience and not of a painful one.

In modern Hindi criticism critics like Keshava Prasad Mishra, Bhagawan Das, Shyam Sunder Das and Hazari Prasad Dwivedi have tried to prove through their different methods that the end of rasa-realization is always delightful. The purpose of rasa is to provide pleasure to the spectator and not to give him mental torture. Rama Chandra Shukla, however, is the strongest opponent of this theory that rasa-realisation is always delightful. In his book *Rasa-Mīmāṁsā* he has tried to prove that Rasa is not necessarily delightful. If *śoka* (sorrow) or *jugupsā* (disgust) is capable of arousing pleasure in the heart of the spectator, then it should be presumed that either the poet has failed to communicate those feelings properly or the spectator has not been able to understand them distinctly. In order to substantiate his theory he gives an example from the play *Satya Harishchandra*. Do we have pleasure when we see Shaibya, the wife of king Harischandra, lamenting over the death of her only son who had died on account of the snake-biting ? Do we not shed tears when we find her asking for coffin

(a piece of cloth) for covering the dead body of her son ? There may be difference in intensity and proportion in our reaction to this pathetic scene but certainly we cannot derive pleasure from it.

Dr. Nagendra in his book *Rasa-Siddhānta* has, however, expressed his disagreement with the views of Acarya Shukla. Like F.L. Lucas, an eminent critic of Aristotle's *Poetics*, he raises this fundamental question : Do we then go to the theatre just to shed tears ? Is the theatre a place for lamentation ? He agrees with Acārya Shukla that the scene of Rohita's and death the mother's lamentation over it in *Satya Harishchandra* is certainly not pleasant. Any rational creature will not derive pleasure from it. But the question is whether this scene is just a part of the drama or the main end of the drama. What is the *intention* of the playwright ? Does he want to show the suffering of these characters or to display their sense of sacrifice far the cause of truth ? Dr. Nagendra further points out that if Acārya Shukla has objection to the use of the word *ānanda* (pleasure) in connection with rasa-realisation, he would prefer to use the *ātmaparitosh* (self-satisfaction) which the spectator derives after seeing a drama in the theatre. If the spectator is not able to derive self-satisfaction after seeing the drama, then it should be understood that there is some flaw either in the structure of the drama or in the sensibility of the spectator. Dr. Nagendra finally concludes that there is pleasure even in our self-satisfaction.

There is, however, some doubt which parsists in our mind. Dr. Nagendra, while referring to the death-scene of Rohita, admits that it is certainly not pleasant, but later on points out that it is just the momentary experience and not the end of the whole drama. He means to suggest that the predominant rasa in *Satya Harishchandra* is heroic and not pathetic. Now the question is if any drama has pathetic (karuṇa) or Odious (bībhatsa) or terrible (bhayānaka) rasa as its predominant rasa, how can the spectator derive pleasure of even self-satisfaction ? We feel that Odious (bibhatsa) or Terrible (bhayānaka) rasa, being used as predominant rasa in the drama, can never give us

pleasure or even self-satisfaction. That is why they are very rarely used as predominant rasas in our plays.

The second controversial but significant issue is as to where lies the rasa, whether in the original character or actor or poet or spectator or the work itself? In the opinion of Bharata rasa is produced when there is the union of sthāyibhāva with vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva. Hence rasa lies in the work of art, and the spectator just enjoys it. Bharata explains rasa as 'āsvādya' (object of relish). It can be made clear by an analogy of the flower. Just as the smell lies in the flower itself and not in the nostril of the person who enjoys its smell, similarly rasa lies in the work of art itself and not in the spectator who just enjoys it.

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa points out that rasa does not lie in the work of art but in the original (historical or mythical) character like Rāma and Sītā. Rasa primarily lies in the original character and the actor by his competent imitation imitates him and thereby delights the spectator. Śri Śaṅkuka, however, does not agree with the views of Lollaṭa. In his opinion rasa does not lie in the original character but in the actor or in the gesticulation of the actor. Through his successful representation the actor is taken up for the original character and the spectator infers love from the gesticulation of the actor. Hence rasa lies in the actor and not in the original character.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka does not agree with the views of either Lollaṭa or Śaṅkuka. He suggests that the Sthāyibhāva of the spectator is ultimately converted into rasa when it is united with the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva in its generalised (sādhāranikṛta) form. Hence rasa lies in the heart of the spectator and not in the original character or the actor. Abhinavagupta too accepts that rasa lies in the heart of the spectator itself.

Dr. Nagendra in his book *Rasa-Siddhānta*[88] has pointed out that rasa lies in the poet, spectator, and if it is a play to be staged, in the actor also. He does not consider the work of art as an independent entity, as in his opinion the work of art is

nothing but the expression of the poet's experience. Hence the question of rasa in the work of art does not arise. Dr. Nagendra is fully conscious of the objection which may be raised against it. Since the poet uses the historical or mythical incidents as his subject matter, how can the work of art be considered to be just the expression of the poet's experience only ? To this objection Dr. Nagendra's suggestion is that the poet uses the subject-matter not for its repetition but for the expression of his motive or intention which is his own. Hence the attempt to find out rasa in the work of art is not acceptable to him. He also rules out the possibility of rasa in the original character.

Dr. Nagendra is of the opinion that rasa lies in the poet as well as in the spectator. If the poet's expression of his experience does not contain rasa, the rasa lying in the spectator's heart will remain dormant. Similarly if there is no rasa in the spectator's heart, the poet's expression alone will not be able to arouse it in his heart. The spectator infact relishes the relishable state of his own being.

Now let us examine whether rasa lies in the actor or not. Abhinavagupta considers the actor to be just a vessel. Just as the taste of wine does not stay in the vessel, similarly rasa does not lie in the actor who is just the means of tasting it. Dr. Nagendra, however, does not agree with the view and says that so long as the actor is not able to experience those feelings and emotions himself, he will not be able to communicate them properly to the spectators. A recent example may be given to illustrate it. In the film *Gandhi*, the British actor Ben Kingasley, who played the role of Mahatma Gandhi, had admitted in an Interview that sometimes he had to go on fast for several days so that he could experience the reaction of Gandhi Ji on such occasions. This proves beyond doubt that the actor cannot be considered to be just a vessel. After all the actor has the human sensibility and he is bound to be influenced at least for the time being by the various situations and psychological reactions that he has to present on the stage.

III

Let us now have a comparative assessment of Aristotle's concept of catharsis and Bharata's theory of rasa. Many Western critics like Minturno, John Milton, Thomas Twining, H. Weil, J. Bernays and Bywater have suggested the purgation theory of catharsis. They interpret catharsis as a medical metaphor keeping in view the ancient Greek theory of homeopathic treatment which is *similia similibus curanter*, *i.e.*, like curing the like. An identical concept occurs in Atharva-Veda also, from which Bharata seems to have borrowed his theory of rasa. It discusses rasa in the sense of water and medicine which produce good health and give divine joy. Since poison is an anti-dote to poison, it is injected in the body in order to neutralise the poison.*Viṣasya viṣmausadham* is a medically acceptable formula. The Atharva-Veda refers to the process of curing fever by sprinkling hot-water, which is much like the Greek theory of homoeopathic treatment.

Butcher in his commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics* has also drawn our attention to the similarity between the Western and Eastern pattern of treatment :

> Aristotle, it would seem, was led to this remarkable theory by observing the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious ecstasy, or, as the Greeks said, 'enthusiasm', such as is rarely seen in this country, and whose proper home is in the East. The persons subject to such transports were regarded as men possessed by a god, and were taken under the care of the priesthood. The treatment prescribed for them was so far homoeopathic in character, that it consisted in applying movement, in soothing the internal trouble of the mind by a wild and restless music.[89]

People forget their earthly existence and realise the blissful experience when they get themselves involved in group-singing in temples in the form of *Kirtan*. It is a sort of tranquillising dose for such people who are passing through the stage of

religious frenzy. It relaxes our tension and gives emotional relief.

So far as the theory of 'Catharsis' is concerned, Aristotle has neither explained it nor taken care to discuss how it originates in drama. However, on the basis of the observations of the critics which we have already discussed, we have come to the conclusion that there are two stages in the relisation of catharsis. In the first stage emotions of pity and fear are evoked to a disturbing pitch and then the devastating force is spent and the mind is at rest. In the second stage the dramatic experience is exalting and ennobling. It provides a chastening calm to the mind of the spectator. It ultimately results in the liberation and purification of the mind.

Bharata, on the other hand, has defined rasa and explained the process of rasa-realisation. We realise rasa when a sthāyibhāva or a permanent mood is brought to a relishable condition by its combination with *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* which excite, follow and strengthen the Sthāyibhāva and lead the spectator to the realisation of rasa. It has been compared to the ecstatic bliss of divine contemplation. It leads the spectator to the stage of an emotional exaltation and a state of serenity.

Just as Aristotle's concept of catharsis reconciles the two opposite emotions of pity and fear, Bharata's rasa theory also reconciles many opposites like 'involvement-detachment', individual-universal', 'multiplicity-unity' and 'excitment-serenity'. It is, however, to be stated that whereas Aristotle uses the term-'catharsis' in the context of tragedy and the emotion of pity and fear only, Bharata's theory of rasa takes into account all the branches of literature including drama and discusses all emotions that may arise in the human heart.

We may make an attempt to identify Bharata's *Karuṇa* rasa (pathetic sentiment) with Aristotelian concept of pity, though it is much wider in import than pity. Bhavabhūti, a great Indian dramatist, considers this rasa to be the most dominant rasa as it has the capacity to move even the mountain and crush

the heart of the thunderbolt. It arises in the heart on account of the suffering under a curse, separation from the dear ones, loss of wealth, captivity, fatal injury, death and the like. Aristotle's concept of pity, however, is very specific. In his opinion pity arises on account of the suffering caused by undeserved misfortune.

Aristotle's concept of fear has been identified with Bharata's concept of *bhayanaka* rasa (terrible sentiment), which arises in the heart of the spectator, as Bharata has pointed out, by the loss of courage, sight of ghosts, terrible cry of jackals and owls, and death etc. Aristotle's emotion of fear arises in the heart of the spectator only when he feels that (*i*) the stuation may aggravate and further complicate and endanger the life of the hero or the heroine, (*ii*) he may be placed under similar circumstances and may have to face the same situation.

We feel pity for others whereas we fear for others as well as for ourselves. These emotions of pity and fear, as Aristotle has indicated, are interrelated and interdependent. Those who cannot fear for themselves, cannot show pity for others. Fear then is the primary emotion which leads to the arousal of pity for others. Pity is aroused in our heart only when we feel that a similar suffering may befall us also. These two emotions together are essential for a successful work of art. Pity alone is likely to make the play excessively sentimental whereas fear alone will make it a horror play. Bharata, however, is of a different opinion. In his view *Karuṇa* rasa (pathetic sentiment) and *bhayānaka* rasa (terrible sentiment) are independent rasas. In his *NŚ* he points out that the theme of eight out of ten types of drama is to be governed by eight different rasas. Each rasa is to determine the theme of one type of drama.

Critics like Ernest Cassirer[90] have compared Bharata's Śānta rasa with the end of Aristotelian catharsis. Śānta rasa is born out of the state of tranquillity and gives us peace and serenity. Similarly in catharsis our soul is ultimately brought to a state of rest and peace. R. Appa Rao, however, refers to the clear distinction between the two :

> While Aristotle's principle of catharsis stops at pleasure the Indian principle of *rasa*-experience transcends this state and reaches the state of *a ananda* or bliss which obviously is a higher level in aesthetic enjoyment.[91]

Whereas catharsis refers to the process of aesthetic pleasure, rasa transcends this stage and goes up to the level of divine bliss.

The world 'rasa' is such a comprehensive term that it is very difficult to find out its equivalent in English language. It has multidimensional connotations and comprehends the entire poetic process. John Dewey has admitted this fact and rightly remarked :

> We have no word in the English language that unambiguously includes what is signified by the two words 'artistic' and 'aesthetic'. Since 'artistic' refers primarily to the act of production and 'aesthetic' to the act of perception and enjoyment, the absence of a term designating the two processes taken together is unfortunate.[92]

Only the world 'rasa', used by Bharata for the first time, is such a term which includes the creative experience of the poet as well as the aesthetic enjoyment of the reader or the spectator 'Rasa' is definitely wider and deeper in its implication than the Aristotelian concept of 'catharsis'.

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4

Structure of Drama

The structure of drama is an over-all architectonic element of drama. It is not just a series of incidents but the process of ordering and organizing them. Aristotle discusses the 'proper structure' of drama, especially the tragedy in greater depth and detail from chapter VI to XIV of *Poetics.* Though Bharata does not pay so much attention to the fable or the plot of drama as Aristotle has done, he is fully aware of its significance and therefore in chapter XXI of NŚ suggests the process the playwright should adopt in order to compose different kinds of plot in the drama.

I

In chapter VI of his *Poetics* Aristotle defines plot as "the arrangement of the incidents"[1]. The plot is not infact the 'story' but the structure or the arrangement of the incidents which make up the story. It primarily refers to, as Else has pointed out, "the *shaping* of the structure of incidents, the forming process which goes on in the mind (soul) of the poet"[2]. Here emphasis should be laid not on individual incidents but on their arrangement, the arrangement thus transforming the separate incidents into something entirely new.

Aristotle considers plot to be the soul of tragedy. The comparison of the plot with the soul of the human being is very significant. In Aristotle's biology just as the soul, *i.e.* form comes prior to the body, plot comes to the drama in exactly the same manner. The drama is a living organism and the plot is its animating principle. Just as the soul gives life to the body,

so does plot to drama. To quote Eva Schaper : "By 'soul' we indicate that a body is alive. By 'plot', analogously, we indicate that the events presented hang together and are functionally interrelated'"[3].

Plot is infact the most significant ordering principle in a work of art. It is evident from the following curious analogy : "A similar fact is seen in painting. The most beautiful colours laid on confusedly, will not give as much pleasure as the chalk outline of a portrait"[4]. Just as the different colours splashed on a surface without any pattern or design are not able to produce any pleasure to the spectators, the play, though full of incidents is not able to delight us in the absence of a coherent structure. Plot should be like the chalk outline of a portrait, a systematic sequence of expressions which may create a 'recognizable pattern of human behavour' in our consciousness.

In chapter VII Aristotle points out that the 'action which is to be imitated in the drama, should be "complete and whole, and of a certain magnitude..."[5] The 'complete and whole' action refers to the movement of the entire drama from beginning to the end. Explaining the concept of a 'whole' Aristotle says that "A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle and an end......A well constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at haphazard, but conform to these principles"[6] The terms 'beginning', 'middle' and 'end' put emphasis on a close cohesion of causes.

Critics and commentators have felt some difficulty in regard to the interpretation of these terms 'begining', 'middle' and 'end as they are absolutely abstract. Since in real life anything that happens, has its own antecedents as well as consequences, how can anything 'begin' in a drama without having its antecedent ? In the Middle Ages writers of the Christian religious drama had faced the problem and they solved it by beginning their drama with the beginning of the creation and ending it with the end of the world. We may cite, for example, the English *Corpus Christi* plays which begin with the beginning of the creation and end with the last judgement. Some playwrights, as Hardison[7]

has pointed out, try to solve this problem either by adopting the loose formula of 'Cradle-to-grave' or by using the social conventions such as marriage and the birth of a child etc. Aristotle, however, feels that such writings are arbitrary and produce a false unity. They depend on something on a convention which is extrinsic to the action, though the drama should emanate from and end in ct ion.

Now the question is as to where from the drama should begin ? Since each beginning has its own antecedent, should we go on tracing its origin or finding out its cause and effect sequence *ad infinitum* ? It would certainly lead to an 'endless retrograde movements. Butcher's comment in this regard is very apt :

> A play must begin at some definite point, and at some definite point it must end. It is for the the poet to see that the action is complete in itself, and that neither the beginning nor the end is arbitrarily chosen. Within the dramatic action, a strict sequence of cause and effect is prescribed ; but the causal chain must not be indefinitely extended outwards.[8]

Some dramatists begin their plays with the murder of the rightful king ; then the society is plunged into a chaotic situation until the usurper is punished and the real heir is brought back to the throne. This pattern has been adopted by Shakespeare in his great tragedy *Macbeth* and a number of history plays from Richard II to to Richard III. Ibsen ha- also applied this principle to his play *The Ghosts.* It begins at a definite stage in the life of Mrs. Alving who makes an untiring effort to free herself from the ties of her husband. The drama comes to an end when Mrs. Alving's hope for a better future is completely shattered and there is no further possibility of the extension of the plot. 'Beginning' in a drama, of course, refers to the incident that starts the process of change. 'End' refers to the specific point when the issue of the drama gets resolved.

The 'middle', unlike the 'beginning', is causally connected with what goes before and unlike the 'end' it is causally related

to what follows. It is very difficult to say at what point should it be placed in the drama. This much, however, is certain that the 'middle' of the drama should be causally connected with what precedes and what comes after. Merely a succession of moving scenes cannot make a coherent tragedy. It is true in connection with the great Greek playwright Euripides who does not try to build up 'well articulated whole' and creates stirring situations and pathetic effects. Aristotelian principle of 'beginning', 'middle' and 'end' is applicable to an ideal tragedy only.

Aristotle now refers to the concept of magnitude which is infact indispensable for the harmonious evolution of a whole. Magnitude in his opinion stands for the physical length of a drama. Though he does not make an attempt to prescribe any very specific rule as to the possible length of a drama, he frankly states that an object which is infinitely large or small, can never be a fit object for artistic representation. He takes, for example the whole Trojan War which has no doubt a beginning and an end, but fails to produce the desired tragic effect as it is too vast in its compass and therefore may seem to be merely a series of detached incidents. Butcher's remark is quit significant: "The whole, he says must be of such dimensions that the memory or the mind's eye can embrace and retain it".[9]

Just as there is an upper limit to magnitude, there should be a lower limit to it also. Extremely short plays such as Yeats's *Plays for Dancers* are not able to produce the impact of a coherent work of art. Referring to the essential requirement of the magnitude Aristotle has expressed similar views in his *Politics* too :

> Beauty is realized in number and magnitude......To the size of states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements......For example a ship which is only a span long will not be a ship at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long......In like manner a state when composed of too few is not......self-sufficing ; when of too many .....it is not a state, being almost incapable of constitutional government[10].

A drama which is lacking in magnitude, can never become a coherent work of art. Improper size in both nature and art creates confusion and incoherence. Why an upper limit or a lower limit should be imposed on the size of a drama, is frankly stated by Aristotle in the following lines :

> Hence a very small animal organism cannot be beautiful ; for the view of it confused, the object being seen in an almost imperceptible moment of time. Nor, again, can one of vast size be beautiful, for as the eye cannot take it all in at once, the unity and sense of the whole is lost for the spectator ; as for instance if there were one a thousand miles long.[11]

In order to determine the magnitude in a drama, the most common principle is that it should be as long as possible but not to the extent of becoming ambiguous. Aristotle clearly suggests that the drama must have the greatest extension and variety but it should never violate the rule of comprehensibility and unity of impression. Butcher remarks : "A play should be of a magnitude sufficient to allow room for the natural development of the story. The action must evolve itself freely and fully, and the decisive change of fortune come about through the causal sequence of events"[12].

Aristotle further discusses unity of plot which is intimately related to wholeness and magnitude. Explaining the concept of the unity of plot he remarks :

> Unity of plot does not, as some persons think, consist in the unity of the hero. For infinitely various are the incidents in one man's life which cannot be reduced to unity ; and so, too, there are many actions of one man out of which we cannot make one action. Hence the error as it appears, of all poets who have composed a Heracleid a Thescid, or other poems of the kind. They imagine that as Heracles was one man, the story of Heracles must also be a unity.[13]

Aristotle rejects the idea that since several incidents occur in the life of a single individual, they are part of the same action and lead to the unity of plot. Mutually heterogenous incidents such as the award of the Nobel Prize and the death of the son may occur in the life of an individual but they will never lead to the unity of plot, as one would lead to the "fortunate" and the other to the "fatal" plot. Hence all the incidents, since they occur in a single individual's life, cannot lead to the unity of plot. The great epic writer Homer was wise enough to avoid this error :

> In composing the Odyssey he did not include all the adventures of Odysseus—such as his wound on Parnassus, or his feigned madness at the mustering of the host—incidents between which there was no necessary probable connection, but he made the Odyssey, and likewise the Illiad to centre round an action that in our sense of the word is one.[14]

The unity of plot can be maintained mainly in two ways (*i*) by making a causal connection among the different parts of the drama, (*ii*) by directing the whole series of events to a definite end. "The end is linked to the beginning", says Butcher, "with inevitable certainty and in the end we discern the meaning of the whole. In this powerful and concentrated impression lies the supreme test of unity."[15]

The different parts of the drama should be so structurally unified, that, in the words of Aristotle himself, "if any one of them is displaced or removed, the whole will be disjointed and distributed. For a thing whose presence or absence makes no visible difference, is not an organic part of the whole."[16] If any episode is not necessary or probable in the unified structure of the plot, it is certainly a digression. Digression in a drama is not only inartistic but also dilutes the dramatic effect and finally makes it difficult for the reader to have a sense of the whole. We may take, for example, Shakespeare's *Hamlet* where a slight change in the sequence of incidents leads to a significant difference in the meaning of the drama. In the original *Hamlet* Hamlet meets Ophelia after the famous soli-

loquy 'To be' or not to be and since he is extremely perturbed, he abuses the woman he had earlier loved. Sir Laurence Olivier in his movie version of *Hamlet* transposed the two incidents in such a manner that Hamlet's conversation with Ophelia preceded his famous soliloquy. This slight modification in the arrangement of incidents, says Hardison, "threatens to change the play from high tragedy to a melodrama about an adolescent having troubles with his lady friend !"[17] The difference between Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and Olivier's *Hamlet* suggests two points: (*i*) Plot is certainly more important than character or other elements of drama and (*ii*) the proper sequence of incidents brings out the necessary or probable relations and leads the drama to a definite end.

Aristotle carries the discussion forward from the interpretation of the unity of plot to the discussion of the sources of poetic unity, that is, the principle of probability and/or necessity. Now the question is as to what the principle of probability and necessity means. It is normally considered to be the 'unifying principle' brought out by the arrangement of incidents in a drama. Some commentators try to differentiate the meaning of probability and necessity and relate them to certain aspects of drama. Summarizing the views of Tedford, Hardison point out that "...in the Sequence 1-2-3, the relation between 1 and 2 is necessary because 1 is in the past ; but the relation between 2 and 3 is only probable since 3 has not actually happened. He further speculates that pity is related to necessary events, because pity is appropriate only for things that have happened, and fear to probable events, since we only fear what may happen but has not yet happened".[18]

Probability and necessity are thus the principles of causality. In the sequence of episodes A-B-C, the dramatist may present A as the "cause" of B and B as the "cause" of C in the simplest and the most common sense of the term. In Euripide's play *Media* Jason's decision to marry the daughter of Creon, the king of Corinth, becomes the cause of Media's anger which in turn, results in Creon's decree of banishment. However, this is not always true. In Sophocle's ***Oedipus, the***

King the messenger's arrival is certainly the immediate cause for the blinding of the king, but what causes the messenger's arrival at the right moment ? Similarly in Shakespeare's *Henry IV Part I* how does a scene in the Boar's Head Tavern become the "cause" of a scene at the rebel camp ? These incidents cannot be explained with the help of the principles of causality. They are of course based on chance, although Aristotle considers a plot based on chance as inartistic.

Aristotle points out that the plots which are lacking in probability or necessity are known as 'episodic'. Episodic plot is considered to be the worst type of plot by Aristotle :

> Of all plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a plot 'episodic' in which the episodes or acts succeed one another without probable or necessary sequence. Bed poets compose such pieces by their own fault, good poets, to please the players ; for, as they write show pieces for competition, they stretch the plot beyond its capacity, and are often forced to break the natural continuity.[19]

In dramatic competitions the length of a drama is not to be decided by the action of the drama but by the number of dramas to be staged. If the dramatist makes an unnecessary addition of the incidents either to please the actors or to cope with the requirements of the dramatic context, he is forced to the plot and are hence "episodic".

Aristotle, however, is convinced that the principle of probability and necessity cannot in itself evoke the intensity of pity and fear. A second condition which is more important, is required. To quote Aristotle himself, "such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by surprise ; and the effect is hightened when, at the same time they follow as cause and effect. The tragic wonder will than be greater than if they happened of themselves or by accident ; for even coincidences

when he was watching a festival nearby. Such a device may not be perfect from the artistic point of view but it would certainly be appealing to popular credulity, as "Such events seem not to be due to mere chance. Plots, therefore, constructed on these principles are necessarily the best.[21]

Aristotle, however, is cautious about the excessive use of "surprise", as it would lead not to the creation of an ideal tragedy but to a melodrama. The sense of 'surprise' may also be produced with the help of the divine agency which is known as ***deux ex mechina***. We may see much examples in the gods of *Prometheus Bound*, the Furies of the *Eumenides*, the dragon-car of *Medea*, the Ghost of *Hamlet* and the witches of *Macbeth*. Aristotle is definitely not in favour of the use of "miracles" or the supernatural occurrences which are extrinsic to the plot of the drama. If the marvellous or the supernatural occurs in a drama, it should be an integral part of the necessary or probable sequence of incidents and noι extrinsic to it. Referring to the question as to what kind of things should not be presented in a drama, Aristotle pointed out that things which are either, impossible, or irrational, or morally hurtful, or contradictory, or contrary to artistic correctness"[22] should not be presented in the drama, as they would violate the principle of necessity and or probability in drama.

After discussing the significance of the principle of probability and necessity for the unified structure of the plot. Aristotle divides plot into two categories—Simple and Complex. He defines the Simple plot as follows :

> An action which is one and continuous in the sense above defined, I call simple, when the change of fortune takes place without Reversal of the Situation and without Recognition.[23]

There are two essential requirements for the simple plot—(*i*) it should be continuous and single, (*ii*) the 'shift' in it should take place without reversal or recognition. In a simple plot there should be the direct movement of the hero's fortunes from happiness to sorrow or vice versa. There should rather be an

indeterminate movement from beginning to end. It is, however, to be pointed out that "In Aristotle's view, pity and fear cannot be aroused to their fullest measure by a simple plot, that is, one in which the outcome is foreseen all the way from the beginning ; or, to put it in his terms, one in which the tragic 'change' moves in a straight line from happiness to unhappiness or the reverse."[24]

Aristotle, therefore, prefers the Complex plot, as it is capable of arousing the tragic emotions more effectively. In the Complex plot the outcome is unexpected but logical and convincing. Defining it he says :

> A Complex action is one in which the change is accompanied by such Reversal, or by Recognition, or by both. These last should arise from the internal structure of the plot, so that what follows should be the necessary or probable result of the preceding action.[25]

In a Complex plot the hero rises to a certain point which is known as the climax and then suddenly makes a retreat to the final catastrophe. Reversal and recognition are the two fundamental aspects of the Complex plot ; they are a formal necessity in the properly organized plot of a drama. However, they should not be imposed upon the plot ; they should rather automatically develop from the structure of the plot itself on the basis of probability or necessity. In the opinion of Aristotle, "It makes quite a difference whether they occur *because of* these events or merely *after* them".[26]

If the reversal and recognition are the integral parts of the Complex plot, what does Aristotle mean by them ? He defines peripety (reversal of situation) as follows :

> Reversal of the Situation is a change by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to our rule of probability or necessity.[27]

There has been a good deal of controversy over the interpretation of the term 'peripety'. Butcher translates it as 'reversal of

situation', Hardison as 'reversal of fortune' Vahlen and Humphry House as 'reversal of intention', Wimsatt & Brooks as 'reversal of expectation or frustration of purpose'. F.L. Lucas interprets it as an "unexpected catastrophe resulting from a deed unwittingly done"[28], whereas Bywater suggests that "a peripety is said to take place when something done by a man with a certain end in view has consequences of a directly opposite kind"[29]. To my mind the most convincing interpretation of this term has been suggested by Gerald Else who points out that peripety is "an *unexpected* yet *logical* shift in the events of the play from happiness to unhappiness or the reverse".[30] There may be controversy over the interpretation of this term 'peripety' but it is certain that reversal is inevitable in a complex plot and if the reversal is 'sudden' and 'unexpected', it is most likely to have a greater impact upon the audience. Aristotle's reference to Sophocles' play *Oedipus, the king* is the most appropriate example. In this play the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus and relieve him of his suspicion about his identity, but his revelation produces and relieve him of his suspicion about his identity, but his revelation produces the effect he had never intended to produce. We find peripety in *Lynceus*—a lost play of Theodectes where the hero Lynceus is being led by Denaus to be executed—but suddenly the hero is saved and Denaus killed. Peripety may be seen in Euripides' play *Iphigenia in Tauris* also where Iphigenia who is prepared to kill the stranger, recognizes at the most crucial moment that the stranger is no one but her own brother and thus saves his life.

The most forceful tragedy, however, is that tragedy where people are not struck down by their Destiny or Chance such as Job or Maurya in *Riders to the Sea*, nor are they annihilated by their enemies such as Polyxena or Henry VI. It becomes most effective only when they become the cause of their own destruction. For example, Oedipus tries his best to run away from the kingdom of his parents so that the prophecy might not prove true, but he falls a prey to his own scheme. Shylock with the help of his Bond wants to take away the life of Antonio, but he is finally entrapped in it. The trial scene in *The Marchant of Venice* may be considered to be one of the best examples of

peripety or the reversal of situation. Othello finally realises his error and curses himself for destroying the priceless jewel of his life. These are all the examples of 'peripetaias' in the true Aristotelian sense of the term. It comes very close to Horatio's utterance in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* —"purposes mistook, Fallen on the inventors' heads".

Aristotle now defines the second term 'anagnorisis' or recognition as follows :

> Recognition, as the name indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune.[31]

We normally understand the term 'anagnorisis' in the sense of the recognition or discovery of a person's identity or of things unknown before. Greek playwrights used anagnorisis as an artificial device strictly in this sense of the term. Modern critics, however, have widened its scope and gone to the extent of defining it as "the realisation of truth, the opening of the eyes, the sudden lightning flash in the darkness"[3] . It is a kind of recognition which is gained by the tragic characters through their sufferings. From these sufferings emerges a new "perception, insight, understanding, perhaps even wisdom—for which we can use Aristotle's term anagnorisis"[33]. An American playwright Maxwell Anderson admits that it is of course very difficult to find out scenes of recognition in Shakespeare's plays or in modern plays as they have become subtle in comparison to the recognition scenes in the Greek plays. Nevertheless "the element of discovery", says Anderson, "is just as important as ever. For the mainspring in the mechanism of a modern play is almost invariably a discovery by the hero of some element in his environment or in his own soul of which he has not been aware—or which he has not taken sufficiently into account.... The leading character, let me say again, must make the discovery ; it must affect him emotionally ; and it must alter his direction in the play"[31]. When the development of the incidents in the drama lead the hero from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge or self awareness, it is known as recognition. We may cite so many examples

in order to justify this interpretation of the term 'anagnorisis'. There is recognition in Shakespear's *Othello* when we find that the hero ultimately realises the true facts of his own tragedy, though as a result of his own ruin. Anagnorisis occurs in *Hamlet* in the 'play within the play' when Hamlet discovers that his uncle Claudius is undoubtedly the murderer of his father. Lear undergoes anagnorisis which changes him from a foolish and egoistic old man to a man of humility, pity and self-knowledge. Anagnorisis can be seen in Ibsen's *Doll's House* too, where we find that Nora finally realises that she had been living all these eight years with a stranger.

Now the question is whether reversal and recognition are closely related to each other or they are distinct from each other. Aristotle has hinted at both the possibilities but in his opinion they are most effective when they are combined together. To quote Aristotle himself : "The best form of recognition is coincident with a Reversal of the Situation, as in the Oedipus. Tnere are indeed other forms".[35] In *Oedipus, the king* the recognition is the discovery by Oedipus of his identity as is reported to him by the messenger. Then immediately the reversal starts and the king blinds himself. Similarly in *Iphigenia at Tauris* as soon as Iphigenia recognizes that the victim to be sacrificed is no one but her own brother, reversal at once takes place and Iphigenia who was prepared to kill the stranger, now tries her best to save his life. In these plays the recognition and reversal are so intimately interwoven that it is very difficult to separate them. There are, however, certain plays where recognition occurs without reversal and vice versa. In some plays the hero is able to learn the identity of his victim without any reversal following, such as Heracles in *Hercules Furens* and Agave in the *Bacchae*. There are other plays where reversal takes place without any recognition of the identity of the persons involved, such as Admetus in the *Alcestis* and Creon in *Antigone*.

Scenes of recognition are so significant and useful for the playwrights that, as Frye has pointed out, "although already discussed in chapters 10 and 11, further instructions for their

criticism and construction are now added in chapter 16".[63] Some critics like Hardison consider this chapter to be an interpolation, as its discussion does not add anything new to the understanding of recognition scenes in Greek tragedies. It is, however, to be pointed out that this chapter does throw some light on the subtle technicalities of recognition scenes. Hence its relevance.

In the opinion of Aristotle there are six kinds of recognition. The first and the least artistic form of recognition is the recognition by signs or marks.[37] With the help of these signs or marks recognition takes place at a crucial stage in the drama and leads to the reversal of incidents. In chapter XIX of the *Odyssey* there is the Bath scene where the old nurse Eurycleia, keeping in view the social custom, washes the feel of the stranger who is Ulysses himself in the disguised form. In the process of washing, the nurse discovers the old scar on his thigh and recognizes him. It is certainly a better way of discovery as it arises out of the incidents themselves. The inferior type of recognition is the recognition of Ulysses by the swincherds in chapter XXI. Here Ulysses himself refers to the scar on his thigh as a mark of recognition. This is certainly unusual and hence inartistic.

The second kind of recognition is the recognition invented by the poet's mind. This kind of recognition is manipulated exclusively by the poet himself without paying any regard to the principle of necessity and/or probability in the drama. It is evident from the recognition scene of Orestes in Euripides' play *Iphigenia in Tauris*. When the sacrifice is just to take place, the exclamation of Orestes, "My sister, my dear sister, from one sire/From Agamemnon sprung, turn not away", appears to be most unnatural and improbable at this moment. This statement does not arise out of the development of the incidents, but is invented by the poet himself in order to enable Iphigenia to recognize her brother.

The third form of recognition, says Aristotle, "depends on memory when the sight of some object awakens a feeling".[38]

He cites two examples in order to substantiate this type of recognition. The first is in connection with The *Cyprioe* of Dicaeogenes, a fourth century tragedian. When Teucer who is in disguised form, sees the picture of his father Telemon, he bursts into tears and is thereby recognized in Salamis. The second example is related with the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, where Ulysses, who is a stranger at the palace of king Alcinous, is so moved by the minstrel's chant in connection with the fall of Troy that he starts weeping and is thereby recognized by the king. In the words of Hardison, "Since the incident depends on a chain of prior incidents extending back to the fall of Troy, it is less arbitrary than recognition by signs or by the poet's contrivance"[39].

The fourth kind of recognition is related to the process of logical speculation. The character is supposed to argue and reach the logical conclusion. Aristotle cites the first example from Aeschylus' second play *Choephoroe* from his *Oresteia* trilogy, where Electra recognizes her brother Orestes through the process of reasoning. Aristotle next refers to the discovery by Iphigenia of her brother's identity on the basis of inference in the play of Polyidus the Sophist. He further mentions two plays—*Tydeus* and *Phincidae* which have unfortunately been lost.

The fifth kind of recognition refers to the recognition by false reasoning which is of course a difficult concept. Here the text is ambiguous and the play mentioned, *i.e. Ulysses the False Messenger* is not available to us. It has been considered as the recognition by bluff which is often used by the detectives. It is better to quote Aristotle himself : "A said that no one else was able to bend the bow ; ...hence B (the disguised Odysseus) imagined that A would > recognize the bow which, in fact, he had not seen ; and to bring about a recognition by this means—the expectation that A would recognize the bow—is false inference"[40]. Lane Cooper[41], however, tries to make it clear by the following example. Joseph's brethren show Jacob the coat they had dipped in goat's blood, and Jacob says : 'It is my son's coat ; an evil beast hath devoured him'.

The sixth kind of recognition is the best type of recognition as it "arises from the incidents themselves where the startling discovery is made by natural means"[42]. Aristotle illustrates it by his most favourite play—*Oedipus, the king* by Sophocles. In this play an astounding revelation is made to the king leading to the recognition of his own identity out of the natural growth of the plot without taking recourse to the process of inference or evidence of tokens or scars. At the end of the chapter Aristotle categorizes these six kinds of recognition in order of priority—recognition arising from the plot is ranked first, then comes the recognition through reasoning and last comes the recognition through signs or external aids.

After discussing reversal and recognition Aristotle takes up a third component of plot—pathos or the Scene of Suffering. Now the question is : what does the Scene of Suffering mean ? Aristotle defines it as follows :

> The Scene of Suffering is a destructive or painful action, such as death on the stage, bodily agony, wounds and the like[42].

Aristotle had already defined tragedy as pitiable and fearful and his definition of the Scene of Suffering certainly refers to its pitiable and fearful content. Although he does not elaborate it further, one thing atleast is certain that most of the tragedies possess one major pathetic scene which deeply effects the whole drama. The pathetic scene in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon,* for example, is seen in the murder of the king by his own wife Clytemnestra. We see example of pathetic scene in *Oedipus, the king* when Oedipus blinds himself on account of the unthinkable mistake that he had committed, or in Ruripides' *Medea* when Medea kills her own children in a mood of vengeance against her husband.

Aristotle now proposes to discuss "what the poet should aim at, and what he should avoid, in constructing his plots ; and by what means the specific effect of Tragedy will be produced"[43]. Though different elements in tragedy can be combined in so many different ways, Aristotle tells us which

combination will be able to produce the best tragic effect. In his opinion a perfect tragedy should be based on a complex rather than a simple plot and it should be able to excite pity and fear. He then suggests that the following three types of complex plot should be avoided, as they would never be able to produce an ideal tragedy :

1. There is a complex-fatal plot where the protagonist is a perfectly virtuous man who comes to an unhappy end in the last. Aristotle, however, suggests that "the change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity ; for this moves neither pity nor fear ; it merely shocks us"[44]. It is certainly repellent to our ethical sense to see a perfectly virtuous man falling from prosperity to adversity. A perfect man make no "miscalculation" and even then if he meets with a fatal end, it violates the principle of probability and/or necessity which are the basic requirements of drama. This type of plot fails to produce any sensible or intelligible relation between the character of the hero and his fatal end. The only possible justification may be the role of chance which brought the hero to such a tragic end. But we should not forget that Aristotle considers the plot involving chance to be the worst type of plot. It lacks unity and coherence. It seems as if episodes have been strung together in order to make a viable plot. Such a plot fails to produce pity and fear no matter how terrible the particular incidents are, because the downfall of a supremely good hero is merely shocking to the spectators. We should not, however, think that Aristotle is here preaching didacticism or is talking of poetic justice. Hardison has rightly remarked that "Aristotle merely insists that in the best tragedy there must be a relation between character and destiny. If no such relation exists, the tragedy lacks unity—it becomes incoherent and, of course, cannot fulfil its tragic "function"[45].

Butcher, however, does not agree with the stand taken by Aristotle. He points out that "Aristotle had not to go beyond the Greek stage to find a guiltless heroine whose death does not shock the moral sense. Nothing but a misplaced ingenuity,

or a resolve at all costs to import a moral lesson into the drama, can discover in Antigone any fault or failing which entailed on her suffering as its due penalty"[46] Butcher's opinion, however, that Antigone is a flawless character is open to question. The flaw in her character lies in the fact that she considers the partial truth to be the absolute truth. No one has the right to deny the equally justifiable claim of others just for the satisfaction of his own claim exclusively. There may be controversy over the issue as to whether the denial of even the burial ceremonies to a traitor is a humanely acceptable proposition or not ; but no one should ignore this fact that the State cannot encourage traitors and allow them or their relatives to keep the law in their own hands. This is what Antigone does and therefore comes to a tragic end.

2. Aristotle next talks of a complex fortunate plot where an extremely evil protagonist is shown passing from adversity to prosperity. He is of the opinion that "nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy ; it possesses no single tragic quality, it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear"[47]. The presentation of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity is really the most untragic situation as it cannot arouse the proper tragic emotions. Such a plot should not be presented on the stage as instead of arousing pity and fear it would lead to the arousal of 'the righteous anger' or 'moral indignation' in the hearts of the spectators. Butcher in this regard has rightly stated that "the doubt and disturbance which arise from the spectacle of real life will be reproduced and perhaps intesified. In the drama our view of universe needs to be harmonised, not confused ; we expect to find the connexion of cause and effect in a form that satisfies the rational faculty"[48].

3. The third type of plot is the complex-fatal plot where a 'villainous' protagonist is seen moving from prosperity to adversity. In a drama if the villainous protagonist gradually destroys himself or is destroyed on account of his evil designs, it is satisfying to the moral sense of the spectators. It is the principle of morality that vice ultimately brings ruin to the

sinner. Hence this type of plot is the best kind of plot from the didactic point of view and is certainly most edifying. Aristotle too admits it but with his own reservations :

> A plot of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves. Such an event, therefore, will be neither pitiful nor terrible.[49]

Aristotle's argument is quite convincing. Emotions of pity and fear are not produced when we see an evil man punished and good man rewarded. Pity cannot arise in our heart for a bad man like Richard III who fully deserves his misfortune. It may be edifying but it is bound to be tedious and sentimental also. It is not the function of catharsis to suggest that he got exactly what he deserved. If catharsis means clarification of pitiable and fearful incidents, there is no need of clarification in such a plot, as the issues at stake are already clear.

4. Aristotle at last discusses the fourth type of plot which he considers to be the best for an ideal tragedy. It fulfils all the requirements of a powerful tragedy. It is known as the complex-fatal plot but it is different from the first type of complex-fatal plot in the sense that whereas the protagonist in the first type of plot is 'an unqualifiedly virtuous man', in the fourth type of plot he is neither too good nor too bad but has a leaning towards goodness. He is such a character that he stands midway, as Aristotle himself has stated, "between these two extremes,—that of a men who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error of frailty. He must be one who is highly renowned and prosperous, a personage like Oedipus, Thyestes, or other illustrious men of such families".[50] Aristotle is right in his view that the hero in such a pot should be neither supremely good nor entirely depraved. He should be just and good but not perfect. He should meet his downfall not through some vice or depravity in character but through some hamartia. Fyfe has rightly pointed out that "there must be some error or

some flaw in his character—something wrong about him—which is the cause of his downfall. But we must never feel that he deserves it. It must be a venial error, a 'little rift within the lute''.[51] Butcher's remark is also very significant in this regard and makes Aristotle's stand very clear : "As it is, we arrive at the result that the tragic hero is a man of noble nature, like ourselves in elemental feelings and emotions; idealised, indeed, but with so large a share of our common humanity as to enlist our eager interest and sympathy. He falls from a position of lofty eminence; and the disaster that wrecks his life may be traced not to deliberate wickedness, but to some great error or frailty''.[52]

Aristotle's use of the term 'hamartia' in connection with the character of the hero which leads to his downfall, has led to a good deal of controversy among critics. It has been interpreted by different critics in different ways. It has been explained as 'flaw' by Butcher and Bradley, as 'error' by Bywater, Rostagni and Humphry House, as 'sin' by Lane Cooper and as 'mistake' by Hardison and F.L. Lucas. Now the question is: which interpretation is most appropriate in the context of Aristotle's use of 'hamartia' in chapter XIII of his *Poetics* ?

Let us first look at the origin of the term 'hamartia'. Etymologically it is derived from the verb *hamartanein* which means 'to miss the mark, to err, to fail'. Hamartia is infact a metaphor taken from archery and literally refers to a 'mis-shot' or 'missing of the mark'. V. Rai has explained it clearly in the following lines : "you shoot an arrow in one direction with the best of intentions and yet it so happens that it has hurt one you never wanted to hurt. In other words, it is simply an error of judgement caused by ignorance or inadequate knowledge of facts for which the character is not morally responsible''.[53] In the Greek *Old Testament* the word 'hamartia' has been used in the context of 'sin'. The interpretation of 'hamartia' as 'sin' in the context of Aristotle's *Poetics* is certainly not acceptable, as Aristotle has clearly stated that the misfortune of hero should not come about by any vice or moral depravity.

Though Butcher admits that there are various 'shades of meaning' so far as the interpretation of 'hamartia' is concerned, he clearly suggests that it is a 'flaw' in the character of the hero. It may denote, as Butcher has pointed out, "a defect of character, distinct on the one hand from an isolated error or fault, and, on the other, from the vice which has its seat in a depraved will. This use, though rarer, is still Aristotelian. Under this head would be included any human frailty or moral weakness, a flaw of character that is not tainted by a vicious purpose"[54]. In order to illustrate his point of view Butcher suggests that Hamlet, Othello, Lear, Macbeth and Coriolanus met with their tragic ends through some defect or flaw in their character. Hamlet's indecision of excessive reflectiveness, Othello's credulity, Lear's vanity, Macbeth's ambition and Coriolanus' pride were the tragic flaws in their character which led them to their fatal end.

We should not, however, forget that Aristotle used the term 'hamartia' in the context of Sophocles' ideal tragedy *Oedipus, the king*. Now, the question is : Does 'harmatia' mean either a 'tragic flaw' or a 'tragic error' in the context of Oedipusy ? Whereas the 'flaw' refers to the physiological set-up and is the result of a permanent state of mind, error refers to an isolated act resulting from the ignorance of some material fact or circumstance. Though Oedipus is a man of hasty and impulsive temperament with too much of self-confidence, his temperament does not become the cause of his tragic end. Is he really in a position to alter the course of his destiny which is almost predetermined ? It is really due to circumstance or the ignorance of parentage that he meets with his tragic end. Anything wrong committed under ignorance or on account of the lack of proper information, cannot be considered to be a 'flaw' in the character of the hero. It is just an error resulting from the ignorance of a particular fact. That is why Bywater and House interpret 'hamartia' as an 'error'.

Lucas and Hardison, however, try to explain 'hamartia, as a mistake rather than as a vice or sin. Lucas points out that when "we seek the 'hamartia' in more modern tragedy like

Ibsen's it becomes clearer than ever that an intellectual mistake is all that the term need mean"[55]. In Ibsen's play *The Ghosts* Mrs. Alving's submission to the marriage-yoke with her husband Captain Alvin who was the patient of a virus disease, proved to be her fatal mistake and ultimately led to her fatal doom.

When we scrutinize all these translations of 'hamartia' as 'sin' or 'flaw' or 'error' or 'mistake', we come to the conclusion that no single English term can convey the full meaning of the Greek term 'hamartia'. In general we may say that anything wrong committed either on account of the lack of proper information or on account of the particular type of hero's temperament or due to typical circumstances, is 'hamartia'. The most important thing about 'hamartia' is that it should always be 'unintentional'. The audience should not suspect the motive of the hero otherwise they will have no pity for the sufferer, as pity is always aroused on account of undeserved misfortune.

5. Aristotle has referred to four types of complex plot only. Another possible type of plot which is known as the complex-fortunate plot, has been left out by him, though he cites examples of this type of plot in his *Poetics*. In this kind of plot the protagonist who is a good man, may be shown as rising from adversity to prosperity. Euripides's *Iphigenia in Tauris* may be cited as an ideal example. Iphigenia has to pass through a good deal of suffering for no fault of her own, but she is ultimately reunited with her brother and the play comes to a happy ending. Though Aristotle considers the complex fatal plot to be the most artistic plot as it produces greater pity and fear, he has a high regard for the complex-fortunate plot also, as is evident from his several favourable references to *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

Now the most remarkable but very controversial issue is whether Aristotle considers the complex-fatal plot to be superior to the complex-fortunate plot or vice versa. His statements appear to be self-contradictory on this issue. In chapter XIII of his *Poetics* he points out that almost all the best tragedies are based on the stories of a few families which were involved in fatal deeds and provided material for fatal plots.

> Now, the best tragedies are founded on the story of a few houses, on the fortunes of Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and those others who have done or suffered something terrible. A tragedy, then, to be perfect according to the rules of art should be of this costruction.[56]

Aristotle here wants to suggest that if the fatal endings had not been suitable for perfect tragedies, dramatists would have turned away from those myths and derived their subject-matter from elsewhere. Aristotle considers unhappy ending to be the 'right ending'. In his opinion, "...such plays, if well worked out, are the most tragic in effect ; and Euripides, faculty though he may be in the general management of his subject, yet is felt to be the most tragic of the poets"[57]. His plays are most effective on the stage as well as in dramatic contests, organized frequently in ancient Greece. Though he is not perfect in the art of plot-construction and makes frequent use of sensationalism, rhetoric and *deux ex machina*, he is considered to be the most powerful dramatist in Greek literature.

In Chapter XIV of his *Poetics*, on the other hand, Aristotle considers tragedy with a happy ending to be the best type of tragedy. It is evident from his following sentences :

> This last case is the best, as when in the Cresphontes Merope is about to slay her son, but, recognizing who he is, spares his life. So in the Iphigenia, the sister recognizes the brother just in time.[58]

Aristotle considers that kind of recognition to be the best type of recognition where the tragic deed is contemplated but then averted in the last moment. That is why he considers the plot of *Iphigenia in Tauris* to be the best type of plot and we all know that it is a complex-fortunate plot with a happy ending. Aristotle, however, adds that the dramatist, while using such plots, is governed by the 'weakness of the spectators' and the 'wishes of his audience'. Now the question is whether the play is an end in itself or it is a means to an end which is nothing

but the elevation of our human consciousness. It is the main function of a work of art to provide a rationale to the audience to show a cause-effect relationship, a proper relation between the act of the hero and his end. In this context Anderson has rightly stated that "...in audience watching a play will go along with it only when the leading character responds in the end to what it considers a higher moral impulse that moved him at the beginning of the story, though the audience will of course define morality as it pleases and in the terms of its own day"[59]. If a work of art fails to do so, it intensifies our doubts and aggravate our misunderstanding. The discovery of the proper relation between cause and effect should not be considered as a device to supplement the weakness of the spectators. Moreover, as Fyfe has pointed out, "a sudden reprieve as the eleventh hour serves powerfully to stimulate the relief of tears"[60]. The German producers of Ibsen's *Doel's House* so repeatedly modified the ending of the drama that the dramatist himself had to device a happy ending for them. Similarly the ending of Shakespeare's *King Lear* and Pinero's *The Profligate* had to be altered in order to suit the requirements of the audience. The distate for the fatal ending is not very rare ; it is rather the fundamental requirement of the people.

Aristotle further discusses the difference between the strucral effects of the plot and the effects produced by spectacle. In his opinion though the effects of pity and fear may be produced by spectacular means, the effects produced by the 'inner structure' of the play are definitely more powerful. Spectacular effects are less artistic and more dependent on extraneous aid. It is mainly the concern of the actor or the producer rather than the dramatist. Structure is certainly more significant than spectale in drama. For the most effective impression, says Aristotle, "the plot ought to be so constructed that, even without the aid of the eye, he who hears the tale told, will thrill with harror and melt to pity at what takes place. This is the impression we should receive from hearing the story of the Oedipus"[61]. Those who depend on spectacular means for creating the tragic effect, do not succeed in creating the emotions of pity and fear proper to a tragedy, but rather the emotion of the monstrous or

sensational. A drama which depends for its effect on incidents rather than on the structure, does not precisely possess those elements which produce the proper tragic effect.

When Aristotle says that pity and fear should primarily arise from the structure of the plot, it does not mean that the dramatist should exclude such incidents which are pitiable and fearful in themselves. He considers such incidents as 'incidents of suffering' or pathos. They are also known as tragic deeds. Now the question is : what are the actions or the situations which appear to us as pitiable and fearful ? Aristotle says :

> Actions capable of this effect must happen between person who are either friends or enemies or indifferent to one another. If an enemy kills an enemy, there is nothing to excite pity either in the act or the intention, except so far as the suffering in itself is pitiful. So again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic incident occurs between those who are near or dear to one another if, for example, a brother kills, or intends to kill, a brother, a son his father, a mother her son, a son his mother, or any other deed of the kind is done these are the situations to be looked for by the poet.[62]

Aristotle here discusses three possible types of tragic deeds which may provide the subject-matter for the tragic dramatist. The first possibility that he discusses is the involvement of two parties which are enemies to each other. If a person kills his enemy, neither his act nor his intention excites pity, though the resultant suffering is of course pitiful in the common sense of the term. The technical meaning of the term 'pity' in Aristotle's *Poetics* does not, however, refer to this kind of suffering. It rather refers to the suffering caused by undeserved misfortune—misfortune that the person neither aspires for nor brings on himself. Here since both the parties involved are enemies of each other, each party aspires for the destruction of the other party and is consequently prepared to face destruction itself. That is why we don't pity Oedipus' father Laius because when Oedipus kills Laius, neither he nor the spectators are under the impres-

sion that he has killed his own father. Hence the question of pity for Laius does not arise.

The second possibility is that the two agents involved in the tragic situation are indifferent to each other. They fall in a tragic situation accidently. Since this tragic situation is the result of merely a chance, such a situation can neither produce pity nor fear. The third possibility is the tragic deed where there is an involvemen of friends or blood relatives. When friends or blood relatives are involved in a tragic deed, it is infact capable of producing pity and fear in the true Aristotelian sense. Aristotle mentions various types of family relationships which may be involved in tragic deeds. A murder or the like may be committed or contemplated by a brother on brother such as Eteocles and Polyneices in the *Phoenissae*, by a mother on her children such as Medea in *Medea* or by a son on his mother as is evident from Orestes against Clytemestra in Aeschylus' *Choephoroe* and Euripides' *Electra*. Aristotle suggests that the dramatist should always select such situations in order to have the maximum tragic effect. For this purpose he should look back to the 'traditional stories' of the Greek myths and legends but with his own discretion. He further refers to the four possible ways of handling the traditional meterial skillfully :

(*i*) In the manner of the older poets the tragic deed may be done consciously and knowingly, as in Euripides' play *Medea* Medea consciously kills her children. Other examples may be seen in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* and Sophocles' *Ajax* which give an account of premeditated murders.

(*ii*) The tragic deed may be done but in ignorance and the relationship discovered afterwards. It is evident from Sophocles' *Oedipus the king* where Oedipus unknowingly quarrels with his father and kills him. The relationship is discovered afterwards and Oedipus at last comes to know that he has killed his own father. Another example may be cited from *wounded Odysseus* in which Telegonus, the illegitimate son of Ulysses, comes to Ithaca in search of his father but wounds him fatally in ignorance.

Similar instances may be seen in *Sohrab and Rustum* and Euripides' *Bacchae* also.

(*iii*) In this category the character, being conscious of all the relevent facts, plan to commit the tragic act but then desists. This is the worst type of tragic act and therefore it is rarely found is drama. Aristotle is of the opinion that "It is shocking without being tragic, for no disaster follows".[63] He cites the example of Haemon in Sophocles' *Antigone*. In this play Haemon, while embracing the dead body of his beloved Antigone, sees his father Creon and threatens to kill him but Creon escapes.

(*iv*) Referring to the last type of tragic act Aristotle says that it takes place "when some one is about to do an irreparable deed through ignorance, and makes the discovery before it is done"[64]. This is the best type of tragic deed as here recognition precedes the fatal act and the tragic deed is averted rather than performed. In order to illustrate this type of drama Aristotle cites three examples from the Greek plays :

(*a*) *Cresphontes*, a lost play of Euripides, in which Polyphontes kills king Cresphontes, captures his kingdom and takes away his wife Merope. When Merop's son comes back and tries to seek vengeance, his own mother Merope is about to kill him but then she recognizes who he is and therefore spares her son's life.

(*b*) *Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides in which Iphigenia is just to sacrifice her own brother Orestes but, then, suddenly they recognize each other and Iphigenia spares har brother's life. Aristotle was deeply moved by this type of 'tragic deed' and that is why he considered it to be the best type.

(*c*) *Hells* of an unknown author, in which the son who is on the verge of giving his mother up to her enemy, recognizes her in time and saves her ultimately.

In order of priority Aristotle considers category no. 4 to be the best type, then comes category no. 1 followed by category

no. 2. The last is category no. 3 which is supposed to be the worst type of tragic deed. Referring to the question as to why most of the Greek tragedy writers turned for subject-matter only to a few families in ancient Greece, Aristotle pointed out that they were forced to "have recourse to those house whose history contains moving incidents like these".[65]

Chapter XIV comes to an end with a formal conclusion, "Enough has now been said concerning the structure of the incidents, and the right kind of plot."[66]. Here there is a reference to the prolonged discussion of plot from chapter VI to chapter XIV. Though the substantial discussion of plot comes to an end by the end of chapter XIV, the matter is taken up again in chapters XVI, XVII and XVIII. Although nothing new has been added to the discussion of the structure of the drama, these later chapters may be regarded as supplementary notes full of practical observations which elaborate and clarify Aristotle's earlier arguments.

Since chapter XVI has already been discussed in the context of the meaning and process of recognition, it is needless to take up that chapter again. Hence we would pass on to the consideration of chapters XVII and XVIII which discuss tragedy from the point of view of the creative writer as well as from the point of view of the critic or the spectator evaluating a finished work of art. While constructing the plot of a tragedy the dramatist should keep three things in mind. The first is that he "should place the scene, as far as possible, before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness as if he were a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it, and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies"[67]. It is evident from the fault censured in Carcinus, that is, the return of Amphiaraus from the temple. This fault would have gone unnoticed if it had not been observed by the spectators. The play could not succeed on the stage simply because the spectators were offended by its incongruity. Though the play is not available to us, the point can be made clear by a reference to chapter XXIV of *Poetics* :

> Thus, the pursuit of Hector would be ludicrous if placed on the stage the Greeks standing still and not joining in the pursuit, and Achilles waving them back. But in the epic poem the absurdity passes unnoticed.[68]

The second thing that the dramatist should keep in mind is that he should try his best to work out his play with appropriate gestures so that it might be appealing to the spectators.

The third thing that the dramatist should do is that "he should first sketch its general outline, and then fill in the episode and amplify in detail".[69] It is the most significant task of the poet to give "universal form" to the different aspects of the story whether the story be ready made or invented and then to present them in general outline. It should conform to the principles of probability and or necessity, as has already been discussed by Aristotle in chapter IX. In order to illustrate his concept of the general plan of drama Aristotle gives the example of one of his most favourite tragedies, that is, Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*. It is better to quote Aristotle himself:

> A young girl is sacrificed; she disappears mysteriously from the eyes of those who sacrificed her: she is transported to another country, where the custom is to offer up all strangers to the goddess. To this ministry she is appointed. Some time later her own brother chances to arrive. The fact that the oracle for some reason ordered him to go there, is outside the general plan of the play. The purpose, again, of his coming is outside the action proper. However, he comes, he is seized, and, when on the point of being sacrificed, reveals who he is. The mode of recognition may be either that of Euripides or of Polyidus, in whose play he exclaims very naturally :— 'So it was not my sister only, but I too who was deemed to be sacrificed; and by that remark he is saved.[70]

After the general plan has been worked out, the dramatist should assign proper names to the different characters, as the naming of characters determines whether the story is historical

or mythical or purely fictitious. It also provides some important clues for characterization in connection with its appropriateness and life-likeness.

When the general outline of the drama has been established, the dramatist should extend it by filling in the episodes which are relevant to the main story. He should retain such episodes which are 'appropriate' to the play and eliminate those which are irrelevant. In order to illustrate it Aristotle gives the example of Euripides' *Orestes.* In this play the narration of Orestes madness which led to his seizure by Taurians and the consequent ritual of purification for his deliverance are the examples of 'appropriate' episodes.

In the opinion of Aristotle episodes in drama are short whereas they can be extended in a leisurely manner in the epic. The epic is certainly more conducive than the drama to the use of episodes which are digressive but delightful. An example of this type of episode can be cited from Ulysses' narration of his adventures to king Alcinous. Aristotle gives the general outline of the plot of *Odyssey* in the following manner.

> A certain man is absent from home for many years ; he is jealously watched by Poseidon, and left desolate. Meanwhile his home is in a wretched plight suitors are wasting his substance and plotting against his son. At length, tempest-tost, he himself arrives ; he makes certain persons acquainted with him ; he attacks the suitors with his own hand, and is himself preserved while he destroys them. This is the essence of the plot ; the rest is episode.[71]

When Aristotle says that 'the rest is episode', the word 'episode' is certainly close to our modern version of 'delightful digression'. The dramatist uses episodes for pleasant digressions without making any significant alteration in the main outline of the drama. We thus see that Aristotle suggests some guidelines which are very practical and useful for the dramatist in the composition of a drama.

Aristotle further discusses the complication-resolution theory which has not been taken up earlier in the formal discussion of plot from chapters VI to XIV. He says :

> Every tragedy falls into two parts—Complication and Unravelling or *Denouement*. Incidents extraneous to the action are frequently combined with a portion of the action proper, to form the complication ; the rest is the Unravelling. By the complication I mean all that extends from the beginning of the action to the part which marks the turning-point to good or bad fortune. The unravelling is that which extends from the beginning of the change to the end.[72]

To sequence of events that leads up to the climax in drama is known as complication whereas the incidents that take place after the climax till the end of the drama are regarded as part of Resolution or Denouement. Aristotle gives the illustration from Theodocte's lost play *Lynceus*. In the play the incidents presupposed in the drama, the seizure of the child and his parents and Lynceus being accused of murder and likely to be executed form part of the Complication. The Resolution or Denouement starts from the accusation of murder and goes up to the fortunate conclusion. We may cite Ibsen's play *The Ghosts* as another example to illustrate his point of view. Here the complication comprises the action from the beginning to the stage of climax when Mrs. Alving's life-long struggle appears to be futile. The resolution starts with the most tragic realisation on the part of Mrs. Alving that she was an active though unconscious participant in her own suffering as well as in the suffering of her unlucky son on account of her union with her 'tainted' husband. The five stages of the plot in modern drama such as (*i*) initial incident, (*ii*) rising action, (*iii*) climax, (*iv*) resolution, (*v*) conclusion or catastrophe are certainly based on Aristotle's division of the Greek play into Complication and Denoument. The first three stages form the complication whereas the last two the Denouement in the drama.

So far as the three Dramatic Unities are concerned, Aristotle is emphatic only about the Unity of Action. The Dramatic unities are the technique of dramatic representation which help the dramatist in the maintaining coherence and harmony in a work of art. Unity refers to a sense of oneness in many. It is "the principle of limit, without which an object loses itself in the region of the undefined, the indeterminate, the accidental. By means of unity the plot becomes individual and also intelligible"[73]. It is therefore the duty of the dramatist to present the scattered but relevant incidents and show a cause-and-effect relationship among them. Artistotle's *Poetics* clearly asserts that there should be an organic unity among the various incidents of the plot. It should neither be wanting in anything for its perfection not having anything in excess without being relevant.

If we say, as is normally said, that Aristotle advocated the use of all the three Unities in drama, it would be an example of gross misrepresentation and misinterpretation. The mischief infact started during the Renaissance period and the real discredit formulating the three Unites goes to a Renaissance critic Castelvetro who in his edition of Aristotle's *Poetics* in 1570 took the authority of Aristotle and boldly asserted that a playwright should observed all three Unities. In 1583 Sir Philip Sidney too in his *Defence of Poesy* took the same stand. The doctrine now became so popular that, in the words of F.L. Lucas, "no intelligent person's imagination could lend credence to a play that was so unreal as to represent more than place or one day."[74] It was only Dr. Johnson who in his *Preface to Shakespeare* strongly repudiated the unities of time and place and gave importance to the Unity of Action only.

It is really very surprising to know how Aristotle was misinterpreted for so many centuries. In his *Poetics* he repeatedly says that the Unity of Action is of paramount importance and the other two Unities are dependent on and consequential to it. In chapter VI Aristotle defines tragedy as imitation of an action (that is, a single action) which should be serious, complete and

a certain magnitude. In subsequent chapters also he puts emphasis on the Unity of Action only. It is, as Butcher has stated, "an organic unity, an inward principle which reveals itself in the form of an outward whole. It is opposed indeed to plurality, but not opposed to the idea of manifoldness and variety ; for simple as it is in one sense, it admits of all the complexity of vital phenomena. The whole in which it is manifested, is complete in its parts, the parts themselves being arranged in a fixed order, and structurally related so that none can be removed, none transposed, without disturbing the organism"[76] In other words, we may say that the dramatist should observe the principle of necessity and/or probability in drama. Each incident should result from what has gone before and must lead to what follows. This causal relationship between what has happened and what is going to happen is the essential requirement of the Unity of Action. This does not, however, admit the presence of the sub-plot or underplot or the mixture of serious and the comic in drama. If Aristotle had to observe and evaluate the Elizabethan dramas, he would have considered them as ill constructed as they contain not only a mixture of the serious and the comic but more than one action also.

Aristotle makes no attempt to prescribe any specific rules so far as the possible length of a play is concerned. He is, however, of the opinion that a certain magnitude is essential for the 'harmonious evolution of a whole', a whole which should have a beginning, a middle and an end. He further points out that any object which is either infinitely large or infinitesimally small, cannot be a suitable object for artistic representation. The whole of the Trojan War even if it has a beginning and an end, is so vast that it cannot be presented by dramatist in a single play. The dramatist should be governed by the law of beauty as well as by the law of comprehensibility.

Whereas the Unity of Action is the most fundamental and controlling force in drama, the other two Unities—Unity of Time and Unity of Place—are of secondary and derivative importance only. The Renaissance critics Scaliger and Castelvetro, how-

ever, stated that Unity of Time should also be observed in drama. In the seventeenth century France and in Restoration England this view became very popular. The Unity of Time was now considered to be an important factor essential for the compactness of plot. Those who support this view, quote the following passages from Aristotle's *Poetics* in order to justify their stand :

(*i*) "They differ again, in their length : for Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun, or but slightly to exceed this limit whereas the Epic action has no limit of time".[76]

(*ii*) "Moreover, the art attains its and within narrower limits, for the concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one which is spread over a long time and so diluted".[77]

It is evident from Aristotle's first remark that he is only comparing tragedy and epic poetry and referring to the obvious distinction between the two so far as their length is concerned. Moreover he is making a rough generalisation of the observed facts and not suggesting a rule which should be strictly adhered to. There has been a controvery regarding the interpretation of the phrase 'a single revolution of the sun', but the most acceptable proposition is that it refers to a period of twenty four hours. It means that only those incidents which have taken place within twenty four hours in the life of an individual, should be presented in the tragedy. Some critics like Dacier and Corneille have tried to confuse the time-limit fixed for the drama with the time being given to the performance of a tragedy in the theatre. The comparison between tragedy and epic poetry in terms of the theatre becomes meaningless as epic poetry is not to be performed in the theatre but is to be read only. Hence the time-limit here refers to the time taken by the incidents in the drama and not to the time being spent over the performance of the drama in the theatre.

The second statement of Aristotle refers to the desirability of 'narrower limits' for the 'concentrated effect' of the drama and not necessarily to the limit of twenty four hours. There are so many existing Greek tragedies which don't conform to this rule of Unity of Time, as is evident from the following examples. In the *Eumenides* we see a long gap of months and years between the opening of the play and the next scene. In Euripides' *Suppliants* so many days are taken in raising an army in Athens, in gaining victory and in its final return. Similarly *Women of Trachis*, *The Persians*, *Oedipus at Colonus* and *Agamemnon* also don't observe the Unity of Time. Shakespear's plays such as *Macbeth, Henry V Antony and Cleopatra* and *The Winters Tale* don't stick to the rule of the Unity of Time as we see in these plays not only a gap of months but of years.

Wherever this rule is observed whether in the Greek tragedy or in the French classical tragedy of Corneille and Racine, it was observed only as a matter of convention rather than as an essential rule. We may observe an adherence to this rule in Milton's *Samson Ogonistes*, Swinburne's *Atlanta*, Ibsen's *The Ghosts*, Masfield's *Tragedy of Nan*, Corneille's *The Cid* and in most of the plays of Ben Jonson where the time-limit does not exceed even the 'single revolution of the sun'. In some of the 20th century plays such as Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* Pinter's *The Caretaker* and McGrath's *Events while Guarding the Bofors Gun* the playwrights have tried to confine the action of the drama to a limited period but certainly not to a period of twenty four hours only.

So far as the Unity of Place is concerned, there is not even a single sentence in Aristotle's *Poetics* which indicates that it is essential for drama. The change of place was not shown on the Greek stage ; it was just reported to the spectators by the chorus The main reason was that in those days it was not possible to change the scene of the place in the absence of the proper provision of the curtain-fall. There is, however, no suggestion given by Aristotle that the action of the entire drama should be confined to a single place. Moreover in our present age when the change of place on the stage is not a problem at all, it is

useless to think of the Unity of place as the basic requirement of drama. There are even some Greek plays where we see the change of place. In *Ajax* there is change of place from hero's tent to the sea-shore and in the *Eumenides* from Delphi to Athens.

The neo-classical critics who suggested that the Unity of place should be observed in the drama, were of the opinion that since the spectator does not change his place while seeing the drama, any change of place on the stage would appear to be unreal and deceptive to the spectator. We should, however, he very clear on this issue that, as Coleridge has pointed out, there is a 'willing suspension of disbelief' on the part of the spectator while he is seeing a drama in the theatre. Otherwise the spectator is always aware of the face that the stage is but a stage and the players are only players.

II

In chapter XXI of *NŚ* Bharata defines plot (itivrtta) as "the body of drama"[78]. If 'rasa' is the soul of drama, plot is certainly the body of drama through which the entire revelation has to be made. It is like an organism wherein everything is well ordered and leads to a fruitful end. It possess five *arthaprakṛtis* (components), five *avasthas* (stages of development) and five *sandhis* (junctures), as they are essential for the proper construction and effective development of the plot.

Bharata suggests that the plot is of two kinds—Principal (ādhikārika) and subsidiary (prāsaṅgika). The principal plot is directly concerned with the activities of the hero whereas the rest is considered to be the part of the subsidiary plot. The issue for which the hero is renowned and to which he appears to be committed, forms part of the principal plot, whereas the subsidiary plot furthers the purpose of the main plot. Bharata has clearly explained and differentiated them in the following lines :

> An (assemblage of) acts which are fabricated with a view to (lit. by reason of) the attainment of (some particular) result, is to be known as the Principal plot. (Acts) other than these constitute a Subsidiary plot. The attainment of the object and its exaltation which the ingenuity of the playwright (lit. poet) plans by means of the associated characters (lit. Heroes) acting in a regular manner (lit.) (lit. resorting to rules), constitute the Principal Plot on account of an attainment of the result. And any incident (lit. anything) mentioned for helping any other (incident) in it, is called the Subsidiary Plot.[79]

The principal plot is concerned with the main goal of the drama with which the hero is basically concerned, whereas the subsidiary plot works only as an instrument to achieve and promote the principal object. In Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* for example, the principal plot is concerned with the relationship between Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā whereas the Viduṣaka incident, the Durvāṣas incident and the fisherman incident form the subsidiary plots. It is the most significant duty of the dramatist to present the theme in such a manner that it may appear as a composite whole. All the incidents in drama should be presented in such a way that each stage leads to the growth of the next stage and finally to the culmination of the whole action to one point. That is why S. Chattopadhyaya[80] believes that the idea of a 'mono-centric' plot has been finally established in the field of Indian dramaturgy. It has close resemblance to the Aristotalian idea of unity of action.

Bharata further discusses the five component parts (arthaprakṛtis) of plot which help the dramatist in maintaining the proper and harmonious development of the drama :

> The five Elements of the plot are—the Germ (bīja), the Prominent point (bindu), the Episode (patākā) the Episodical Incident (prakarī) and Denouement (Kārya).[81]

The three elements of the plot—the Germ (bīja), the Prominent Point (bindu) and the Denouement (kārya) are the essential

features of every plot or the Principal plot ; whereas the other two elements of the plot—the Episode (patākā) and the Episodical Incident (prakarī) are needed only when the dramatis has to introduce a Subsidiary Plot. The dramatist should use them cautiously so that he might be able to give a beautiful unified structure to the drama. In this connection Bharata's remark is quite significant :

> Of these, what serves the purpose or leads to excellence, has to be emphasized, the rest are non-essential.[82]

In the very beginning of the drama the dramatist should sow the 'germ' (bīja) of his plot and then try to work out its development in such a manner that the plot goes on expanding in ever widening circles like a drop (bindu) of water. The expansion of the plot should be made possible by the use of varied actions and various types of episodes. "It is by such inclusion of incidents, events, episodes and actions of characters", says G.K. Bhat, "that the plot development is done, till the dramatic action comes to a close, accomplishing the expected fruit (kārya)"[83].

Significantly Bharata's observations imply the organic metaphor of a tree which passes through these stages—the germ, the sprout, its development into branches and leaves, the flowers and the fruits. The ultimate purpose of the seed is served when it gives birth to the fruit. Just as the tree in its different stages of fulfilment starts with the seed and ends with the fruit, the plot in a drama starts with the germ which leads to the realisation of fruit in the end. Referring to the similarity between the two, B. Bhattacharya has rightly said, "... as in the case of the tree, there is a basic unity running from the seed up to the fruit, linking the life-force of the tree with the various manifestations of it in the form of the sprouts, branches, flowers etc., so in the case of the drama there is a basic unity underlying the entire plot and a linking of it with its outcome in the form of the actions of the hero"[84].

Bharata has explained all the five component parts of the plot and discussed their significance in the construction of the drama. Let us take them one by one :—

(*i*) **The Seed** (bīja)—In Sanskrit dramatic theory the seed is supposed to be the genesis of the plot. It is very significant from the dramatic point of view as it leads the drama to its desired end. It pervades the entire drama and is hence indispensable to every plot. Bharata defines it as follows :

> That which scattered in a small measure, expands itself in various ways and ends in fruition, is called the Seed of the Plot[85].

It is considered to be the most significant element of the plot as all other elements originate and ensue from it. Much of the success of the drama depends on it as it gives a slight indication of the final object. The dramatist should introduce it in such a manner that it may appear to be natural and appropriate in the prevailing circumstances.

The Seed should be normally mentioned in the Introduction Prastāvanā) by the Sūtradhāra, as without it the Introduction would appear to be inadequate. It is evident from the play *Ratnāvali*. The Seed, however, may sometimes be introduced in the Explanatory Scene before the first Act, as can be seen *Mālvikāgnimitra*. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* the Seed is introduced with Vaikhānasa's blessing to Duṣyanta that he would be the father of a cakravartī son. It goes on expanding till the end of the drama when Duṣyanta is not only reunited with his wife Śakuntalā but with his Cakravartī son also.

(*ii*) **Vital Drop (bindu) or the Prominent Point**—When seed has been sown, it will naturally sprout ; but there is always a possibility of its being diverted towards the wrong track. Now the second element of plot which is known as *bindu* or vital drop, comes to its help and controls the seed from being misdirected. Its main function is to restore the continuity whenever there is an obstruction in the realisation of the chief object of the drama. Bharata defines it as follows :

> That which sustains the continuity (lit. non-separation) till the end of the play even when the chief object (of

the play) is (for the time being) suspended, is called the Vital Drop (bindu)[86].

The word *bindu* has been explained by different critics in different ways with the help of similes. Abhinavagupta and Dhanika suggest that bindu is like a drop of oil which spreads over the surface of water. It links the different elements of the plot with a common purpose. S. Chattopadhyaya has stated that "as drops of water dripping from the sides of a thatch indicate the fall of water even when the rain is over, so Bindu also indicates the purpose and maintains the continuity of the main action when it is interrupted by secondary issues"[87].

When the dramatist feels that the main motive of the drama is getting shrouded by extraneous incidents, he should use bindu or the prominent point in order to restore the continuity of the main argument in the drama. Referring to the fundamental purpose of bindu in drama B. Bhattacharya says that by employing bindu "the dramatist should ensure that the motif of the play is recalled at definite intervals so that the audience may not lose sight of the chief end of the play".[88]

Sāgar Nandin illustrates this element of the plot from *Veṇisaṃhāra* where the dramatist uses in all the acts some such statements which reveal the anger against the Kauravas and give continuity to the main purpose of the plot, that is, to tie the hair of Draupati in a knot after taking revenge against Kauravas. From *Abhijñānasākuntalam* two instances will be sufficient to make the concept of bindu clear to the readers. The wild elephants cause trouble to the dwellers in the vicinity of the āśrama and Duṣyanta has to rush to that place in order to protect his subjects. This creates obstacle in the union of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā. However the invitation to Duṣyanta by hermits and Śakuntalā's friends to revisit the āśrama gives him an opportunity to meet Śakuntalā again. This invitation serves as the bindu in drama. We see the second instance in Duṣyanta's rejection of Śākuntalā under the impact of the curse of Durvāsa. This again creates a formidable hindrance in the union of Śakuntalā with Duṣyanta. However, the discovery

of the ring by the fisherman paves the way for their reunion. This discovery of the ring is nothing but the bindu in drama.

(*iii*) **The Episode** (Patākā)—There are two kinds of plot—the principal plot and the Subsidiary plot. The subsidiary plot is also of two kinds—Patākā and Prakāri. The main distinction between the two is that whereas Patākā or episode continues as a subsidiary story for a number of Acts, prakāri or the episodical incident is merely an incident. The literal meaning of the term patākā is flag. Just as the flag of a king denotes his majesty and glory, the patākā in a plot refers to the full significance of the dramatic theme. Though it tells a different story altogether it promotes the cause of the main plot and leads the main action to its final goal. Bharata defines it as follows :

> The event which is introduced in the interest of the Principal (Plot) and is treated like it, is called an Episode.[89]

The episode or patākā should not stand isolated ; it should be linked with the main plot by one or more junctures. It should, however, come to an end before the attainment of the result otherwise it would not be able to serve the purpose of the main plot. The episode of Indra's invitation to Duṣyanta for assisting him in his fight against the demons may be cited as an example of patākā. There are other examples of patākā such as the episodes of Sugrīva or Vibhīsaṇa in the legendary stories of Rāmāyan. Though they do attain their respective ends, they make the story of Rāma more appealing, In *Veṇisaṃhāra* though Karṇa displays his own valour and other heroic qualities, he has been introduced to help Duryodhana in the development of the main plot.

(*iv*) **Prakāri** (The Episodical Incident) : It is similar in nature to the Patākā with the only difference that it is introduced in the drama for a very short while. Though it is concerned with the characters other than the hero, it is used in order to enhance the intensity of the Principal Plot. Bharata defines it as follows :

> When merely the result of such an event is presented for the purpose of another (*i.e.* the Principal Plot) and it has no continuation it is called the Episodical Incident.[90]

Prakāri is used only in a subsidiary plot, and it has no use when the drama does not have a subsidiary plot. It "is almost an interesting casual incident" says S. Chattopadhyaya, "occupying a small portion of the whole action"[91] Jatāyu-Rāvana incident may be cited as an example of this element of the plot. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* the incident of Sānumati where Sānumati comes at the request of Menaka to watch the condition of king Duṣyanta and know his reaction about Śakuntalā in Act VI, may be considered as a prakāri or the episodical incident. Though it serves the purpose of the Principal plot, it has no continuity of its own.

(*v*) **Kārya** (Action)—It may be interpreted as the effort towards the end which the hero of the drama and the dramatist himself aim at. It may be considered to be some sort of achievement on the part of the hero, which is also known as *phalayoga*. Bharata defines it as follows :

> The efforts made for the purpose of the Principal Plot introduced (in a play) by the experts, is called the Action (kārya)[92].

Though Viśvanātha and Keith translate Kārya as 'Denouement', Ghosh rightly translates it as 'Action'. The confusion arises mainly on account of the fact they confuse *arthaprakṛtis* (components of drama) with avasthās (stages of development in drama). *Kārya* is a part of the *arthaprakṛtis* and not of avasthās. Whereas the *arthaprakṛtis* are only the means towards an end, Denouement is the end itself. Hence the better and more appropriate translation of *Kārya* would be 'Action'. It refers to the efforts made by the various characters for realisation of the main objective of the drama. The main objective in *Abhijñāaśākuntalam* is the reunion of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā and the effort made for the realisation of this objective is known as *kārya*.

Five Stages (Avasthās) of Plot-development

The plot in a drama is considered to be the manifestation of a sustained effort on the part of the hero for the realisation of an objective. It may be the realisation of love, victory in a battle or the fulfilment of some social, religious or moral ideal. In order to realise his ambition the hero has to pass through five stages, which are as follows : (*i*) Beginning (prārambha), (*ii*) Effort (prayatna), (*iii*) Possibility of Attainment (prāptisambhava), *iv*) Certainty of Attainment (niyataprāpti), and (*v*) Attainment of object (phala-prāpti). Summarizing the situation during these five stages, Sylvain Levi has pointed out that the hero "takes up the issue, makes an effort to realise it, hopefully sees the possibility of success, gains the certainty that he will be successful and finally sees his effort crowned with success"[93].

(*i*) **Beginning** (ārambha) Beginning arouses curiosity and is intimately linked with the Seed (bīja). Bharata defines it as follows :

> That part of the play (lit. composition) which merely creates a curiosity about the Attainment of the great object with reference to the Seed (bīja), is called the Beginning (ārambha).[94]

It does not mean the beginning of the real action but the rise of an ardent desire in the heart of the hero which refers to the Beginning. It is a hint about the hero's first effort for creating curiosity among the readers about what he intends to achieve. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* when an ascetic informs the king that since Kaṇva is not present in his hermitage and Śakuntalā has been asked to look after the guests, the king says, "Then I shall see her". This curiosity of Duṣyanta for having a glimpse of Śakuntalā refers to the stage of Beginning (ārambha).

(2) **Effort** (Prayatna)—It refers to the hero's zeal and firm determination for the attainment of his goal, though the fruit is not yet in sight. Bharata defines it as follows :

> (Hero's striving towards the Attainment of the object when the same is not in view, and his steps exciting curiosity (about it), is called the Efforts (prayatna).[95]

It reveals the hero's feverish attempts for the realisation of his objective in spite of the many hurdles he has to face. This is the proper occasion for introducing episodes or episodical incidents if the plot so permits. We may cite an example from *Abhijñānśākuntalam*. In Act III when Duṣyanta consults Mādhavya as to how to meet Śakuntalā again and is very keen to meet her, it refers to this second stage of effort (prayatna).

(3) **Prospect of Success** (Prāptyasā or prāptisambhava). It refers the psyschological impression that the success appears to be attainable though the hero is temporarily beset with the obstacles which create a sense of suspension and uncertainty about it. Bharata defines it as follows :

> When the Attainment of the Object is slightly suggested by some Psychological State (of the hero), it is known as the Possibility of Attainment (prāpti-sambhava).[96]

At this stage the hero realises that success is possible and therefore he resolves to go ahead. Though he has yet to face the so many obstacles and impediments, he is sure about the possibility of success. His emotions, says B. Bhattacharya, "reach almost a breaking point and there is a corresponding desperation in his thoughts and actions. He, however, overcomes it and is sustained by the prospect of attaining the cherished end".[97] In *Abhijñānśākuntalam* Duṣyanta becomes hopeful of his happy married life after his second meeting with Śakuntalā in Act III. But then in Act IV Durvāsā's curse makes the prospect dim, though his later modification of the curse revives the hope of reunion.

(4) **Certainty of Success** (niyatāpti or niyata-phalaprāpti) At this stage the hero feels that though the obstacle is still to be overcome, he is sure about his success and the objective now appears to be within reach. Bharata defines it in the following words :

> When the Hero visualises due to a Psychological State (of his), a sure attainment of the object, it is called Certainty of Attainment (miyata phala-prāpti).[98]

He has just to surmount the final obstacle, as B. Bhattacharya has pointed out that "the achievement (āpti) appears to be conditioned (niyata) by the final obstacle".[99] Now there is greater possibility of success than ever before. In Act VI of *Abhijñānśākuntalam* the discovery of the ring provides an opportunity to Duṣyanta for remembering his secret relationship with Śakuntalā and this paves the way for their reunion, though he has yet to overcome the final obstacle.

(5) **Attainment of the Result** (phalayoga)—It refers to the stage when the hero is able to obtain his desired object. Bharata defines it as follows :

> When a suitable Result of intended actions appears in full at the end of events (of a play) it is called Attainment of the Object (phala-yoga)[100].

It brings the play to a happy end. The last obstacle is now removed and the hero is crowned with success. Since Indian dramatists believe in the Brahmanical view of life which suggest that virtue is ultimately rewarded and vice punished, the hero of the Sanskrit drama usually meets with success in the end of the drama. In Act VII of *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* king Duṣyanta is ultimately reunited with Śakuntalā and his son and this is known as phala-yoga (Attainment of the Result).

We thus see that these are the five stages in the realisation of the main objective on the part of the hero. In the words of G.K. Bhat, "Bharata expects that these stages are put together in a unified relation so that drama has a proper beginning and the expected logical end, achieving a unity of action"[101] Bharata is basically concerned with the construction of a closely knit and hermonious structure of the drama. In order to maintain the proper harmony between the components of the plot and the stages of plot-development Bharata suggests the use of five

junctures (sandhis) and their sixty four sub-divisions (sandhyaṅgas). These *sandhis* and *sandhyaṅgas* are used as links between the Plot and the Action. The dramatists should use them freely according to the requirements of sentiment, time, place and situation. It is not necessary to use all the limbs in every drama. However its appropriate use is essential as without its use the drama would appear just like a human body without arms or legs. Referring to the specific purpose behind the use of junctures Bharata has pointed out :

> Expressing the desired object, non-omission of any essential item in the plot, attaining the quality of pleasing in production, concealment of the objects to be concealed, telling tales of surprise and disclosing things to be disclosed are the six-fold needs of the limbs described in the Śāstra[102].

Now the question is as to what is Sandhi (juncture) in the drama. The literal meaning of the word *Sandhi* is joining or maintaining a link. Dhanaṃjaya has rightly defined the *sandhi* as "the connection of one thing with a different one, when there is a single sequence (of events)"[103].

The five elements of the plot and the five stages of plot-development combine respectively and form the five junctures (Sandhis) such as the Opening (mukha), the Progression (pratimukha the Development (garbha), the pause (vimarśa) and the Conclusion (nirvahaṇa). These five junctures and their sixty-four sub-divisions have been unanimously accepted by all the theorists as indispensable parts of drama, though all of them need not be used in every kind of drama. All the five junctures (sandhis) may be used in Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa but not in other varieties of drama. They should be used in order to support the chief sentiment of the drama, as they are mainly concerned with the Principal plot and the Actions of the hero. The five junctures (sandhis) are as follows :

(1) The Opening (mukh-sandhi)—Bharata defines it as follows :

> That part of a play, in which the creation of the seed (bija) as the source of many objects and sentiments takes place, is called in relation to its body the Opening.[104]

It refers to the first section of the play where the Action arises out of the Germ and the juncture reveals the prevailing Sentiment. It stirs the plot into movement. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam*, for example, the portion from the entrance of king Duṣyanta till Act II when the king confesses to have fallen in love with Śakuntalā forms part of the opening juncture (mukha-sandhi).

There are twelve component parts of the opening juncture, as Bharata[105] pointed out : suggestion (upaṣepa), Enlargement (parikara), Establishment (pariṇyāsa), Allurement (vilobhana), Decision or Resolve (yukti), Accession (prāpti), Settling (samādhāna), Conflict of Feelings (vidhāna), Surprise (paribhāvana), Disclosure (udbheda), Activity (karaṇa) and Incitement (bheda). All the twelve component part of the Opening juncture, however, are not equally essential for the use of the dramatist. They are used in order to prepare the suitable atmosphere for the hero to begin his efforts for the realisation of his goal. The Opening juncture, says B. Bhattacharya, "having for its base the 'Germ' and the 'Beginning', pushes on the hero to attain his desired end through these twelve steps".[106]

(2) **The Progression** (pratimukha)—This is the second stage of the hero's effort where he makes a vigorous attempt for the realisation of his dream. Defining it Bharata has pointed out that "uncovering of the Seed placed at the Opening after it has sometimes been perceptible and sometimes been lost, is called the Progression".[107] Here the hero's progress towards the cherished dream is perceptible but only for a short while. It appears that the germ would bear fruit but the moment we realise it, the fruit seems to have disappeared. Even then it increases the momentum in the drama. "The Germ, having come to light in the Opening", says B. Bhattacharya, "now assumes a greater importance and allures the hero who embarks upon a vigorous search to get at the result suggested by the

Germ"[108]. He has to face hurdles in his passionate pursuit and hence frustration and disappointment follow. He feels tormented and gradually passes through the vicissitudes of emotions. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam*, for example, the portion from the moment when the king confesses his love to the jester up to the end of Act III forms part of the Progression (pratimukha).

There are thirteen[109] component parts of the Progression—Amorousness (vilāsa), Pursuit (Parisarpa), Refusal (vidhūta), Pessimism (tāpana), Joke (Narma), Amusement (Narmadyūti), Response (Pragamana), Hindrance (nirodha), Moving Forward (Paryupāsana), Sweet words (Puṣpa), Thunderbolt (vajra) Reference (upanyāsa), Meeting of Castes (varṇasaṃh ra). These component parts reveal the effort of the hero in order to attain his object. The dramatist should use his diseretion in applying them to his plays. Since the creation of proper rasa-realisation is the main motive of the dramatist, he should use passion (vilāsa) at the beginning of this juncture. The passion will provide the necessary incentive for the hero to overcome the hurdles and pass to the next stage of the Action.

(3) **The Development** (garbha).—Since it is known as the 'garbha', it is supposed to be the middle of the drama. Bharata defines it as follows :

> The sprouting of the Seed, its attainment or non-attainment and search for it, is called the Development (garbha).[110]

At this stage the hero has been able to surmount so many hurdles, but he is still not very close to the realisation of his objective. We find him restless both in his emotions and actions. Success now appears to be a possibility but not a certainty. Since the hero is not yet able to realise his objective, he makes a renewed effort for this purpose. It is the possibility of success that encourages the hero for his onward journey to the realisation of his goal. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* the portion from Act IV where Kaṇva is preparing Śakuntalā to send her to the palace of king Duṣyanta till the rejection of Śakuntalā by

Duṣyanta under the influence of the curse of Durvāsā, forms part of the Development (garbha).

As Bharata[111] has pointed out, there are thirteen component parts of Development (garbha) : Mis-statement (abhūtāharaṇa), Indication (mārga), Supposition (rūpa), Exaggeration (udāharaṇa), Progress (Karma), propitiation (saṃgraha), Deduction (anumāna), Supplication (prārthanā), Revelation (ākṣipta), Quarrel (toṭaka), Outwitting (adhibala), Dismay (udvega), and Consternation (vidrava). Sylvain Levi[112] is of the opinion that only five component parts of the garbha such as the *abhūtāharaṇa*, the *mārga*, the *troṭaka*, the *adhibala* and the *ākṣepa* are to be definitely used, while others are to be used only when needed.

(4) **Pause** (vimarśa, lit. deliberation) : Since the prospect of success appears to be very bright for the hero, he now reaches the fourth stage where he can pause and think over his progress as well as his shortcomings. Now the realisation of his objective appears to be very close and hence the onward movement becomes almost leisurely. The hero reviews the whole situation through which he has passed and contemplates the future course of action. Bharata defines 'pause' as follows :

> One's pause (vimarśa, lit. deliberation) over the Seed (bīja) that has sprouted in the Development (garbha) on account of some temptation, anger of distress, is called the Segment of that name (*i.e.* Pause)[113].

Since the hero has had the possibility of success in the previous stage, he now decides to make a deliberation (vimarśa) over the prevailing circumstances. Even if the success appears to be near at hand, the hero feels uncertain, sometimes almost disheartened. At this stage he has to take a very calculated step which may lead him to the final stage of success. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam*, for example, the discovery of the ring by the fisherman places the king in uch a situation that he has to pause or contemplate his future course of action, as the realisation of the objective is still very uncertain. We may see a similar instance in Shakespeare's device of 'play within the play' in *Hamlet*.

As Bharata[114] has pointed out, there are thirteen component parts of pause (vimarśa) : Censure (apavāda), Angry words (sampheta). Insolence (abhidrava), Placation (śakti), Assertion (vyavasāya), Mention (Prasaṁga), Injury (druti), Lessitude (kheda), Opposition (niṣedhana), Altercation (virodhana), Summing up (ādāna), Humiliation (sādana) and Foresight (pravocanā). It is significant in the sense that the hero now takes stock of the situation and feels confident of the final success. Referring to the use of the component parts of Pause, B. Bhattacharya has stated that "the hero starts with Censure directed against him and passes through Altercation, Tumult and challenge to Assertion, a decision to carry out the plan of Action. He then faces, among the rest, disappointment, Despair and Opposition. Undoubted he reaches at Summary, a view of the Germ and the Denouement that grants him Foresight of the conclusion.[115]

(5) **The Conclusion** (nirvahaṇa)—The last juncture is known as the Conclusion. It is as indispensable as the Opening because every plot does have a beginning and an end. Bharata defines it as follows :

> Bringing together the object (of the Segments) such as the Opening (mukha) etc. along with the Seed (bīja), when they have attained fruition, is called the conclusion (nirvahaṇa).[116]

Dhanaṃjaya points out that "The Conclusion (nirvahaṇa) is that (juncture) in which the matters that occurred in the opening (mukha) and in the other junctures, and that contained the Germ (bīja) and were distributed in due order, are brought together to one end"[117]. All the efforts and the strivings of the hero now culminate at a point which bears fruit for him. The hero, overcome all the hurdles, is now able to realise his cherished goal, and gets the benediction from Heaven. At this stage the drama comes to an end. Bharata compares the nirvahaṇa to the tail of a cow. Act VII of *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* forms part of the nirvahaṇa or the conclusion of the drama where Duṣyanta is reunited with his beloved Śakuntalā.

As Bharata[118] has pointed out, there are fourteen component parts of the conclusion (nirvahaṇa) : Junction (sandhi), Awakening (vibodha), Assembling (grathana), Ascertainment (nirṇaya), Conversation (paribhaṣana), Confirmation (dhṛti), Gratification (prasāda), joy (ānand), Deliverance (samaya), Surprise (apagūhana), Speech (bhāṣana), Retrospect (pūrvavākya), Termination of the play (kāvya-saṃhāra) and Benediction (prasasti). We, thus, see that there are sixty-four component parts of the plot, some of which are essential while others are just accidental. Referring to the use of Sandhis (junctures or Segments) in different kinds of drama, Bharata[119] has stated that all the five Sandhis should be used in Nāṭaka, and the Prakaraṇa ; four sandhis excluding pause should be used in the Dima and the Samavakāra, three sandhis excluding Development and Pause should be used in the Vyāyoga and Ihāmṛga and only two sandhis—the opening and the conclusion—are to be used in the Prahasana, the Vīthī, the Aṅka and the Bhāṇa. Regarding the omission of junctures in order of priority Bharata points out that if one is to be omitted, it should be the fourth-'Pause' ; if two are to be left out, then the third and the fourth *i.e.* the Development and the Pause ; if three are to be omitted, then the second, third and fourth *i.e.* the Progression. the Development and the Pause are to be omitted. The opening and the conclusion are indispensable and therefore essential for every kind of drama. The rule regarding the use of Sandhis is applicable only to the main plot and not to the subsidiary plot as it is used mainly to serve the purpose of the main plot. Besides discussing these Sandhis (segments) Bharata refers to twentyone 'contents of Segments' which are used in order to enhance the beauty of the junctures. These are as follows : Conciliation (sāma), Dissention (bheda), Making Gifts (pradāna), Chastisement (daṇda), killing (vadha), Presence of Mind (pratyutpanna-matilva), Blunder in Addressing (gotra-skhalita), Rashness (sāhasa), Terror (bhaya), Imaginative Fancy (dhī), Deceit (māya), Anger (krodha), Strength (ojas), Concealment (saṃvaraṇa) ; Error (bhrānti), Ascertainment (avadhāvana), Messenger (dūta), Letter (lekha), Dream (svapna), Portrait (citra) and Intoxication (mada)[120]. Regarding the significance of the use of these Sandhis and their differ-

ent component parts in drama Bharata has expressed his views in the following words :

> Just as a man deficient in his (limbs is unable) to fight a battle, so a play deficient in the limbs (of segments) will be unfit for (successful) production.[121]

He further points out that a play which is poor in theme but well equipped with the limbs is better than the play that has a lofty theme but is devoid of the requisite limbs. Therefore the dramatist should use the junctures in proper places and with proper sentiments.

Bharata suggested the three-fold division of the plot such as the five elements of plot, five stages of plot-development and the five junctures in order to maintain unity and coherence in drama. The independent and outward circumstance is known as *arthaprakṛiti*, the voluntary action of the hero is known as *avasthā*, and the joining of the two is known as *sandhi*. In the terminology of the *NŚ*, says Adya Rangacharya, "straying into K~n~va's hermitage is the 'beeja' (seed) and Dusyanta's wilful action to go to the sage to pay his respects is the *ārambha* (beginning) and the two circumstances combining to start the love-story is the 'sandhi' (joining, combining) called mukha (lit. face, opening first etc.)"[122] of the drama. This broad outline is sufficient for guiding the playwrights regarding the structure of drama. Further classification of the five sandhis (junctures) into sixty four component parts, however, appears to the modern readers as mere hair-splitting and reduntant to some extent. It is not possible for any playwright to use all the component parts of the juncture, as their full use would make the drama highly mechanical and devoid of meaning whereas the main function of drama is to convey the sentiments of human life. B. Bhattacharya has rightly stated that "A blind following of these in respect of handling the theme and collocating the incidents would clearly take away the initiative of the playwright and tend to make his art mechanical."[123]

Division of Drama into Acts

Bharata discusses the construction of drama from yet another point of view. In his opinion the plot is to be developed through an Act or a series of Acts depending upon the nature and scope of the story. Bharata considers Act as a unit of plot-construction. He defines it as follows :

> The Aṅka is the customary word. As by means of presentation of the Psychological States and Sentiments, it causes the purposes of the play to develop, and as it adheres to some technical rules (for this purpose), it is called an Aṅka (Act). An Act should be brought to a close by (lit. in) a division of the play, and no final disposal of the seed (bīja) should be made in it. And the vital Drop (bindu) of (lit. arising from) the play should again and again be made to occur in the plot (vastu).[124]

The Act does not stand isolated ; it is a logical part of the total consistent structure of the drama. It is related with the prior as well as the subsequent stages of the plot-development. M. Ghosh has rightly stated that Acts in ancient Indian Naṭakas are not "a set of clearly divided scenes as they are in modern Western Compositions of this category. An Act of the ancient Indian drama consists of a series of more or less loosely connected scenes which due to its peculiar technique could not be separated in writng from one another."[125] The purpose of the Act is to divide the whole drama into such parts as may provide an organic unity to it. It satisfies the time factor as "definite breaks in the course of staging a play are necessary and helpful for both the actors and the audience"[126].

There appears to be a natural connection between the junctures of the drama and the Acts of the drama, though the Acts may be larger in number than the junctures. There are only five junctures whereas there may be more than five Acts, sometimes even ten. The Acts therefore seem to correspond with the stages of Action, though the playwright is free to use more than one Act in order to cover a particular Stage of

Action. In *Veṇīsaṃhāra,* for example, the dramatist uses three Acts—the third; the fourth and the fifth in order to show the third Stage of Action, the Prospect of Success, and the same juncture, the Development.

There are slow as well as fast moving plots in dramas. The Nāṭaka, Prakaraṇa and the Nātikā are supposed to have slow-moving plots as they possess all the junctures. The Prahasana, Vīthī, the Dima, the Samavakāra, the Ihāmṛga, the vyāyoga and Aṅka varieties are known to have fast-moving plots as in these varieties some junctures are left out.

Five Explanatory Devices (arthopakṣepaka)

Bharata feels that there are certain incidents such as the portrayal of a battle, loss of kingdom, death, the siege of a city, a marriage ceremony or any other religious ritual and so many pieces of information which are essential for the development of the story but they don't form a part of the plot. In order to supply the necessary information and supplement the missing links Bharata suggests the use of five Explanatory Devices (arthopakṣepaka lit. communicator of incidents), which are vary helpful in clarifying the obscurities that may occur on account of the extreme condensation of the subject-matter of the drama. These five Explanatory Devices are as follows :

(*i*) **The Supporting Scene** (viṣkambhaka)—It is an interlute. It is used for describing some incident or occurrence that has either taken place or is just to take place. It is related originally to the opening Segment of the Nātaka. In this connection Bharata has stated :

> A Supporting Scene (viṣkambhaka) should employ the middling male characters, are relate to the Opening Segment (mukhasandhi) only of the Nāṭaka and it is (to be) graced by a priest, minister or Kañcukin (armour-bearer).[127]

Not more than two characters should participate in it and they too should be secondary characters. The Supporting Scene

is divided into two types—pure and mixed. In the first type of the Supporting Scene only characters of middle rank are on the stage and they speak Sanskrit. Persons of the highest rank such as gods and king should not be employed for this purpose. In the mixed type of the Supporting Scene inferior and middling characters should be used and they should speak Prākrit. In the opinion of Sylvain Levi[128] Bharata's rule that the use of the Supporting Scene should be restricted to the mukha-sandhi, should not be literally followed as there are exceptions to it. Act IV of *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* which belongs to the *garbha sandhi*, begins with a viṣkambhaka (Supporting Scene).

(*ii*) **Intimating Speech** (cūlika)—It is a kind of speech which is made from behind the curtain in order to give some important but brief information. Bharata defines it as follows :

> When some points are explained by a superior, middling or inferior character from behind the curtain, it is called an Intimating Speech (cūlika).

Normally it is used either to introduce a new character or to give some important information regarding the outcome of some fierce battles. In the beginning of Act II of *Uttararāmacarita* a voice from behind the curtain introduces a female hermit and reveals her identity. In Act IV of *Mahāvīracarita* a voice from behind the curtain announces that Paraśurāma has been defeated by Rāma.

(*iii*) **Introductory Scene** (praveśaka) — The Introductory Scene is an intermediary scene used between two Acts. When the events of a day cannot be accommodated in an Act, they should be presented through an Introductory Scene after closing the Act. In Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa the Introductory Scene should refer briefly to the summary of the next segments. When a particular item which is too large, cannot be completely presented in an Act, its account should be given through an Introductory Scene in a compressed form. Regarding the other purposes of the Introductory Scene Bharata says :

> An Introductory Scene may have many purposes. (For example), it may explain the advent of time, change of purpose, or the inversion of movement, or making a beginning (of some event).[130]

In the Introductory Scene exalted speech of the superior or the middling characters should not be used. The speech and manner should rather be of the common people. An *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* at the beginning of Act VI the conversation between the fisherman and the guards, and in *Ratnāvalī* the scene between the two maids, may be cited as the best examples of the Introductory Scene (praveśaka).

There has been a good deal of controversy over the issue as to whether the Introductory Scene (praveśaka) and the Supporting Scene (viṣkambhaka) are identical or distinct from each other. B. Bhattacharya translates 'viṣkambhaka' as the Explanatory Scene and points out that "the Explanatory and Introductory Scenes should be treated as identical. They have nothing distinctive in them in essence, that can justify their separate enumeration. The mere prohibition of using the latter in the beginning of the first Act can hardly be taken to justify its separate character."[131] A. B. Keith, however, is of the opinion that there are distinctions between the two. The Viṣkambhaka (Supporting Scene) is to be performed by not more than two characters and they should not be of noble rank. It may be used at the beginning of the drama whereas Praveśaka (Introductory Scene) cannot be used at the beginning of the drama, and should be used only when the first Act is over. If the viṣkambhaka is pure, its characters should be of middle rank and should speak Sanskrit whereas the characters of the Pravesaka are always of inferior class and speak Prākrit. In *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* Act III is introduced by a viṣkambhaka where a disciple of Kaṇva Ṛsi speaks in Sanskrit and informs us that king Duṣyanta is staying in the hermitage, whereas in Act VI a Praveśaka introcuced the conversation between the fisherman and the police who speak in Prākrit.

The purpose of both these dramatic devices—viṣkambhaka and praveśaka—is to give information about what has happened

or what is going to happen in order to give a clear hint about the next phase of development. "All this is done", says G.K. Bhat, "by simple narration and/or conversation. Being mere links and not of much dramatic interest, the viskambhaka and pravesaka have to be short, to the point, and also suggestive"[133].

In other three Explanatory Devices—the Intimating Speech (cūlikā), the Transitional Scene (aṅkāvatāra) and the Anticipatory Scene (aṅkamukha) are comparatively less significant Devices.

(*iv*) **Transitional Scene or Continuation Scene** (aṅkāvatāra)—Bharata defines it as follows :

> As in practice it falls between two Acts, or within an Act, and relates to the purpose of the Seed (bīja), it is called a Transitional Scene (aṅkāvatāra) [134]

Though the definition is not very clear, it appears to give an indication about the theme of the next Act. It is a close succession of two acts in order to keep the development of the plot well connected. It is intended, says B. Bhattacharya, "to bring the Germ of the Plot to the forefront, when it is lost sight of, either as the part of an Act or as a separate entity."[135] Viśvanātha gives the example of the fisherman incident. The recovery of the ring from the fisherman brings the motif of the play of the forefront and makes the reunion of Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā possible.

(*v*) **Anticipatory Scene** (aṅkamukha)—It is mostly used in plays other than the Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa. Here the dramatist employs only one character in order to give a summary of the next Act. Bharata defines it as follows :

> When the detached beginning of an Act is summarized beforehand by a male or a female character, it is called Anticipatory Scene (aṅkamukha).[136]

It reveals such matters which cannot be staged very conveniently. We may take, for example, the *Mahāvīracarita* where at the

end of Act II Sumanta announces the arrival of three characters Vasiṣṭha, Viśvāmitra and Praśurām and these three open Act IV. Viśvanātha, however, takes a different view and defines it as the part of an Act where a reference is made to the subject of the following Act along with the entire story from the germ to the denouement. He gives the example of the dialogue of Avalokitā and Kāmandaki in Act I of the *Mālatimādhava* which gives an account of the part to be played by the characters and their distinct motive.

In addition to these five Explanatory Devices there are a few other parts of the drama which have been mentioned by Bharata in the *NŚ*. They are as follows :

(*i*) **Preliminaries** (purvaraṅga)—They are performed by the singers with the help of musical instruments in the beginning of the drama.

(*ii*) **Benediction** (nandi)—It is the invocation of the blessing of gods, Kings and Brahmins.

(*iii*) **Prologue** (prastāvanā)—It is used by the dramatist in order to proclaim the theme of the play.

(*iv*) **Prayer** (Bharata-Vākyama)—It is a kind of *praśasti* used by the dramatist at the end of the drama in order to express his good wishes for the betterment of the whole world. Bharata himself uses the Bharata-vākyama at the end of his *NŚ*.

> What more shall I say ? Let the earth be full of grains, and be free from diseases for all time. Let there be peace for cows and Brahmins and Let the king protect thus the entire earth.[137]

This *bharata-vākyama* is used by the Sanskrit playwrights at the end of their plays, and it expresses their expectations for a better future.

Three Unities

(*i*) **Unity of Action** (Impression)

Bharata, like the Greek theorist Aristotle, does not attach much importance to all the three unities. In his opinion Unity of Action (Impression) alone is important ; the other two unities—unity of time and unity of place—could be achieved but in accordance with the requirements of the story G.K. Bhat has rightly pointed out that "what a dramatist cannot afford to neglect without sacrificing literary art is the Unity of Action which makes a play a logically built organic structure."[138]

In the opinion of Bharata an Act should not contain too many incidents as it would violate the unity of impression in the drama. Moreover, there should be proper coordination between the main plot and the sub-plot and if there is anything which cannot be directly represented on the stage, it should be reported to the audience through the Explanatory Devices. It gives not only a guarantee of the unity of impression but also a rapidity of movement to the plot which is required for a successful dramatic representation. Bharata's suggestion about the five elements of plot, five stages of plot-development and the five junctures reveals the utmost importance which Bharata gave to the Unity of Action.

The presence of the Hero as well as the use of the Seed and the vital drop in every Act also contributes towards the unity of Action. In this connection Bharata has pointed out that "The Seed (bīja) of the play as well as its vital Drop (bindu) was always to relate to every Act of the play, and the Hero was sometimes to appear in every Act or to be mentioned there."[139] The use of Explanatory Devices also helps the dramatist in avoiding ambiguity and clumsiness in the drama.

(*ii*) **Unity of Time**

Bharata is not very specific about the Unity of Time and he gives a very wide scope to the dramatists and producers. Unity of time, in his opinion, refers to the time taken by the actual incidents in the drama. Referring to time he says :

> Depending on the Germ, the Act should present the actions relating to a single day, and there should be no

conflict with the routine duties. At times, a skilled playwright may present many Actions but these should not come in the way of the necessary duties.[140]

It is evident from the above passage that the individual Act should not contain such incidents which cross the limit of a single day. Moreover there should be nothing in an Act that could interrupt the routine duties such as the recitation of prayers or taking of meals. There are, however, some difficulties which the dramatist has to face. For example, the hero Duṣyanta in *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* leaves one place and goes to another. How is it possible that the journey will take only one day ? If the journey takes more than one day, how to present it in the drama ? Bharata refers to the 'Termination of Act' (ankacbeda) and the use of Explanatory devices for this purpose. If the gap of one month or even one year is to be shown between two Acts, it should be reported through Explanatory devices. Kalidasa, for example, introduces an Explanatory Scene after the termination of Act III in order to report Śakuntalā's marriage with Duṣyanta, the hero's return to the capital, the curse of Durvāsā and the worries of Anasuyā and Priyambadā over the fate of Śakuntalā.

Later theorists, however, relaxed Bharata's insistence on the limit of one year's duration on the basis of the plays written by different playwrights. They were of the opinion that even more than one year's gap might be reported through these Explanatory devices. Bhavabhūti in *Uttararāmacarita* for instance, reports in the Explanatory Scene an interval of twelve years between the first and the second Acts. Similarly a gap of four or five years is shown between the fifth and the Sixth Acts in *Abhijñānaśākuntalam*. These intervals don't militate against our sense of reality and they don't create any obstacle to our perception of unity.

(*iii*) **Unity of Place**

So far as the unity of Place is concerned, there is not even the slightest suggestion anywhere in the *NŚ* that means any kind of restriction over the change of place in the drama. Since in

Bharata's opinion drama initiates all that is there in the three worlds, the question of restiction over the place does not arise. He wanted that the characters of the drama may be placed in the whole of the Bhāratavarsa which is the most proper place for dramatic representation and production. If the character is on a voyage or tour to a foreign land, the Act should be brought to a close at his departure and the new Act should begin. In *Uttararāmacarita* the change of place from Ayodhya to the forest or in *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* Duṣyanta's visit from his kingdom to the hermitage of Kaṇva Ṛsi does not create an unnatural impression over the mind of the spectators.

III

Both the theorists—Aristotle as well as Bharata have laid emphasis on the supremacy of plot in drama. Whereas Aristotle considers plot to be the 'soul of drama', Bharata calls it 'the body of drama' though both the theorists use these two terms metaphorically in order to communicate the same truth. In considering the plot as the 'body of drama' Bharata appears to be more exact and appropriate, as plot is certainly the body i.e. the outer structure of drama. Aristotle uses the word 'soul' in the sense that plot is the most significant element of drama and we cannot conceive of a drama without plot just as we cannot think of the human beings without their souls. Bharata too, while calling the plot the 'body of drama', accepts the significance of plot as without body we cannot even think of the soul. Both the theorists, thus, have substantially identical views about the significance of plot in drama.

Both the theorists are of the opinion that the plot should be an organic whole and nothing irrelevant or inconsistent should be incorporated into it. In the opinion of Aristotle the plot of a tragedy should have a proper magnitude with a beginning, a middle and an end. Aristotle's three stages of the evolution of dramatic action are elaborated into five-beginning (prārambha), effort (prayatna), possibility of attainment (prāptisambhava), Certainty of attainment (niyataprāpti) and attainment of object (phala prāpti) by Bharata. Bharata's reference to the five

elements of plot as well as the five segments is also intended to emphasize the unified structure of plot.

Aristotle points out that there are five structural parts of a play such as Prologue, Episode, Exode, Parode and Stasimon. The prologue in Greek plays corresponds to the *prastāvanā* of Sanskrit plays, where the subject matter of the play is reported to the audience in order to prepare them for what is going to be staged. The Episode may be compared to an 'Act' in Indian dramaturgy. Sanskrit drama has no parallel to the Greek concept of Exode which is the last scene in a Greek drama, though Bharata's conception of phalayoga including the *bharatavākyam* may be considered to be at par with it.

The opening in Greek drama is different from that in Sanskrit drama. Greek drama opens with the *prologos* (an introductory speech) which is intended to arouse the interest of the audience so that the action may gather momentum. It is done by the main characters of the drama. Sanskrit drama, however, begins with the prastāvanā where the sūtradhāra, after performing the religious ritual, announces the title of the play and the name of the playwright and then creates the proper situation for the entrance of the hero. The introduction of the hero by the sūtradhāra in sanskrit drama is definitely more dramatic and appealing than the pattern of self-introduction by the hero in Greek drama, as is evident from Sophocles' great play *Oedipus, the king* where Oedipus himself says—'I am Oedipus'. It appears to be dull and prosaic.

Greek playwrights are fond of using chorus in their plays. The chorus, which consists of the common Athenian people, serves various purposes in Greek drama. It serves as the spokesman of the playwright and changes in its views reflect the changing perspectives in drama. It is also used to report the non presentable incidents of drama and connect the missing links. It sometimes reveals the happenings off the stage and denotes the significance of certain actions and their consequences. This purpose is served by the Sanskrit playwrights by making use of arthopakṣepakas (Explanatory Devices) in

order to report such things which are either not possible to be presented on the stage or not proper for enactment on the stage such as the showing of battle, siege of a city, loss of a kingdom, marriage ceremony and the actual occurrence of a miracle etc. However these problems have now been solved on account of the advancement of science and technology. Modern playwrights, producers and directors do not have to face these problems for the enactment of drama.

Sanskrit plays are divided into various Acts in order to indicate the various stages of plot development in drama. There is, however, no such division of Greek drama. The different stages in Greek drama are to be denoted by the different choral songs known as *stasimons*. In addition to these choral speeches there is a prologue before the entrance of the chorus and an epilogue after the exit of the chorus. Chorus plays such an important role in the plays of Aeschylus that some of his existing tragedies such as *The Supplicators, The Persians, The Libation Bearers* and *The Eumenides* are nemed after them. The importance of chorus, however, declines in the plays of Euripides and it is virtually dispensed with in the Elizabethan age. Even if we find a speech or two by the chorus in Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* and Shakespeare's *Henry V*, it is just in the form of impersonating an actor and not the group of actors as we see in the Greek tragedies. There are five stasimons in Sophocles' *Oedipus, the king* and therefore the play is divided into six sections—each related to the other and interdependent in nature. Absence of Acts in Greek drama shows its limitation and its undramatic modes. This deficiency, however, is supplemented later by the British and American playwrights by dividing the play into various Acts and Scenes.

Aristotle has suggested that there are two stages in the plot-construction of a drama—Complication and Denouement. In Bharata's system these stages are called sandhis or segments and their number is five. The Aristotelian concept of the Complication covers the first three segments which are known as the Opening (mukha), the Progression (pratimukha) and the Development (garbha) whereas the Denouement includes the

last two segments which are called the Pause (vimarśa) and the Conclusion (nirvahaṇa). The Aristotelian concept of complication and Denouement is later developed in Western criticism into five stages—the Initial Incident, the Rising Action (or Growth or Complication), the Climax (or crisis or turning point), the falling Action (or Resolution or Denouement) and the Conclusion (or catastophe) which have close resemblance with Bharata's concept of the five segments.

Aristotle's classification of plot as simple and Complex has no parallel in Bharata's concept of drama. Bharata nowhere uses the terms such as 'anagnorisis' (recognition) and 'peripety' (reversal), though instances of this type are available in Sanskrit plays also. Kālidāsa's *Aahijñānaśākuntalam* may be cited as an instance. When Duṣyanta sees the ring, brought to his court by the fisherman, he recognizes what a serious error has been committed by him on account of his rejection of Śakuntalā and then there is a reversal or change in his outlook. He repents over his conduct. In *Oedipus, the king* there is reversal from good to bad fortune but in *Abhjñānaśākuntalam* there is reversal from bad to good fortune, though there are similar instances in Greek plays also such as *Iphigenia in Tauris* where the reversal after recognition leads to the reunion of a brother with his sister. In *Vikramorvaśī* the recognition is possible through the stone of reunion (saṁgamamaṇi) which helps Purūravas in recognizing his beloved though she had been transformed into a creeper. The necklace in *Ratnāvali*, the jewel in *Nāgānanda* the garland in the *Mālatimādhava*, jewels in *Mṛcchakatika*, and the ring of the queen in *Mālvikāgnimitra* are similar instances of recognition in Sanskrit plays. Aristotle's concept of the sub-plot too does have its resemblance in Bharata's theory of Patākā and Prakāri.

Further, in Aristotle's theory of plot construction some sort of conflict or tension is inevitable while the delineation of emotion or emotional reactions is the main objective of the Sanskrit plays. Even if there is conflict in Sanskrit drama, it is controlable. In *Uttararāmacarita* the conflict arises in the heart of Rāma between his sense of duty towards his subjects

and that of his love for Sītā but ultimately the latter is subordinated to the former. The deep rooted sense of high idealism prompted the Indian writers to display the virtue triumphant and vice suppressed at the end of the drama. In Sanskrit plays no hero or heroine dies or is killed at the end of the drama, but in Greek tragedies most of the heroes and heroines meet with a fatal end. In Sanskrit plays tragic endings are avoided and evil forces are finally overpowered. Studied in this light, Bhāsa's *Urubhaṅga* ceases to be a tragedy as Duryodhana who was the source of all atrocities on the Pandavas, is finally killed by Bhīma. Here there is the victory of virtue over vice, honesty over dishonesty. However, if we study *Urubhaṅga* in the light of the Aristotelian theory of tragedy, Duryodhana becomes the hero of the drama and he meets with his downfall simply on account of the flaw in his character—the flaw of over-ambition or lust for power and prosperity.

Referring to the sources which provide the subject-matter for plots, both the theorists are of the opinion that may be borrowed from the famous stories whether legendary, mythical or traditional or may be the poet's own creation or a mixture of the two. Though Bharata does not make any such classification regarding the sources of the plot, his definition of the ten types of drama substantially refers to the same thing. Referring to the plot of the Nāṭaka he points out that it sould be borrowed from a well-known story (prakhyāta vastuviṣayam) whereas the plot of the Prakaraṇa should be derived from the writer's creative genius (prakurute). We thus see that both the theorists are identical in their views regarding the sources of plot. Both due emphasis on the writer's creative power.

Both the theorists are of the opinion that the dramatist should observe the principle of probability and/or necessity and should take into account the principles of universal appeal while writing a drama. He should present his theme in such a manner that it might satisfy the taste and aspirations of the spectators. Both the theorists feel that the unity of Action or Impression alone is sufficient for effective and forceful presentation of drama. Unity of time or unity of place is not considered

essential for a consistent and coherent presentation of theme in drama either by Aristotle or Bharata.


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5

Hero in Drama

In the present chapter we have to discuss the qualities and characteristics of hero in the drama as pointed out by Aristotle in his *Poetics* and Bharata in his *NŚ* respectively and then assess their resemblances as well as the differences. Aristotle is of the opinion that there are four qualities—goodness, appropriateness, life-likeness and consistency which should be aimed at by the dramatist while portraying the character of hero in the drama. Bharata suggests that there are four categories of hero in the drama—Dhīrodātta (the self-controlled and exalted), Dhīralalita (the self-controlled and light-hearted), Dhīroddhata (the self-controlled and vehement) and Dhīrapraśānta (the self-controlled and calm) which should be used according to the requirement of the situation in the drama.

I

Aristotle's delineation of character, especially the character of the hero, occurs in chapter XV of his *Poetics*. Explaining as to what character is, Aristotle says :

> By character I mean that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents.[1]

Character, as an element in drama, refers to the expression of character through speech or action. Though Aristotle does not begin a formal discussion of character (ethos) before chapter XV, he does drop certain important hints on the subject in the earlier chapters of his *Poetics*. For example, chapter II gives a hint to this effect that the character in tragedy should be noble and of a better sort. Though chapter XIII is concerned with

the construction of plot, it also throws some light on the qualities of the tragic hero.

The first requirement of character that Aristotle mentions in chapter XV, is that it should be 'good' :

> First, and most important, it must be good. Now any speech or action that manifests moral purpose of any kind will be expressive of character : the character will be good if the purpose is good. This rule is relative to each class. Even a woman may be good, and also a slave, though the woman may be said to be an inferior being, and the slave quite worthless.[2]

The most fundamental requirement of tragedy is that the character, especially the character of the hero, should be good, as without the 'goodness' of character the true tragic emotions of pity and fear cannot be aroused in the heart of the spectators. Humphry House and Colin Hardie have rightly pointed out that "Aristotle assumes in his spectators a normally balanced moral attitude, by which they cannot give their sympathetics to one who is 'depraved' or 'odious' ; and sympathy is the very basis of the whole tragic pleasure."[3] 'Goodness' may be evaluated in terms of moral purpose which is to be seen even in a woman or a slave. We have deep sympathy for the tragic fate of the hero simply because he is a 'good' and not an evil creature. The 'goodness' of the hero may be defined as "the quality that provides moral elevation in tragic characters. The specific quality will change from play to play and from character to character, but all tragic protagonists have it in some degree, and the more the better".[4]

In chapter XIII Aristotle explains the characteristics of the ideal tragic hero in the light of the function of tragedy which is "to produce the *Katharsis* of pity and fear ; pity being felt for a person who, if not wholly innocent, meets with suffering beyond his deserts ; fear being awakened when the sufferer is a man of like nature with ourselves"[5]. Hence certain types of character are not considered suitable for the purpose of an ideal tragedy :

(*i*) The hero of the tragedy should be good but not a perfect character as blameless goodness passing from prosperity to adversity does not awaken either pity or fear. It merely shocks or repels us. In fact we can have no pity for an innocent sufferer as 'wholly unmerited suffering' is repulsive to our emotions. Moreover, as Butcher has pointed out, "it has been sometimes said that such persons themselves despise the pain of suffering ; they enjoy so much inward consolation that they have no need of our sympathy".[6] A flawless character does not have a strong motive and is not very effective on the stage. Though Butcher feels that the character of Antigone is a flawless character and she is powerful on the stage, we have our own reservations regarding the perfection of her character. She has to choose between two contending duties—duty towards her dead brother and duty towards the State and she chooses the first. Is her choice absolutely justified ? Does she have no duty or responsibility towards the State ? The denial of the right for burial ceremonies may be a debatable issue, but no state can flourish by permitting traitors to be treated at par with its loyal citizens. Sometimes there is a clash between two equally justifiable claims, between imperative and impulse, between the moral ordinance and unruly passion, between mandate and desire when the situation becomes irreconciliable and the fatal ending inevitable.

There are, however, some religious tragedies such as Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* and Shaw's *Saint Joan* which have added a new dimension to the Aristotelian concept of tragic hero. The protagonists here are flawless but at the same time effective on the stage. We should, however, bear one thing in mind that these protagonists can fill us with wonder and admiration but never with pity and fear which are the true tragic emotions in the Aristotelian sense of the term. The saints or martyrs can hardly arouse our emotions of pity and fear which are indispensable factors in a true tragedy. Some critics, on the contrary, are of the opinion that suffering has to be accounted for in human terms. Becket's and Joan's sufferings have their roots in their characters and are worthy of our sympathy. Even Christ is a sufferer and even his suffering calls for sympathy.

Such characters in tragedy have to be seen and evaluated in human contexts.

(*ii*) The hero of the tragedy should not be a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity, as nothing can be more disturbing to our sense of poetic justice or the spirit of tragedy than this situation in the drama. Aristotle has rightly stated :

> Nor, again, that of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity : for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy ; it possesses no single tragic quality ; it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear.[7]

Such a situation is completely devoid of tragic quality and is wanting alike in pity and fear. Though the rise of a bad man to the position of power and glory is frequently seen in day-to-day life, it is not very conducive to a work of art. It may arouse righteous anger or moral indignation but not the pity and fear in a work of art. It will be outrageous to our sense of justice too. We have no hesitation in arguing with Butcher that "Even granting that art must touch us through our aesthetic sensibility, and has nothing directly to do with the sense of justice, the aesthetic effect itself will be one of pain and disquiet ; the doubt and disturbance which arise from the spectable of real life, will be reproduced and parhaps intensified"[8]. Drama which is intended to display a plausible connection between cause and effect, fails in its purpose if it shows the supremacy of sheer Fate or blind Chance in human life. It may aggravate our confusion and intensify our distrust for order and system in human life.

(*iii*) The hero of the tragedy should not be an utter villain as his downfall would neither arouse pity nor fear. In this connection Aristotle has stated :

> Nor, again, should the downfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the

> misfortune of a man like ourselves. Such an event, therefore, will be neither pitiful nor terrible [9]

The overthrow of a villain is certainly satisfying to our moral sense but is lacking in true tragic qualities. We cannot pity the sufferer whose suffering is well deserved on moral grounds. Similarly we cannot have fear if the sufferer is not like us in nature or character. Since the villain deserves his suffering and we cannot identify ourselves with the character of the villain, we cannot have either pity or fear if the villain comes to a fatal end. Even if the wickedness of a villain is presented on a grand scale and the villain is invested with a resolute will or powerful intellect, we can only have sympathy for his misuse of splendid gifts and not the pity for his suffering which is an essential requirement for an ideal tragedy. Some experiments, however, have been made during the Elizabethan period in order to make such character the hero of the drama. Tourneur's Vendice and Webster's Vittoria Corombona may be cited as examples of this type of character. Shakespeare's Macbeth, Richard III and Marlowe's Dr. Faustus also belong to this category to a very great extent, as they all choose evil deliberately, stick to it and ultimately pay for it. In the absence of the soliloquies Macbeth's character would have been the character of a villain but as the play stands, he is undoubtedly a tragic hero in spite of the fact that he chooses evil deliberately.

(*iv*) In the opinion of Aristotle the hero of tragedy should be good but not a perfect character. He clearly suggests :

> There remains, then, the character between these two extremes, —that of a man who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty. He must be one who is highly renowned and prosperous, —a personage like Oedipus, Thyestes or other illustrious men of such families.[10]

The hero of tragedy should be a man of mixed character—neither supremely good nor extremely depraved. He should,

however, be leaning to the side of goodness. He should be, says Butcher, "a man of noble nature, like ourselves in elemental feelings and emotions ; idealised, indeed, but with so large a share of our common humanity as to enlist our eager interest and sympathy".[11] The hero of tragedy should not be a perfectly virtuous man, as then there would be no 'necessary and probable' connection between his original tragic deed and his catastrophe. He should come to his fatal end not through some deliberate Vice but through some great flaw or error of character. Aristotle uses the term 'hamartia' for this purpose. We have already explained it in greater depth and detail in our chapter on the structure of drama. It would here be sufficient to say that the tragic hero should meet with his downfall through an act that is not intentional. Othello's innocence, Macbeth's ambition and Hamlet's indecision are mainly responsible for their tragic end. There are, however, moments of tragic catastrophe when the hero himself is not responsible for his downfall either directly or indirectly. The responsibility rather goes to the other forces such as Fato in Greek tragedy or heredity in modern one. Fate has a major part to play in Oedipus' tragic end and heredity in the suffering of Mrs. Alving in Ibsen's *The Ghosts*. There are religious, social and psychological tragedies also. In the social tragedies of Galsworthy the hero's social mal-adjustment is responsible for his fatal end and not the flaw in his character. Similarly in psychological tragedies the hero comes to a fatal end due to his conflict between the conscious and the unconscious forces of the psyche In Aristotle's theory there is no scope for such a tragic hero who displays the struggle between a pure will and a disjointed world or the conflict between a grand criminal purpose and a higher moral force.

Aristotle's requirement that the hero should be 'highly renowned and prosperous' is applicable to the Greek tragedies, Shakespearian tragedies and some of the modern tragedies only. In modern age the nature of requirement has changed. Today even the common man may become the hero of the tragedy. He is undoubtedly very much like us but at the same time he is different from us in his intellectual and spiritual superiority.

He is superior to others, says Northrop Frye, "in his concern with a large problem, in his exceptional power of action, in his extraordinary capacity to suffer, and vehement refusal of a servile submissiveness to his circumstances and the forces working against him"[12]. The social status of the hero in the past has now been replaced by his moral status—his sense of dedication and devotion to such a noble cause which concerns the entire human race in one way or the other. Willy Loman in Arthur Miller's well-known play *The Death of a Salesman* does not possess the tragic grandeur of an Oedipus or a Lear, but he is undoubtedly a moving tragic character as there underlies a vital truth relating to his tragic experience.

(2) Aristotle is of the opinion that the next requirement in the character is its appropriateness :

> The second thing to aim at is propriety. There is a type of manly valour ; but valour in a woman, or unscrupulous cleverness, is inappropriate.[13]

In every age human characters have been classified according to certain general categories. Since they are mostly drawn from Ethics or legendary and historical sources, they must be appropriate to their traditional accounts. They must naturally be linked with their age, sex, social class, status and nationality. If courage or unscrupulous cleverness is shown in a woman, it would be inappropriate. John Jones has suggested that "The stages woman should possess the womanly virtues and the stage-slave the slavish virtue ; the former should not be brave like a a man nor the latter generous, tempered like a king, for this will produce an ultimate aesthetic anarchy"[14]. But the question is : where should we then place Antigone or Portia ? Do they not 'overstep' the reasonable limits of their class ? The appropriateness of character in fact should not be confused with its being type, as neo-classicists did. The traits of Ben Jonson's characters are based on the theory of humours and their specific characteristics are determined by their 'humours'. They became so rigid in their outline that there is no scope for the expression of the subtleties and complexities. They ultimately appear to be superficial.

That is certainly not the intension of the great critic Aristotle when he uses the term appropriateness of character. Humphry House is not willing to accept the stand of the critics that finally reduces all characterization to the mere presentation of types. In his opinion there is "no word in the Greek at all corresponding to "type". The word translated "appropriate" is quite fairly so translated ; it is an intransitive participle meaning "fitting."[15] It means that the character in the drama should not normally 'overstep' the proper limits of his class either up or down, as it would then become unnatural and hence cunconvincing to the spectators. Women, for evample, possess their own graces, weaknesses and strengths. It would not be proper to ignore the womanliness of a woman and depict as if there is no basic difference between the two opposite sexes. There are, of course, social, psychological and biological factors which place a demarcating line between male and female characters. This fundamental distinction should be maintained by the dramatist in the portrayal of his characters. In the light of the Aristotelian principle Mclanippi's clever speech would appear to be inappropriate to her sex and Medea's murder of her children as most unwom only.

Aristotle, however, does not mean to say that the dramatist should ignore the particularities and the subtleties of human character. If we want that the character should be typical enough to be intelligible to the readers, we at the same time expect that it should also be untypical enough to retain its individuality and its distinctive character. This is what Aristotle means by the appropriateness of character.

(3) The third requirement in the character is that it should be true to life, as Aristotle has said :

> Thirdly, character must be true to life ; for this a distinct thing from goodness and propriety, as here described.[16]

Whereas Butcher translates the original Greek version regarding the third requirement as 'true to life', Bywater and Gerald Else suggest that the character should be 'like'. This is perhaps the most perplexing issue as Aristotle here does not either care to

explain it further or give example in order to substantiate it. The problem remains as to 'like' what ? Else[17] derives two meanings from the context :—

(*i*) The character should be like the original mythical prototype, as presented by tradition.

(*ii*) The character should be like men in general, or as Aristotle is fond of saying, like 'us', i.e. true to life.

Regarding his first observation it is evident that if the dramatist has to use a mythical or historical character, he should conform to the accounts of that particular character in the myth or history. If the playwright has to depict the character of Zeus and Agamemnon, he should preserve their characteristics as narrated in traditional myth and legend. If the character is to be named after Medea or Oedipus or Helen, the playwright should turn to their traditional accounts for like characteristics. If any fundamental deviation is introduced, it would not be convincing to the spectator. If Medea is represented as a self-sacrificing woman, Oedipus as very tolerant and Helen as ugly in appearance, it would neither be appealing nor convincing to the people. However the playwright is free to use his hown observation and experience in order to make them more lively and interesting. There is no binding of mythical or historical account on the writer if he chooses an imaginative character. He is free to choose a character of his liking and give a new dimension to his personality.

Regarding his second observation that the character should be true to life, it is clear that he should behave and react in the manner we all do in our own life. He should not be presented as more puppets—wooden and lifeless. Aristotle gives a hint to this effect when he uses the word 'hamartia' which leads the here to his downfall. 'Hamartia' refers to a common human weakness from which we all suffer. If 'hamartia' is responsible for the tragic end of the hero, it means that the hero is one like ourselves. Moreover one of the two fundamental tragic emotions, that is, fear is aroused only when we feel that the hero is one of us and by our reaction that the

some thing might happen to us. The tragedy of a titen or of an animal will have no impact on us if they do not possess the recognizable humanity of a tragic character. Aristotle's observation is quite convening when he says that "since Tragedy is an imitation of persons who are above the common level, the example of good portrait-painters should be followed. They, while reproducing the distinctive form of the original, make a likeness which is true to life and yet more beautiful. So too the poet, in representing men who are irascible or indolent, or have other defects of character, should preserve the type and yet ennoble it. In this way Achilles is portrayed by Agathon and Homer.[18]

(4) The fourth requirement in the character is that it should be consistent. The requirement of consistency in the character does not permit the playwright change its class or category in the midstream. It should be depicted from the beginning to the end of the drama in such a manner that its growth may appear to be rationally understandable.

The character should possess consistency and its development should take place according to the principle of probability and/or necessity. The right thing, therefore, would be that :

> As in the structure of the plot, so too in the portraiture of character, the poet should always aim either at the necessary or the probable. Thus a person of a given character should speak or act in a given way, by the rule either of necessity or of probability; just as this event should follow that by necessary or probable sequence.[19]

The rule of necessity and/or probability is essential in the art of characterization as its absence leads to a disruption of the dramatic illusion. The play seems to violate natural causality. Aristotle clearly suggests in chapter II of his *Poetics* that the playwright should imitate men in action, but he nowhere overtly criticizes the use of magic fairies and supernatural agents. He wants to emphasize this point that the characterization should be consistent with the ending of the drama so that it might give the impression that character is responsible

for the growth of action in drama, as in real life. Even if the playwright uses 'magical powers' in drama, he should use them in such a manner that it may provide a convincing and effective 'cause' for the use of that miracle. The objection against Eurupides' *Medea* is not that it makes use of the Sun-chariot in order to escape but he uses it in such a situation that it appears to be a bit of unmotivated sensationalism.

Consistency is the basic requirement of character as it is to be evaluated as a whole. It refers to the logical growth of the character and appears to have originated from the Greek aesthetic intellectualism. Consistency does not mean that there should be no turn or twist in the life of the character. By putting emphasis upon consistency, Aristotle, says Humphry House, "is not recommending a dead level, not a flat uniformity but a living coherence"[20].

It the character is a bundle of contradictions and a figure of momentarily changing moods, it certainly means that it is inconsistent in its growth. Aristotle might have anticipated this objection that may arise in connection with this requirement of character, as is evident from the observations of John Jones ;

> Thus Aristotle anticipates a sophistical objection to the requirement of consistency : a student might come to him afer the lecture and ask "But what about the inconsistent people ? At the same time it may not be entirely fanciful to see him fumbling—and fumbling impressively—with the fact that a strand of chaos may be traced through the pattern and system of the sanest life.[21]

Aristotle is of the opinion that if the character is inconsistent in its growth, it should be 'consistently inconsistent'. The dramatist should try to trace consistency even in his inconsistency, as Aristotle says :

> ...though the subject of the imitation, who suggested the type, be inconsistent, still he must be consistently inconsistent.[22]

Even if the life of the character is chaotic, the playwright should discover a rational order in it. Aristotle illustrates his point of view from the apparent inconsistency of Achilles' character. Though there is inconsistency on account of abrupt changes in the character of Achilles, he is consistently inconsistent and hence acceptable to Aristotle.

After mentioning that the dramatist should aim at goodness, appropriateness, life-likeness and consistency in the protrayal of tragic hero or some other character, Aristotle further tries to make his stand clear by giving some illustrations in the following lines :

> As an example of motiveless degradation of character we have Menelaus in the Orestes : of character indecorus and inappropriate, the lament of Odysseus in the Scylla, and the speech of Melanippe : of inconsistency, the Iphigenia at Aulis,—for Iphigenia the suppliant in no way resembles her later self.[23]

Through the example cited above Aristotle shows the violation of three of the four criteria regarding the art of characterization, that is, goodness, appropriateness and consistency. So far as the principle of goodness is concerned, Euripides violates it in the portrayal of his character Menelaus in his play *Orestes*. When Menelaus is expected to help save Orestes from being condemned to death, fear prevents him from doing so and he is finally condemned. This shows the degradation or baseness of Menelaus' character. Aristotle uses the word 'motiveless degradation' of character in the sense that the act of degradation on the part of Menelaus is not required by the action of the drama and Euripides could have easily omitted it. Goodness of character is of course an essential requirement as the downfall of a villain would not be able to arouse either pity of fear.

Regarding the violation of the rule of appropriateness in character Aristotle cites two examples in order to substantiate it —the lament of Odysseus in the *Scylla* and the speech of Melanippi. Ulyasses, as the tradition says, was a great warrior and a courageous fellow. However in the (lost) dithyramb of

> The self-controlled and light-hearted (Hero) (Dhīralalita) is free from anxiety, fond of the arts (song, dance etc.), happy and gentle.[27]

His main concern is to overcome the love of a new favourite by getting through the obstacles which may come in his way. The predominant rasa in this type of hero is the Erotic Sentiment. King Vatsaraj Udayana in the *Ratnāwali* is a dhīralalita character.

(*iii*) **Dhīroddhata** (the self-controlled and vehement)—This type of hero is arrogant and self-assertive. He is proud, jealous, fickle, irascible and boaetful. He is fond of fight and action. Explaining his distinguishing features Dhanaṃjaya has stated :

> The self-controlled and vehement (Hero) (dhīroddhata) is altogether dominated by pride and jealousy wholly devoted to magic practices and deceit, self-assertive, fickle, irascible, and boastful.[28]

He is used as hero in the Dima, the Vyāyoga and the Ihāmṛga types of drama where violent activities dominate the whole play. Paraśurāma in *Mahāvīracarita* is dhīroddhata as he thinks that he is capable of lifting Kailash mountain and is able to conquer all the three worlds. Rāvaṇa too belongs to the same category as he is proud of this fact that he can take away the goddess Lakshmi forcibly with his own hands.

(*iv*) **Dhīrapraśānta** (the self-controlled and calm)—He is such a hero who is self-controlled and calm and possesses the common qualities. In the opinion of Bharata a Brahmin, a merchant, a priest or a minister may belong to this category. Dhanaṃjaya has rightly stated the chief features of this type of hero :

> The self-controlled and calm (Hero) (dhīraśānta) is a Brahmin or the like, possessed of generic merits[29].

This type of hero is normally used in Prakaraṇa. Mādhava in *Mālatimādhava* and Cārudatta in Sudraka's *Mṛcchakatikam* are examples of this type of hero.

are possessed by the hero of the drama : (*i*) Beauty of character (śobhā), (*ii*) vivacity (vilāsa), (*iii*) Equanimity (mādhurya), (*iv*) Poise (gāmbhīrya), (*n*) Firmness (sthairya), (*vi*) Sense of honour (tejas), (*vii*) Light-heartedness (lalita), and (*viii*) Magnanimity (audārya). He later on explains their distinguishing features :—

(*i*) **Beauty of character (śobhā)**—*It refers to the brilliance* and splendour of character. It implies sympathy for the weak and help to the poor. Dhanaṃjaya explains this quality in the following lines.

> In Beauty of character (śobhā) (are comprised) compassion for the lowly, emulation of one's superiors, heroism and cleverness.[31]

(*ii*) **Vivacity (vilāsa)**—In the opinion of Dhanaṃjaya, "vivacity (vilāsa) includes a firm step and glance and a laughing voice."[32] *It refers to the elegance, firmness in gait and* assured look.

(*iii*) **Equanimity (mādhurya)**—Bharata defines mādhurya as preserving the same gracefulness of body and mind even in the most adverse circumstances. Dhanaṃjaya explains it as the "slight change of demeanor even in very great agitation."[33]

(*iv*) **Poise (gāmbhīrya)**—It refers to the imperturbability of character. One should remain unperturbed even in the moment of great agitation and should not allow himself to be the victim of his own passions. Dhanamjaya observes that "because of the strength of character, no change of demeanor whatsoever is observed (even in very great agitation)."[34]

(*v*) **Firmness (Sthairya)**—"Firmness (sthairya) is the not being swerved", says Dhanaṃjaya, "from one's determination *even by a multitude of obstacles.*"[35] *It refers to the steadfastness* of a man's character.

(*vi*) **Sense of Honour (Tejas)**—It refers to the hero's unflinching courage which forces him to prefer death rather than

insult. Dhanaṃjaya has rightly explained it in the follo lines. "Sense of Honor (Tejas) is the not enduring insults the like, even at the cost of one's life."[36]

(*vii*) **Light-heartedness (lalita)**—It refers to the eleg and natural distinction in bearing. In the words of Dhar jaya, it is "the natural sweet appearance and demeano love."[37]

(*viii*) **Magnanimity (audārya)**—It refers to the subli of character and shows the readiness for sacrifice for the we of the people. Dhanamjaya defines it as follows :

> Maganimity (audārya) is the giving up of even as n as (*a*) one's life, with a kindly word, (and) the propi ion of the virtuous.[38]

Besides these sātivika qualities, the hero in all the m types of drama is expected to be well-bred, young, charm generous, intelligent, popular, upright, eloquent, resol energetic, of noble lineage, endowed with memory, skilfu arts, proud, heroic, majestic, vigorous and well conversan religious and human codes.

The Hero as Lover

Since most of the Sanskrit plays are concerned with stories of love, the hero is normally presented as a lover. A lover he may be presented in four different situations, ou which the first three presuppose a previous love-affair. In t connection Dhanamjaya has rightly pointed out :

> When he has been captivated by another woman, (Hero may be) clever (daksina), deceitful (śatha), shameless (dhrsta) toward his previous (love).[39]

(*i*) The hero may be presented as daksina (clever or cou ous) lover. Haas translates dakṣṇa as clever whereas Naray Mukherjee as courteous. This type of lover is kind to his p vious love. He shares his heart between new and old lo Dhanamjaya explains him as follows :

A clever (Hero) (daksina) is (one that is) kind to her (*i.e.* to his previous love).[40]

Sylvain Levi[41] gives the following example in order to substantiate it—"The daughter of Kuntala is here, fresh from her bath ; now it is the turn of the sister of the king of Anga. But Kamatā confessed during the dice-game that the first queen, too, was hoping for his favour—When I had thus informed the king about the beauties of the harem, he remained undecided for a long time".

(*ii*) The hero may be presented as a śaṭha (deceitful or false) lover. Haas translates śaṭha as deceitful whereas Narayan Mukherjee as false. This type of lover tries to conceal his new love from the old one. Dhanamjaya explains him as one who "hides his unfaithfulness"[42]. Sylvain Levi gives the following example :

> Traitor ! As soon as you heard the jingling of the jewels of another woman's waistband, your embrace became loose. To whom can I speak now that the honey of your words has poisoned my heart ? No, my friend does not care for me any more.[43]

Though both 'clever' and 'deceitful' lovers are equally unfaithful to their previous love, the fundamental difference between the two is that the clever lover is kind to his former love whereas the deceitful lover is not.

(*iii*) The hero may appear as dhṛṣṭa (shameless or impudent) lover. Whereas Haas translates dhṛṣṭa as shameless, Narayan Mukherjee translates it as impudent. This type of lover does not even care to conceal from his old love the marks of disfigurement made by the nails and teeth of the new beloved. Dhanamjaya explains him as one that "lets the disfigurements on his body show"[44]. Sylvain Levi illustrates it as follows :

> On his forehead a stain of lac, on his neck the mark of bangles, on his lips the black stain of collyrium, on his eyes the red stain of betal. This new make-up of her

> lover made her mad with anger and, as the day dawned, she let out her sighs in the heart of the lotus which she pretended to smell.[45]

There has been some controversy over the classification of such a hero as Vatsa in *Ratnāvali.* The issue is as to whether he should be considered a 'clever', 'deceitful' or 'shameless' lover. He should not be considered as 'deceitful' or 'shameless' even though he conceals his love first and then openly confers it. He should therefore be placed in the category of a clever or courteous lover, as he retains some affection for his former love also. A double alliance should not be considered impossible, as the works of great dramatists give ample illustrations of it.

(*iv*) Finally the hero may be presented as anukūla (faithful) lover. Dhanamjaya defines him as one who "has only a single lady-love".[46] He does not frequently change his loyalty from one woman to the other. He rather constantly remains faithful to his lady-love. Sylvain Levi gives the following example in order to make it more clear :

> My dress, my dear, is not gorgeous, my garland is plain, my bearing is simple and my laughter is genuine. I have no pride. But people say that my lover never looks at another woman, and my happiness is so great that everybody seems to me unhappy.[47]

The hero in the drama stands in contrast with that of his rival (prati-nāyaka or anti-hero) who is always hostile to the hero. The rival of the hero is jealous, arrogant, egoist and evil-minded and is easily swept away by the vehemence of his passions. Rāvana, for example, is the rival of Rāma and Duryodhana that of Yudhistir.

The Heroine

The heroine, like the hero, also "contributes no less than that of the hero in giving to the drama its particular charm"[48]. In the opinion of Bharata[49] there are four classes of heroines

such as goddesses, queens, women of high family and courtesans. Normally the heroine is *kulajā*, a woman of noble family. Only in the social type of play like *prakarana* the heroine may be an accomplished courtesan. These different kinds of heroines possess their own special characteristics. The goddesses and the queens possess all the major qualities and therefore they may be self-controlled (dhīrā), light-hearted (lalitā), exalted udattā and modest (nibhṛtā). Whereas the women of high family are exalted and modest, the courtesans may be exalted and light-hearted.

Bharata does not say anything more in connection with the heroines. Dhanaṃjaya, however, made further observations on this issue. In his opinion the heroine, in relation to the hero, may be of three kinds : "(the Hero's) own wife (svā), (a woman who is) another's (anyā), or a common woman (sādhāraṇastrī) ; and she has his (*i.e.* the Hero's) qualities".[50] All these heroines are always to be seen in different kinds of love with their heroes.

(1) If the heroine is the hero's own wife (svā) or svīyā), she possesses good character, uprightness, straightforwardness, honesty and the like. She may be of three categories : (*i*) Mugdhā which is translaten by Haas as 'inexperienced' and by Levi as 'innocent' (*ii*) Madhyā which is translated by Haas as 'partly experienced' and by Levi as 'middling' (*iii*) Pragalbhā which is translated by Haas as 'experienced' and by Levi as 'shameless'. Dhanaṃjaya[51] has further commented on all the three categories with a good deal of subtlety and appropriateness :

(*i*) The inexperienced (kind of wife) (mugdhā) has the desire of new youth, is coy in love and gentle in anger.

(*ii*) The partly experienced (kind of wife) (madhyā) has the love of rising youth and permits its indulgence even to fainting.

(*iii*) The experienced (kind of wife) (pragalbhā) in blinded by youth, crazed with love, infatuated, and clinging, as it were,

to the body of her husband for joy even at the beginning of love's pleasures.

(2) The heroine who is another's (anyā, anyastrī) is either a maiden or some one else's wife. A woman who is the wife of some one else should never be the object of the principal sentiment. A maiden, on the other hand, may be the object of both the principal as well as the subordinate sentiments. It sometimes happens that a maiden is secretly in love with the hero, although the secrecy is necessitated not by the objection of the parents or the guardian but by the presence of a third person who creates obstacles to their happy union. Mālati and Mādhava and Sāgarikā and Vatsa may be quoted as classical examples of this type.

(3) The heroine who belongs to everybody (sādhāranastrī), is a courtesan, a public woman, a lover of different arts, shameless and cunning. She tries to allure and entrap the rich, the foolish, the extravagant and the impotent by her various gestures and techniques. She turns them out of her house when they become penniless.

If the courtesan is to be shown as heroine she must have true love for the hero, as is evident from Vasantasenā in the *Mṛcchakaṭika*. In the Prahasana, however, she must not be in true love with the hero in order to produce the comic effect. *Madanamanjarī* in the *Laṭaka-melaka* may illustrate this point. The courtesan should not be made the heroine of such a drama where the hero is a god, a semi-god or a celestial king.

Natural Graces of Heroine

In connection with the natural graces (sattvajalankāra) of the heroine Bharata is silent. Dhanaṃjaya[52], however, points out that there are twenty natural graces which are found in the heroine in the prime of her youth. Viśvanātha adds eight more blandishments to the list. Whereas Dhanaṃjaya mentions and defines them only, Sylvain Levi illustrates them also. These are the following twenty-eight graceful traits :

(*i*) *Bhāva* (feeling)—It is 'the first touch of emotion' in a woman who had remained so far unaffected.

Śakuntalā, for example, in *Abhijñānaśākuntalam*, has the bhāva when she sees Duṣyanta for the first time in the hermitage.

(*ii*) *Hāva* (emotion)—When the bhāva becomes stronger, it is known as hāva. It brings about changes in the eyes and the eyebrows. When Śakuntalā's love for Duṣyanta gets a gestural expression it is called hāva.

(*iii*) *Helā* (Passion) – When the feeling of love becomes more explicit and evident, it is known as Helā. When the desire for conjugal relationship arises in Śakuntalā for Duṣyanta, it is regarded as Helā.

These three natural graces reveal a progressive series of manifestations of love. The next seven graces display the inherent characteristics of the heroine. They are as follows :

(*iv*) Śobhā (Beauty) (*v*) kānti (loveliness), (*vi*) Mādhurya (Sweetness), (*vii*) Dīpti (Radiance), (*viii*) Prāgalbhya or Pragalbhatā (courage), (*ix*) Audārya (Dignity), and (*x*) Dhairya (self-control).

Then follow ten traits of character :—

(*xi*) *Līlā* (sportiveness)—It refers to the imitation of a lover in the actions of a fair-limbed (maiden).

(*xii*) *Vilāsa* (Delight) —At the sight of the hero the sudden change that arises in the voice and the manner of the heroine is known as vilāsa.

(*xiii*) *Vicchitti* (Tastefulness)—It is an arrangement, though slight, of adornment in order to increase the loveliness.

(*xiv*) *Vibhrama* (Confusion)—When the heroine misplaces the ornaments out of eagerness to meet the hero, it is called vibhrama.

(*xv*) *Kilakiñcita* (Hysterical Mood)—It refers to the amorous agitation which produces a combination of anger and tears, joys and fear and the like.

(*xvi*) *Moṭṭāyita* (Manifestation of Affection)—When the heroine hears the news of her lover'a arrival and thinks of him, her silent expression of love is known as Moṭṭāyita.

(*xvii*) *Kuṭṭamitā* (Pretended Anger)—When the heroine, though inwardly filled with immense joy, expresses her anger outwardly when the lover touches her body, it is known as kuṭṭamitā.

(*xviii*) *Bibboka* (Affected Indifferencey—Indifferent affectation towards the lover due to pride and arrogance is known as bibboka.

(*xix*) *Lalita* (lolling)—Graceful and languid gesture is known as lalita.

(*xx*) *Vihṛta or Vikṛta* (Bashfulness)—The heroine, even when she gets the right opportunity to talk to the lover, does not talk to him due to her coyness and modesty, it is known as vihṛta or vikṛta.

Viśvanātha's eight more additions are as follows :

(*xxi*) *Mada* (Pride)—When the heroine attaches special importance to her youth and fortune, that mode of thinking is known as mada.

(*xxii*) **Tapana** (Pang of separation)—When the heroine is passing through the stage of pain and boredom on account of the absence of her lover, it is known as tapana.

(*xxiii*) **Maugdhya** (innocent behaviour)—When the heroine starts behaving like an innocent child, it is known as Maugdhya.

(*xxiv*) **Vikṣepa** (love-distraction)—When the heroine loses her sense of balance and keeps the ornaments in utter disorder on account of her frustration in love, it is known as vīkṣepa.

(*xxv*) **Kutūhala** (Utmost curisoity)—When the heroine becomes impatient and is very keen to have a glance at her lover, it is known as Kutūhala.

(*xxvi*) **Hasitā** (Laughter)—When the heroine is extremely happy and gives spontaneous expression to his sense of youthful joy, it is regarded as hasitā.

(*xxvii*) **Cakita** (pleasant surprise)—The heroine's reaction to something unexpected is considered to be cakita.

(*xxviii*) **Keli** (Wanton play)—The heroine's amorous game with her lover is known as keli.

Bharata has pointed out that in general characters, male and female, are of three types—Superior (uttama), middling (madhyama), and inferior (adhama). Commenting on the superior type of character Bharata says :

> (A man) who has controlled his senses, is wise, skilled in various arts and crafts (śilpa), honest, expert in enjoyment, brings consolation to the poor, is versed in different śāstras, grave, liberal, patient and munificent, is to be known as a superior (uttama) (male) character.[53]

Bharata refers to the chief characteristics of the middling character as follows :

> (A man) who is an expert in the manners of people, proficient in arts and crafts as well as in śāstra, has wisdom, sweetness (of manners) is to be known as a 'middling' (madhyama) male) character.[54]

The middling character stands midway between the superior and inferior character. Bharata has drawn a clear distinction between the superior and middling characters. Whereas superior male character acquires the knowledge of different arts and crafts as an accomplishment, the middling character should be capable of making a professional use of them for his livelihood.

Regarding the inferior (adhama) male character Bharata says :

> (Men) who are harsh in words, ill-mannered, low-spirited, criminally disposed, irascible and violent, can kill friends, can kill anyone by torturing, are prone to engage himself in useless things, speak very little, are mean, haughty in words, ungrateful, indolent, expert in insulting honoured persons, covetous of women, fond of quarrel, treacherous, doers of evil deeds, stealers of others' properties, are to be known as inferior (adhama) (male) character.[55]

The inferior character is vulgar and ill-mannered. He is fickle, shameless, lustful and ungrateful.

After describing these three categories of male characters Bharata discusses in due order the female characters also. Commenting on the superior female character Bharata says :

> A woman who has a tender nature, is not fickle, speaks smilingly, is free from cruelty, attentive to words of her superiors, bashful, good mannered, has natural beauty, nobility and such other qualities, and is grave and patient, is to be known as a 'superior' (female) character.[56]

A female character of this type is controlled in speech, well mannered, skilful, serious and modest.

Referring to the chief characteristics of the middling female character Bharata points out :

> A woman who does not possess these qualities to a great extent and always, and has some faults mixed with him, is to be known as a 'middling' (female) character.[57]

The middling female character is such a character who stands half-way between the superior and the inferior female character. He knows the usages of the world, so far as the inferior female character is concerned, Bharata is of the opinion that "she is to be known in brief from an inferior male character"[58]. She is

normally ill-tempered, shameless, arrogant and artificial in conduct.

In addition to these three types of male and female characters Bharata also refers to the characters of a mixed nature such as the maid servants, the *śakāra,* the *viṭa* and the hermaphrodite etc.

III

Both Aristotle and Bharata have expressed identical views in connection with the various types of characters. Aristotle is of the opinion that the characters or the agents represented in a drama should be either above our level or below it or just as we are. In a tragedy the writer imitates the first type of characters, in a comedy the second type of characters. Aristotle is silent about the third type as mere imitation of reality is not the purpose of literature. In the tragedy the dramatist tries to present an idealised picture of human society, in the comedy the ludicrous presentation of it. The tragedy writer looks at the problems of human life seriously whereas the writer of the comedy in a lighter vein.

Bharata too has classified characters into three categories-uttama or superior, madhyama or middling and adhama or inferior. Their characteristics have already been described in greater detail. But since Bharata never thought of drama in terms of tragedy and comedy, there is no such classification here. Here the difference between the superior and middling characters is that of degree and not of the kind. He does not give any example regarding the inferior type of characters.

Referring to the qualities of character in the tragedy Aristotle has pointed out that it should be good, appropriate, life-like and consistent. Let us now see whether Bharata has also thought of character on this line or not. In connection with the first quality of character that it should be good. We may refer to Bharata's classification of hero as dhīrodātta (self-controlled and exalted), dhīralalita (self-controlled and light-hearted), dhīrapraśānta (the self-controlled and calm) and

dhīroddhata (the self-controlled and haughty), the term *dhīra* (self-controlled) being common to all. It is very close to the Aristotelian requirement of the goodness of character.

Though Bharata does not say anything explicitly in connection with the appropriateness of character, he has given enough hint to this effect. He was of the opinion that the proper role should be given to the different characters in the drama. He emphatically asserted that

> ... a woman should not be made a Heroine in any theatrical show, when she smiles on wrong occasions, is rough, has an uneven gait and movement, persistent anger, miserable look and is always haughty and fickle.[59]

This is, I feel, what Aristotle has said about the appropriateness of character :

> There is a manly valour ; but valour in a woman or unscrupulous cleverness, is inappropriate.[60]

Referring to the third quality of character that it should be true to life, there is enough hint in Bharata's *NŚ*. Bharata is of the opinion that the dramatist should create living and moving characters and not merely puppets. If Bharata insists that different roles should be assigned to proper characters, it certainly means that he was insisting on creating natural and life like characters. Bharata's description of the conduct and behaviour of different types of characters in the *NŚ* gives an impression that he wanted the characters to look life-like and human.

Regarding the consistency of character Bharata does not say anything clearly but who can say that characters in Sanskrit plays were inconsistent ? Bharata is of the opioion that if the dramatist chooses a dhīrodātta (self-controlled and exalted) character he should remain dhīrodātta till the end of the drama. A dhīrodātta hero can never be wicked or stoop to a low level. So is the case with other types of character. Consistency in character is an essential requirement of the drama, as it enables

the play to appear natural and convincing. If the development of the drama is not convincing to the audience, it would not be very effective on the stage. We, thus, see that the four requirements of character in a tragedy, as suggested by Aristotle, are implicit in Bharata's *NŚ* too.

Referring to the status of the tragic hero Aristotle has pointed out that he should be a man of noble and royal descent. He should be highly renowned and prosperous. Bharata too expresses similar views in connection with the hero of the. drama. He should be a king or a prince or a person belonging to the higher strata of society. Just as the heroes in most of the Greek tragedies were borrowed from certain well-known families, most of the heroes in Sanskrit drama hail from certain aristocratic families. Even during the medieval era, especially in the plays of Shakespeare, only persons belonging to the higher strata of society such as Hamlet, Othello, Lear, Macbeth and others could become the heroes of the drama. In the modern period, however, the concept of hero in connection with his lineage has changed. The hero now-a-days may come from a poor and ordinary family also. The deficiency in his status has been supplemented by identifying him as the representative of a class or a force etc. The position of the hero in English literature has been changing from time to time but there has been no change, in the status of the heroes in Sanskrit dramas. Rāma, Dusyanta, Chārudatta and Mādhava became the heroes of the Sanskrit dramas and not the ordinary people of the society.

Aristotle is of the opinion that the tragic hero should be virtuous but at the same time possess a tragic flaw which would lead him from prosperity to adversity. We may cite numerous examples from Greek as well as British drama to illustrate his theory of hamartia. Oedipus, Agamemnon, Hamlet, Othello and Macbeth—all suffer from a tragic flaw which leads them to their tragic ends. Now the question is as to whether there are plays in Sanskrit literature also where heroes suffer from tragic flaw. At least there are two plays available in Sanskrit drama which may illustrate the Aristotelian view of tragic hero suffer-

ing from a tragic flaw. They are Bhāsa's *Urubhangam* and *Karṇabhāram*. Most of the Sanskrit scholars, however, are not prepared to accept *Urubhangam* as a tragedy and Duryodhana as the tragic hero. I beg to differ from them and consider Duryodhana to be the tragic hero on the following grounds :

(*i*) Bhīma cannot be the hero of the drama as he violates the rule of the battlefield and resorts to foul means in order to kill Duryodhana.

(*ii*) Bhīma has not been presented as a character on the stage though the breaking of Duryodhana's thighs is performed by him.

(*iii*) Balrāma, the elder brother of Krishna, condemns Bhīma for his foul method and considers Duryodhana to be an ascetic who, at the last moment of his life, wanted the Pāndavas to survive for offering oblations to the ancestors.

(*iv*) There is acute realisation at the end of the drama on the part of Duryodhana. When Asvasthāma asks him as to what has happened to him, he replies, "The son of my guru, it is the fruit of discontentment".

Can we not consider 'discontentment' to be the tragic flaw in the character of Duryodhana which leads him to his tragic end ? Duryodhana's insatiable desire for gaining full supremacy over the whole of Bhāratavarṣa and his reluctance in leaving the land to the Pāndavas even equal to the point of a needle was certainly a tragic flaw which led him to his ruin.

Bhāsa's second tragedy *Karnabhāram* is based on an episode from Mahābhārata. Karṇa was gifted with armour and ear-rings which were capable of giving full protection to him from any kind of danger. But what was the tragic flaw in his character ? I think, it was unbounded charity. He was such a dignified person that he could not deny anything to a Brahmin. Lord Krishna exploited this situation and took away his divine armour and ear-rings which enabled Arjuna to kill Karṇa. May

we not consider this 'unbounded charity' to be a flaw in the character of Karṇa which led him to his death ?

Whereas most of the Greek heroes become the victim of Fate and meet with their fall as well as death, most of the Sanskrit plays rule out the possibility of defeat as well as the death of the hero. Whereas in most of the Greek plays 'Destiny is character', in Sanskrit plays 'character is destiny'. Indian hero may pass through suffering and turmoil, but in the end he is sure to realise the ambition of his life. He never surrenders before Fate and accepts defeat in life. When we make a comparison between Sophocles' *Oedipus, the king* and Bhāsa's *Urbubhaṇga*, we see the difference very clearly. In *Oedipus, the king* the life of the hero Oedipus appears to be merely a plaything in the hands of Fate. Though he is a man of strong will and firm determination, his life seems to be conditioned by the forces beyond his control. On the other hand the hero of the *Urubhaṇga*, Duryodhana is not a puppet in the hands of Fate. He accepts his own responsibility in his tragic end. It is not his Fate but unrighteous designs which lead him to his fatal end. The sense of pessimism that we see in the character of Oedipus is altogether missing from the character of Duryodhana who, by the end of the drama, realises his own fault and makes a revolution of his own life.

Most of the Shakespearean characters also bring their own downfall. Take, for example, the character of Macbeth. He becomes the victim of his own high ambition to become the king. His long association with the royal army as well as Lady Macbeth incited his ambition for power. He was the de facto king of Scotland but aspired to be the dejure king. This high ambition ultimately led him to his own destruction. The hero in Sanskrit drama, however, normally accepts the challenge and ultimately meets with success. The hero, as described by Bharata in his *NŚ*, is the netā (one who leads), who is sure to succeed in all his endeavours. He possesses some excellent qualities of head and heart such as humanity, tenderness, sense of renunciation, skill in action, sweetness of tongue, love for all, illustrious birth, patience, youth, intelligence wisdom, good

memory, energy, self-respect, valour, unwaveringness and loyalty to religion and duty. How is it possible that such an ideal hero will commit such an act which would lead him to his own downfall ? However, lack of any or some of these qualities may work as a tragic flaw in the character of the hero and bring his ruin. The dhīroddhata hero in Sanskrit drama who is extremely unyielding and agoistic, reckless and fluctuating in conduct, easily excited and indulgent in unabashed self-praise, belongs to this category. Rāvaṇa and Duryodhana may be cited as example of *dhīroddhata* heroes who are responsible for their own downfall.

Rāma in *Uttararāmacarita*, however, is a dhīrodātta hero who passes through acute mental suffering but does not have any tragic flaw. Though Aristotle considered tragic flaw to be an essential requirement for tragedy, Hegel contradicted it. In the opinion of Hegel there is not always a clash between good and evil but sometimes between two goods also. In the character of Rāma there is conflict between two goods—conflict regarding duty as a husband towards his wife Sītā and duty as a king towards his subjects. It is of course very difficult to make a choice between two equally justifiable moral claims. The hero Rāma suffers immensely but does not accept his defeat. He does not feel that he is just a puppet in the hands of destiny.


There are some points of divergence between the two great theorists. Whereas Aristotle is silent in his *Poetics* regarding the role of the heroine in a tragedy, Bharata has discussed various types of heroines and their respective characteristics. Infact what Aristotle says about characters in general applies as well to the heroines also. On the basis of the extant heroines in both the Greek and the Sanskrit plays we perceive the clear-cut difference in their outlook. Whereas heroines in Sanskrit drama are humble and obedient in reacting to their suppress-ions, Greek heroines are reactionary and sometimes become violent also. There are some heroines in Sanskrit drama such as Sītā, Śakuntalā and Śaivyā who never react violently against the decision of their husbands, howsoever oppressive and insult-ing their decisions might be. On the contrary the Greek heroine

Antigone asserts her own right for giving proper burial to the dead body of her brother. Clytemnestra goes to the extent of killing her own husband Agamemnon and Medea her own children. This shows a remarkable difference in their outlook which reflects the wide difference in their respective cultural and social backgrounds.

Whereas Aristotle does not say anything regarding the role of minor characters in the drama, Bharata has discussed their role too in greater depth and detail. He has paid proper attention to the role of jesters, parasites, errand-girls, servants messengers and dancers etc. Bharata has not only taken into account the role of various characters, but given detailed instructions also regarding the assignment of proper roles to various characters keeping in view their suitability on the stage. There is no such account available in Aristotle's *Poetics*.

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6

Types of Drama

The present chapter discusses various types of drama as suggested by Aristotle and Bharata respectively. Whereas Aristotle suggests two types of drama—Tragedy and Comedy only, Bharata refers to ten types of drama—Nāṭaka, Prakaraṇa, Samavakāra, Ihāmṛga, Dima, Vyāyoga, Utsṛṣṭikāṅka, Prahasana Bhāṇa and Vīthi. These various types of drama are discussed separately and then an attempt is being made to find out the similarities as well as the differences between the two theorists regarding their categorization of drama. The question of complete identification between Aristotle and Bharata on this issue does not arise. Only an approximate similarity may be traced between the two.

I

Let us first take up Aristotle's concept of tragedy and comedy and discuss them in detail. Referring to the origin of the theatre in connection with the growth of tragedy and comedy, in ancient period, Maxwell Anderson has rightly stated :

> The theatre originated in two complementary religious ceremonies, one celebrating the animal in man and one celebrating the god. Old Greek Comedy was dedicated to the spirits of lust and riot and earth, spirits which are certainly necessary to the health and continuance of the race. Greek tragedy was dedicated to man's aspiration, to his kinship with the gods, to his unending, blind attempt to lift himself above his lusts and his pure animalism into

> a world where there are other values than pleasure and survival. However unaware of it we may be, our theatre has followed the Greek patterns with no change in essence from Aristophanes and Euripides to our own day.[1]

In ancient Greece both tragedy and comedy originated from the religious rituals. Tragedy originated from the lamentations associated with the public worship of Dionysus, the god of vegetation. In Winter and early Spring people used to worship Dionysus in order to propitiate him so that he might bless them with fine harvests. The word 'tragedy' owes its origin to the Greek term 'tragodoi, which refers to a chorus, who personated goats. Etymologically 'tragedy' refers to a 'goat-song'. In the opinion of Hardison the term 'tragedy' was traced by Hellenistic critics to "the practice of awarding a goat to the winner in dithyrambic contests honoring Dionysus. Later, the term tragedy came to be used as the label for plays performed at the dramatic contests that replaced the dithyrambic contests. On each day of a dramatic festival, four plays were performed, three generally serious in tone and one satyr-play"[2]. The first three plays which were serious in tone, were then known as tragedy.

Tragedy

Since we have already discussed Aristotle's concept of the nature, function and structure of tragedy in earlier chapters, it is necessary here to give a brief account of what a tragedy is. Let us start with the definition of tragedy, given by Aristotle himself :

> Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude ; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play ; in the form of action, not of narrative ; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.[3]

Aristotle considers tragedy to be a 'serious' work of art. It is concerned with the serious issues and not with the trivial

incidents of human life. Moreover it should be 'complete' and of a certain 'magnitude'. Explaining the word 'complete' Aristotle has further stated that the action represented must have beginning, middle and an end. It is also essential that the tragedy is of a certain magnitude, as the beauty of anything whether it is a ship, a city or a work of art, depends upon its proper size. The tragedy should be of such a size that it may be taken in by the memory of the audience.

The tragedy should employ such a language which has been enhanced by each kind of artistic ornament. Its mode of presentation should be dramatic and not narrative. It should excite the emotions of pity and fear in the heart of the audience and than by providing proper outlet to these and similar other emotions, produce a pleasant relief which is known as catharsis. Tragedy is in fact the greatest and the most significant form of drama. Its contribution to the human society lies in the fact that it is mainly concerned with man's never-ending struggle to understand himself and the world he lives in. It contemplates the human situation freely and tries to uncloud the immediate concerns of human life. It explores the complicated situation in which "the divided human being faces basic conflicts, perhaps rationally insoluble, of obligations and passions, makes choices, for good or for evil ; errs knowingly or involuntarily ; accepts consequences ; comes into a new, larger awareness ; suffers or dies, yet with a larger wisdom"[4].

Aristotle analyses tragedy into six constituent elements. The first three elements—(*i*) plot or the arragement of incidents concerning human actions or experiences, (*ii*) character of different personae, and (*iii*) thought which gives an impression about the intellectual qualities of different characters, are related with the objects of imitation. The other two elements—diction and melody—are the means of imitation employed by the dramatist in order to enhance the beauty and effectiveness of expression in the drama. The last element *i.e.* spectacle is the manner of imitation. It is concerned with the way the tragedy is to be presented on the stage before the audience.

Aristotle further refers to the types of tragedy and says that they are of four types :

(*i*) Complex tragedy which entirely depends on peripety and anagnorisis.

(*ii*) Pethetic tragedy or the tragedy of suffering, as is evident from the tragedies on Ajex or Ixion.

(*iii*) Ethical tragedy or the tragedy of character, as can be seen in Sophocles' lost play *Phthiotides* which is based on feminine psychology and another play *Peleus* written by both Sophocles and Euripides.

(*iv*) Simple tragedy or the tragedy of Spectacle such as the *Phorcides, Prometheus Bound* and all the plays with the scenes laid in Hades.

The most significant distinction among them is that the first kind of tragedy is certainly different from the remaining three. It is a complex form of tragedy and is entirely dependent on reversal and recognition, as is evident from the complex-fatal plot of *Oedipus, the king* and the complex-fortunate plot of *Iphigenia in Tauris*. The remaining three kinds of tragedy, on the other hand, are simple in nature. Among the Simple types the first kind of tragedy is the tragedy of Suffering. As is evident from chapter XI in *Poetics*, the third part of the plot is the Scene of Suffering which consists of destructive or painful events such as death, physical agony, wounds and the like. This type of tragedy does not depend on the complex structure for its effect but rather on such incidents which are pitiable and fearful in themselves. Sophocles' play *Ajax* illustrates this type of tragedy. It is a simple portrayal of the hero's sufferings which come to an end with deliberate suicide. It may rightly be considered to be a traged of suffering as it ends with the suicide of the hero, without having any reversal or recognition in it.

Among the Simple types the second kind of tragedy is the Ethical tragedy or the tragedy of Character where the emphasis shifts from plot to Character. The tragedy of character mainly

depends on the use of moral stereotypes and frequently tends to be episodic. The action in such a play is rather weak and the drama appears to be a series on dramatic monologues. It is evident from Robert Browning's dramatic monologues such as *Andrea del Sarto* and *Fra Lippo Lippi* as well as *The Ring and the Book*. It can be also noticed in O'Neill's *Strange Encounter*. Though the nineteenth century critics tried to put greater emphasis on character rather than on the plot, Aristotle is very clear in his assertion about the primary of plot. "To him the tragedy of character" says Hardison, "is an inferior kind. As his examples show, tragedy of character is possible and can be treated artistically ; but it ignores just those parts of tragedy that are most important to the tragic effecti".[5]

The last type of tragedy is the tragedy of spectacle. Spectacle is a formal part of tragedy and can produce the tragic effect even without the help of the structural development of incidents in the drama. It depends on the scenes for its effectiveness on the stage as in the *Peleus*. Like *Prometheus Bound* it takes the help of sensational acting and the powerful stage-craft for its effect.

Aristotle also discusses the question whether tragedy is superior to the epic or vice versa. In the beginning of chapter XXVI he summarizes the arguments for the superiority of the epic over tragedy. He refers to the fact that people are normally under the impression that the better art is the art which appeals to the more refined set of people. Considered from this point of view, epic is definitely superior to tragedy because the latter depends on the actor's gesture for its success and its appeal is intended for the common people. Aristotle, therefore, concludes their arguments in the following lines :

> So we are told that Epic poetry is addressed to a cultivated audience, who do not need gesture ; Tragedy, to an inferior public. Being then unrefined, it is evidently the lower of the two.[6]

However he does not agree with the view. In his opinion the accusation is directed against the art of acting and not against

tragedy itself. Moreover, it is possible to overdo gestures both in epic recitations as well as song competitions. Aristotle gives four positive arguments which reveal the super positive of tragedy over epic :

(*i*) In addition to all the epic elements tragedy uses two more—song and spectacle for producing the most vivid impression on the audience. Though they are not the most important parts of tragedy, they certainly make it richer and more effective in performance.

(*ii*) Tragedy gives more vivid impression in reading as well as in representation. Aristotle has stated that tragedy, like epic poetry, "produces its effect even without action ; it reveals its power by more reading."[7] It is true that we are immensely moved just by reading the tragedy ; its enactment on the stage is not essential for its enjoyment.

(*iii*) Tragedy requires a 'shorter length of time' than epic in achieving its end. In the opinion of Aristotle, "...the concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one which is spread over a long time and so diluted. What, for example, would be the effect of the Oedipus of Sophocles, if it were cast into a form as long as the Iliad."[8] It would certainly be two long and would definitely spoil its effect. Aristotle here clearly links economy with intensity of effect.

(*iv*) Tragedy is confined to a single action and does not include such episodes which are outside the plot. The dramatist concentrates on a single action and excludes all that is not necessary or probable, thereby achieving greater unity then epic. Tragedy produces the 'proper pleasure', that is, catharsis more efficiently than epic.

If tragedy is, thus, superior to epic in possessing a large number of elements, a greater compression and a better unity and in achieving catharsis more effectively, it is evident that "Tragedy is the higher art, as attaining its end more perfectly".[9]

Tragedy is in fact superior to epic as well as comedy in the delineation of the complexities of human life and in its powerful appeal.

COMEDY

Comedy, like tragedy, first originated in ancient Greece as a result of the religious celebrations in honour of Dionysus. Etymologically the word 'comedy' has been derived from the Greek term 'komos' which means merriment and revelry. It is associated with the reveals in the honour of Dionysus as a god of wine, fruitfulness and reproduction. The Dionysus spirit gets reflected in "songs of joy and delight in nature, the rollicking fun which showed in the gay treatment of the divine and in the fantasies of cloud cuckooland, the earthly pleasures of natural processes"[10], and is to be seen in almost all the comedies right from the days of Aristophanes upto the present age.

It is a fact that not as much importance was attached to comedy as had been given to tragedy. It is evident from Aristotle's own statement :

> The successive changes through which Tragedy passed, and the authors of these changes, are well known, whereas Comedy has had no history, because it was not at first treated seriously.[11]

There is no systematic discussion of comedy in Aristotle's *Poetics* also, though there is a good deal of exploration of the history of comedy in chapters III and IV. Chapter V begins with an account of comedy arousing the expectation that it would give a full account of comedy. It is, however, to be regretted that that account is missing though Aristotle clearly promises in the very beginning of chapter VI to discuss comedy in detail at a later stage. Critics still differ as to whether the *Poetics* originally consisted of two Books, the other Book being devoted to the discussion of comedy and catharsis or not. It is quite obvious that Aristotle' contemporaries were well acquainted with his theory of comedy in some form or the other.

There is a work entitled *Tractatus Coislinianus* where the definition of comedy is available to us, although its date and authorship are not known. Moreover Humphry House and Colin Hardie have pointed out that "it reads like an almost mechanical invention by somebody working with the Aristotelian definition of Tragedy in front of him, and producing what has been called a "travesty" of it and a "sorry fabrication.[12] Though it is a complex and puzzling abstract, it reveals the workings of a great mind. Lane Cooper has attempted to construct an Aristotelian theory of comedy comparable to that of tragedy with the help of the classical work *Tractatus Coislinianus* as well as the hints given in Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. Lane Cooper's account of Aristotelian theory of comedy, however, cannot be considered to be an authentic one, as a systematic theory cannot be propounded merely on the basis of the hints being taken from different sources. Formulation of a systematic Aristotelian theory of comedy is almost impossible on account of the lack of proper evidence. "Scholars still argue", says W.D. Howarth, "over the etymological derivation of the word 'comedy' ; there is no general agreement on the boundaries prescribed for this kind of drama, or the authentic purpose which animates it ; and we possess no challenging formulation of the essence of comedy, such as the *Poetics* provide for tragedy, with sufficient authority to make it the necessary starting point for any theoretical inquiry"[13]. However a general theory of comedy may be propounded on the basis of the hints being given in Aristotle's *Poetics* and the available comedies, Greek as well as English.

Let us begin with Aristotle's meagre account of comedy in his *Poetics* :

> Comedy is, as we have said, an imitation of characters of a lower type—not, however, in the full sense of the word bad, the Ludicrous being merely a subdivision of the ugly. It consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive. To take an obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and distorted, but does not imply pain.[14]

Aristotle's preoccupation with 'an imitation of characters of a lower type' in comedy does not mean that comedy is concerned with low types of people only. It simply means that comedy makes men appear worse than they are in real life. It is evident from Aristotle's another statement in *Poetics* : "Comedy aims at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life."[15] In Greek comedies of Aristophanes there are so many characters like Socrates, Creon, Euripides and Heracles who possess dignified status in society but they have not been shown in the exalted moments of their life in the plays. Aristophanes has rather exposed their weaknesses and defects and exaggerated them to such an extent that they might appear to be amusing to the audience. In *The Clouds* Aristophanes does not want to glorify Socrates but intends to ridicule his follies as the leader of the new sophistries, then in fashion. In *The Frogs* he presents the merits and demerits of Aeschylus and Euripides as a tragedy writers and finally tilts in favour of Aeschylus, as only a return to Aeschylean passion could save tragedy from utter ruin. In *The Birds* he expresses his disgust at what is real and ludicrous and seeks refuge in an imaginative, fantastic utopian world.

Though it is an undisputed fact that comedies of Aristophanes, Plautus, Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Moliers and others are mostly dominated by characters of ludicrous qualities, there are some characters like Viola, Portia, Orlando, Imogen, Candida or Prospero who possess qualities of rare excellence and intellectual perfection. Their presence in comedy is an important as the presence of the erring and the imperfect, as they "complete the perspective of life and hold out, in their very existence, a hope and an ideal-Comedy, with its unflinching faith in the possibility of human happiness, cannot ignore these effective instruments of redemption."[16]

Aristotle traces the origin of comedy to the "poems of satirical kind" and suggests that the writers of comdey evolved from the lampooners or the writers of personal satire. He considers Homer as the father of comedy as he was the first poet to have "laid down the main lines of comedy, by dramatising the ludicrous instead of writing personal satire"[17]. Whatever be the

origin of comedy, there is no doubt it that comedy is basically concerned with the social aspects of character. Elizabeth Drew has clearly stated her views on this issue :

> Comedy is always rooted in the social order. It deals with the relationship of individuals to society and of society to individuals.[18]

It is true that most of the comedies are mainly concerned with the social behaviour of human beings and try to show the lapses in the social behaviour of men and women. There are, however, some exceptions to this. The presence of such comedies as Aristophanes' *The Birds* or Shakespeare's *The Tempest* testify to this fact that the concern of comedy is not social only. It would be more appropriate to say that nothing human is alien to comedy.

The spirit of comedy is a spirit of ardent joy for and unshakable faith in the forces of life. Its purpose is to evoke laughter at some defect or ugliness which is neither painful nor destructive. Aristotle here deviates from Plato who had clearly stated that comedy corrupts the passions by displaying images of depravity and arouses malicious and painful laughter. In the opinion of Aristotle comedy should be amusing but not malicious or painful. Genuine comedy should not include personal satire and gallying caricature. The omission of malica in the context of comedy was a significant departure of Aristotle from Plato. Explaining Aristotle's views on comedy Else has rightly stated that "comedy does not involve us in the painful emotions of envy, anger, malice and the like ; *and* it does not involve the comic characters in pain, death and destruction. Both aspects are pertinent to the definition of the genre, and to its history."[19]

The essence of comedy lies in the continued assertion of the human will to live and enjoy the happiness from within and without. There may be passing moods of cynicism and sadness in comedy but the lasting impression is one of ardent faith in the value of man and his existence on the earth. Even when the comic playwright appears to be wholly occupied with the

weaknesses, follies and foibles of man, he is fully "aware of his vast potentialities for achievement, and believes in the possibility of a happier and a more enlightened human life".[20] Aristophanes' comedy *The Birds* illustrates it perfectly, as it is capable of inspiring us to aspire for a happier and more peaceful life. In Galsworthy's play *The Pigeon* Ferrand is such a character who is forced to lead a life of perpetual poverty, but there is a remarkable quality in his character which compensates his lack of earthly comforts. He has an immense capacity for enjoying 'the light of life as it is and the sweetness of life as it may be'. He has a message to convey and that may be considered to be the message of comedy—'Life is sweet, Monsieur'.

The purpose of comedy is to arouse amusement and laughter, Amusement, aesthetic in nature, says G.S. Amur, "is the comedic way of overcoming the imperfection and ugliness in life, and laughter is its outward, though not an inevitable, manifestation"[21]. Laughter serves a very useful biological purpose. It provides an outlet for superfluous energy and gives relief to our mental tension. It strengthens those forces which make our life worth living. It has been interpreted by various critics as a 'sudden glory', 'a surge of vital feeling', a catharsis of psychic tension', or something else. James L. Calderwood and Harold E. Toliver[22], however, are of the opinion that the interpretation of laughter is not so significant as its pattern of development. Laughter generally arises from the incongruous which implies a forced linkage of disparate categories such as the clown's distended nose, the motley fool in court, the pompous strut leading to a pratfall, verbal devices like hyperbole, understatement and pun etc.

Laughter in comedy should arise from the ugly, the disproportion ate and the unsymmetrical and not from the graver vices or crimes. It may also be extended to embrace, says Butcher, "the incogruities, absurdities, or cross-purposes of life, its blunders and discords, its imperfect correspondences and adjustments, and that in matters intellectual as well as moral"[23] Comedy is not basically concerned with the graver

issues of human life but rather looks at its follies, imperfections and inconsistencies. It deals with the idle and distorted moments of human life. It also embodies a dominant characteristic or a leading passion of human life. It deals with romance and fantacy and displays the kindliness of human nature. It is, however, to be accepted that the chief end of comedy is not mere amusement. It is rather "an embodiment of the great spirit of harmony, and, in its full expression, is as necessary for a fully developed life as Tragedy is".[24]

The spirit of comedy is not compatible with an uncontrolled moral indignation. Though it exposes the follies and foibles of human life and thereby encourages the growth of a healthy society, it is never rigid in its moral commitments. If on the one hand it cherishes the traditional values like chastily, fidelity and love as we see in the comedies of Shakespeare, on the other hand it is highly critical of the limitations of our traditional moral values as is evident from the plays of Bernard Shaw. Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Moliere and Shaw have tried to preserve what is best in the life of the individual as well as the society and have fought against the forces of irrationality, stupidity and false values which deeply influence the human society. They have made an ardent search for order and system and indirectly affirmed the rational values of human life.

Comedy adopts the most reasonable and human attitude to the problem of sex. It frankly admits the requirements of sex as an indispensable part of a healthy process of procreation. Since comedy had originated from Dionysiac rituals of fertility, *gamos*—union of sexes—became its most significant ingredient. It is evident from the plays of Aristophanes that most of them end in the union of sexes. So is the case with the comedies of Shakespeare. Comedy infact recognizes the claims of love and brings out its beauty and romance in abundance. It looks upon the relations of men and women as an eternal source of happiness for the human race.

The spirit of comedy is a spirit of invention and imagination and takes delight in fantacy and romance. The plays of

Menander, especially *The Arbitration*, are romantic in their setting. The comedies of Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Dekker, Goldsmith and Fry are remarkable in their affinity to fantacy and romance. Even Bernard Shaw has made frequent use of fantasy in some of his plays such as *Man and Superman* and *Androcles and the Lion.* Streaks of romanticism and sentimental expression can be easily seen in the plays like *As you like it, The Twelfth Night, Love for Love. The School for Scandal, The Lady's not for Burning* or *The Winslow Boy.* Frequent use of wit and humour generates an atmosphere of relaxation and amusement in comedy.

Comedy stands for the assertion of the forces of life over the forces of death and destruction. Fry's play *The Lady's not for Burning* displays the triumph of the love of life over the love of death. We may see the victory of true love over the heavy odd of life in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* or *As you Like It* or the triumph of the good and the virtuous over the wicked and the sinning in *The Merchant of Venice* or *The Tempest.* The triumph of normality over abnormality has been celebrated by Aristophanes in his play *The Clouds.* Comedy is in fact concerned with the depiction of the ritual combat of a young man with an old man and displays the clash of summer against winter, life against death and fertility against sterility. Even if death occurs in the comedy, it is not an all-absorbing conclusive death of tragedy but just a transitory phase in an over-all comic movement.

Difference between Tragedy and Comedy

From the earliest times up to the present age we have the general impression that whereas tragedy is sad, serious and profoundly dark, comedy is light, bright and animated. We normally associate tragedy and comedy with the unhappy and happy endings respectively. It is, however, very significant that Aristotle never made such a distinction between tragedy and comedy. In his opinion there are two types of complex plot in the tragedy—complex-fatal plot and complex-fortunate plot. There is unhappy ending in the complex-fatal plot as is evident from the plays such as *Oedipus, the King. Antigone,*

Hamlet, *Macbeth* and *King Lear* etc. On the other hand there is happy ending in the complex-fortunate plot as is clear from the plays such as *Oresteia and Iphigenia in Tauris.* Aristotle considers Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* to be an ideal tragedy, though we all know that the play, instead of ending unhappily, ends with the reunion of Iphigenia with her lost brother Orestes. It is a very moving tragedy in the sense that it depicts the pangs of separation of long lost brother and sister who fail to recognize each other. Imphigenia goes to the extent of killing her own brother, though at the last moment recognition takes place and his life is saved.

Though most of the tragedies do end unhappily, 'unhappy ending' is not an essential requirement of tragedy. Similarly 'happy ending' is appropriate to comedy, but comedy cannot be determined solely by its happy ending. Most of the comedies do end on a happy note of triumph, reunion, harmony and contentment which give us the impression of the sweetness of life. However we should not forget that the happy ending is not the proper ending for comedy only. Happy ending may be frequent in comedy but is certainly not the distinguishing feature of comedy solely. Happy ending is possible even in a powerful tragedy. Now the question is : If happy ending is possible in both tragedy and comedy, how can we differentiate the two ? In tragedy the happy ending is possible simply by the avoidance of impending disaster, in comedy there is no such disaster ever really threatened. Hence we cannot determine whether a particular play is a tragedy or a comedy on the basis of the ending of the drama.

It is also very diffiult to say whether a particular play ends happily or unhappily unless the point of view is quite obvious. We may take, for example, Ibsen's famous play *A Doll's House.* If we consider it purely from a conventional point of view, it appears to have an unhappy ending as it ends with the breaking up of Helmer's family. However if we go deeper into it, we find that Nora has got deliverance from the doll's house and is now in a position to lead an independent life and Helmer has become wiser and more hopeful of future happiness. The

play comes to an optimistic end as it shows the triumph of human spirit over the shackles of time and space.

Though comedy usually ends with marriages, reunions and reconciliations, they cannot always be relied upon as the decisive tests of comedy. Osborne's *Look Back in Anger* cannot be considered to be a comedy even though it ends with the reunion between Jimmy and Alison. On the other hand Oscar Wild's play *A Women of No importance* is a comedy though there is no reconciliation between Mrs. Arbuthnot and Lord Illingworth even till the end of the play. G.S. Amur has gone to the extent of saying that "under particular circumstances and against a particular background, even such a sure sign of an unhappy ending as death becomes part of a perfectly acceptable comedic end, as in Shaw's *The Doctor's Dilemma*, Maugham's *Sheppey* or Eliot's *The Cocktail Party*".[25] We, thus, see that the ending of the drama cannot primarily be responsible for determining whether the play is a tragedy or a comedy.

Aristotle says that tragedy and comedy differ in respect of the subject of the object of imitation. Whereas tragedy imitates the exalted and the noble, comedy is concerned with the humbler and meaner types of action. In chapter IV of his *Poetics* Aristotle, while giving an account of the origin of tragedy and comedy, has clearly stated :

> Poetry now diverged in two directions, according to the individual character of the writers. The graver spirits imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men. The more trivial sort imitated the actions of meaner persons, at first composing satires, as the former did hymns to the gods and the praises of famous men...Thus the older poets were distinguished as writers of heroic or of lampooning verse.[26]

The epic-spirited poets became tragedy writers and the satirical lampooners writers of comedy in due course of time.

Albert Cook[27] is of the opinion that the difference between tragedy and comedy lies in the choice of the subject-matter

rather than the ending of the drama. He analyses the theme of *Philoctetes* and *The Tempest* and finds both of them to be profound and powerful plays. Both of them have a happy ending but whereas the *Philoctetes* is a tragedy, *The Tempest* is a comedy. Tragedy derives its theme from the grim aspects of Greek mythology or from the serious concerns of human life, comedy derives it from the lighter or the ludicrous side of human life. Comedy does not possess the kind of metaphysical dimension which is of prime importance in the tragedy. Tragedy deals with the exalted figures, comedy with the inferior types. Tragedy appeals to the heart, comedy to the head. These are, however, sweeping generalisations and cannot be a sure guide to the exact nature of tragedy and comedy as "the range of comedic characters is not limited to the ridiculous or the typical. It is usual for comedy to portray the nobler aspects of humanity as well, and when this happens, our response to the characters of comedy is one of emotional sympathy and not merely one of detached judgement"[28].

Tragedy is concerned with the irremediable and inevitable vices of society, comedy with the remediable ones. In tragedy whereas the moderate and the most reasonable ambitions are dashed to the ground, in comedy even the wildest ones are realised. Willy Loman is not able to realise his humble ambitions, but Lysistrate and Viola succeed even in their most fantastic plans. Oedipus miserably failed in spite of his best possible efforts to avert the inevitable course of Fate, Bassanio succeeded in realising his dream of marrying Portia even through the choice of Casket. In tragedy even the minor errors lead to the fatal end, in comedy the greater errors are condoned and forgiven. In tragedy goodness and wisdom do exist but they are often ineffective and hence wasted or sacrificed as is evident from the characters of Cordelia, Desdemona or Ophelia. In comedy, on the other hand, goodness and wisdom are great source of happiness and are capable of restoring harmony by the end of the drama as is evident from the careers of Paulina and Camillo in *The Winter's Tale*. The comedy opens with a confused state of affairs but the confusion is happily cleared up by the end of the drama, whereas tragedy

opens with the distinct issues but the outcome is horrifying. There is another difference between tragedy and comedy regarding the reader's response also. "The tragic poet", says J.G. Warry, steadily tightens up his grip upon the audience, but the comic poet wakens his victims as soon as they are entranced, drawing attention to the deceit which under his spell he has been able—or would have been able to practise on them".[29]

Tragedy makes a positive presentation of truth, comedy refers to it by implication. Comedy, by exposing the hollowness of untruth, refers to the superiority of truth indirectly. In comparison to tragedy the appeal of comedy is less exalted and the analysis of human emotions less profound. Throwing further light on the difference between tragedy and comedy P.S. Sastri has pointed out that "while tragedy appears to present idealism persons, comedy turn out to be busy with personified ideals ; comedy merges the individuals in the type, a tragedy reveals the type through the individuals".[30] In tragedy we start with a well known figure like Oedipus, Agamemnon or Hamlet and try to see what level it reaches at through a certain development. In comedy, on the other hand, we begin with a fixed meaning and try to fill it out with examples. Wimsatt & Brooks have drawn our attention to another very significant difference between tragedy and comedy.

> Tragedy takes *hamartia* literally but magnifies its punishment—and is thus fearful and pitiful. Comedy distorts hamartia by carica'ure, reduces punishment to discomfiture and mortification, and is thus ridiculous.[31]

Tragedy deals with unusual but normal, comedy with the abnormal but not unusual. "In tragedy there is ever a clash" says A. Nicoll, "between forces physical or mental or both ; in comedy there is ever a conflict between personalities, between the sexes, or between an individual and society".[32] In tragedy there is outer as well as inner conflict—outer conflict between man and man or man and some force outside himself as with Orestes and the Furies, or Oedipus and his Fate and inner conflicts which takes place in the mind of the hero. In *Hamlet*,

for example, though there is conflict between Hamlet and his father's ghost or Hamlet and Claudius but the real clash lies in the mind of Hamlet himself. In comedy the clash between personalities or between the sexes arousing our laughter can be easily seen in Sheridan's *The School for Scandal* or Fletcher's *Tamer Tam'd* or *Wild-goose chase*. Another remarkable difference between tragedy and comedy is that whereas the tragedy is mostly dominated by man like Oedipus, Dr. Faustus, Hamlet, Othello, Macbeth and King Lear, comedy is mostly dominated by women like Portia, Viola, Rosalind, Beatrice and Maria etc. These female characters bend the action as well as the male characters in the drama to their own purposes.

Tragedy displays the suffering of the protagonist for some vital issue, comedy deals with the events suggestive of ongoing life and a sense of the continuity. In tragedy the protagonist, in the process of suffering or loss, gains a new insight and a qualitative refinement of consciousness which Aristotle calls *anagnorisis* or recognition. Comedy, on the other hand, looks at the human life in a lighter vein and tries to evoke laughter by exposing its follies and foibles.

We, thus, see that the 'ending' of the drama is not a determining factor whether the play is a tragedy or a comedy. We may take, for example, Shakespeare's most powerful tragedy *Hamlet*. Suppose a slight modification is introduced in the ending of the drama—Hamlet is able to kill Claudius but himself survives ; it is just possible and dramatically conceivable—will Shakespeare's *Hamlet* then become a comedy simply because it ends happily ? Certainly not. The ending of *Hamlet* is not so important as the mental suffering of Hamlet and his philosophic meditation over the vital issues of human life—'To be or not to be ; that is the question'. Similarly will Sheridan's play *The School for Scandal* become a tragedy if its ending is slightly altered ? In *The School for Scandal* if Sir Peter and Lady Teazle quarrel again in the last Act and Sir Peter in a fit of anger kills his wife and then in a mood of extreme tension, commits suicide, should it then be considered a tragedy ? Certainly not. It is thus evident that the ending of the drama is not so significant a factor in determining

whether the play is a tragedy or a comedy, as the main issue in the drama, the intention of the play-wright, his attitude towards life and the reader's response to it. The most distinguishing feature of drama is its moving spirit which determines its character and the nature of its appeal. If this is so, then the Hindi translation of tragedy as 'dukhānta nāṭaka'—play with a unhappy ending and of comedy as 'sukhānta nātaka'—play with a happy ending, is misleading and hence not an appropriate translation. 'Gambhīra nāṭaka' - serious play and 'Vinodapurna nāṭaka'—delightful play, would certainly be better terms for tragedy and comedy respectively.

Melodrama

In England some plays, whose appeal was more sensational than tragic, were written by the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. It constituted a separate form of drama which was known as melodrama. Etymologically it referred to a serious play, accompanied by music, in order to stir up the audience. The main purpose of melodrama was to produce thrills at any cost.

Melodrama is certainly a less significant dramatic form than tragedy, as its appeal is trivial and temporary. It is not expected to communicate a deeper level of meaning to the audience. It does not deal with the inner conflicts like Hamlet's mental struggles or Alceste's fight against social conventions but an external one like the fight between two men for the beauty of a woman or the fight among people for the sake of property.

Though melodrama has been universally recognized today as a form of drama, it is a fact that little attempt had been made by the early dramatists to distinguish melodrama from tragedy—Even during the Renaissance the term 'tragedy' included melodrama. "Some of the best Elizabethan tragedies", say F.B. Millet & G.E. Bentley, "Like Webster's *Duchess of Malfi*, and Beaumont and Fletcher's *Maid's Tragedy*, made use of melodrama, while other plays called tragedies at the time, like Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy* and Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus* are melodrama pure and simple."[33]

Melodrama takes into account the whole range of conflicts starting from failure to success, from defeat to victory undergone by various characters. The main issue of conflict here is, says Robert B. Heilman, "not the reordering of the self, but the reordering of one's relations with others, with the world of people or things ; not the knowledge of self, but the maintenance of self, in its assumption of wholeness, until conflicts are won or lost"[34]. Melodrama is described as monopathic and shows characters in defeat or victory guilt or innocence having affiliations with politics and history. Characters are usually type figures and they are frequently inconsistent. Plot here dominates the characters and is capable of producing thrills to the audience.

Melodrama is not intended to display a logical sequence of events but a series of individual scenes, each scene exciting in itself and is not dependent on the others for its effect, as is normally seen in the tragedy. The characters and the events presented on the stage don't have much significance and their resemblance to real life is only superficial. The melodrama is not thought-provoking and the less we think over it, the more we are likely to enjoy it.

Farce

Whereas melodrama deals with sensational events, farce is is concerned with the ridiculous ones. Whereas melodrama produces thrill, farce produces laughter in the heart of the audience. Now the question is ; what is the demarcating line between comedy and farce ? It is a surprising fact that no attempt was ever made by the early Greek writers or by Aristotle to distinguish farce from comedy. When we read the plays of Aristophanes and Plautus, we see comedy and farce mixed together. Even the Latin comedy followed the same pattern. When we trace the history of the development of drama, we find the word 'farce' introduced during the Restoration period. It was, however, not used to refer to a special type of comic technique, but to a short humorous play consisting of three acts instead of five. Extremely exaggerated incidents and characters were brilliantly presented in these

plays. It is this crude technique of exaggeration and slapstick that is the main distinction of farce today.

Even when farce had not been recognized as a distinct form of drama such as in Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew*, Jonsons *Epicoene* and Goldsmith's *She Stoops to Conquer* we find farce wixed with comedy. There are scenes of farce in other plays also. In Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night* the duel between Viola and Sir Andrew Aguecheck and in Congreve's *Love for Love* Miss Prue's pursuit of Tattle are typical farces.

In farce plot gets predominance over character. Physical action gets utmost priority in farce as dramatist here is exclusively concerned with what people do and not with their process of thinking and feeling, Its appeals depends entirely on its humorous incidents. "It makes no pretense", say F. B. Millet & G.K. Bantley, "to depict reality and it constantly resorts to gross improbabilities in action and in Character".[35] *Charlies Aunt* the young scapegrace is dressed as an elderly lady, gets into all sorts of ridiculous diffiulties and thereby produces a good deal of laughter in the heart of the audience.

There are other minor forms of drama such as the History plays and the Problem plays which have only ephemeral interests in the long history of drama as they were the products of specific requirements of particular periods. The moment the specific requirement subsided, these forms disappeared. In the sixteenth century a large number of history plays where written by Shakespeare on account of the absorbing interest of the Elizabethan audience in history and they were in as much popular demand as tragedy and comedy were. But when the interest of the people in history declined, these plays automatically lost their popularity. Similarly the problem plays became very popular in the last phase of the nineteenth and the first phase of the twentieth century on account of the efforts of Ibsen, Galsworthy and other social dramatic reformers but they rapidly disappeared due to the drastic change in our social requirements.

II

Bharata has devoted chapter XX of his *NŚ* to the discussion and classification of ten kinds of drama. Dhanamjaya also wrote a book on this very theme and called it *Daśarūpaka*. Referring to the distinction between the Greek pattern and Indian pattern of classification Manomohan Ghosh has stated :

> Unlike the three-fold division of the Greeks based on a consideration of the sentiment involved, such as tragic, comic and an admixture of the both, the Indian classification depended on the subject-matter as well as technique of construction and presentation.[36]

Bharatia himself gives the reason for this kind of classification of drama. In his opinion the bases or mother-sources for this classification are known as *vṛttisa* which is normally interpreted as 'a style of production'. In the present contevt, however, it is used as the "source of different types of plays".[37] The classification of Sanskrit drama is not based on the 'ending' of the drama, as in our Indian philosophy life and death are endless sequence of continuity. The classification is rather based on "the delineation of particular emotional content"[38]. On the basis of their relative complexity Mr. Ghosh has classified them into major and minor types—the major types being the Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa and the remaining eight types known as minor types. Nāṭaka and Prakarṇṇa are the principal varieties which attracted the attention of the well-known playwrights. The other eight types don't have even sufficient representative works.

(1) Nāṭaka

Nāṭaka is considered to be the most perfect kind of dramatic composition. A.B. Keith calls it 'heroic comedy'. It derives its subject-matter from well-known sources like myth, legend, established tradition and so on. These sources may be Purāṇa, Rāmāyan, and Mahābhārata or any other celebrated work like Bṛhatkathā. The hero of the Nāṭaka should be a celebrated man of exalted nature such as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and

Udayana or a royal seer like Janaka and Viśvāmitra. He should be a man of refined taste, noble, dignified and large hearted. Keeping in view the sublime character of the hero Bharata does not like the use of low level humour and vulgar love-scenes in the Nāṭaka. He wanted to retain the dignified level of the Nāṭaka so that even the parents might see the dramatic performance with their sons and daughters. He wanted to choose such a well-known figure as the hero of the Nāṭaka who could justify the title of the drama.

Though Bharata does not put any restriction regarding the use of rasa in the Nāṭaka, he is certainly of the opinion that the predominant rasa should be heroic or erotic. Regarding the number of Acts to be used in the Nāṭaka Bharata clearly suggests that 'suitable number of Acts' must be introduced. Elaborating it further M. Ghosh points out that "unlike Greek plays ancient Indian Nāṭakas are divided into Acts the number of which must be less than five or more ten"[39]. Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntalam*, *Mālvikāgnimitra V'kramorvasi*, Bhāsa's *Pratimānāṭak*, Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākāṣasa*, Bhavabhūti's *Mahaviracarita* and *Uttararāmacarita*, Vijjaka's *Kaumudi Mahotsava*, Kṛṣna Misra's *Prabodha Candrodaya* may be cited as examples of this type of Nāṭakas. There are, however, excepttions to this rule. There are some plays which ignore the limitation of five to ten Acts. Ravidāsa's *Mithyājñānavidambanā* has one, Vedāntavāgica's *Bhojacarita* two, Ghanacyāma's *Navagrahcarita* three, Madhusūdana's *Janakīpariṇaya* four, Kavibhūṣaṇa's *Adbhutārṇava* twelve and *Hanumannāṭaka* fourteen Acts.

Bharata is of the opinion that the Nāṭaka should be so composed as to include five sandhis, for styles, sixty-four sandhiañgas, thirty six lakṣaṇas and embellishment of poetic excellances and figures of speech. Its plot should be well-knit and well connected. Its style should be clear, forceful and harmonious. It should arouse pleasure in the heart of the audience. The missing links or the unpleasant incidents like death should be reported with the help of the Introductory scenes in the Nāṭakas.

(2) Prakaraṇa

Prakaraṇa is the second type of ancient Indian drama. A.B. Keith calls it 'the bourgeois comedy' or the 'comedy of manners'"[40]. It follows the pattern of the Nāṭaka in everything except the nature of the plot and the condition of the hero. Whereas the plot of the Nāṭaka is based on myth and legend, the plot of the Prakaraṇa should be derived from the writer's own imaginative creation. In this regard Bharata has clearly stated :

> The play (lit. where) in which the writer *prakurute* (devises) by his own intellect an original plot with its Hero and works up its elaboration (śarīra), is called the Prakaraṇa.[41]

Whereas the hero of the Nāṭaka is a man of divine origin or a royal seer, the hero of the prakaraṇa should be a man of the society like a Brahamin, a minister or a merchant. Let us look at the remark of Bharata :

> The prakaraṇa should be known as not made up with an exalted Hero. And it does not contain the character of any god, has no story of king's enjoyment (of pleasures), and it is connected with the men outside (the royal palace)[42].

The hero of the Prakaraṇa is calm and noble. He is drawn from real life and the most appropriate theme is love. He pursues his object through many hurdles but ultimately succeeds in realising it.

Female characters in the Prakaraṇa should be either a courtezan or a depraved woman of good family. It is also possible to have both types of characters. It has been suggested that the Prakaraṇa may be of three types : it is pure (suddha) if the heroine is of pure character ; it is impure (vikṛta' if the heroine is a courtezan, it is mixed (sankīrṇa) if both types of heroine—a woman of pure character and a courtezan—appear in the same play. The heroine may be of three types, a lady of good

family, as in the lost *Puṣpadūṣita* (bhūṣita); a hetaera as in the lost *Taraṅgadatta* ; or a lady of good family may share the honours with a hetaera, with whom, however, she may not come in contact, as in the *cārudatta* and the *Mṛcchakaṭika*. The drama offers an appropriate place for slaves, vitas, merchant chiefs and rogues of various kinds. It is to be mentioned that if the hero is in the company of a respectable woman, no courtezan should meet him and vice versa. If, however, an urgent necessity arises and their meeting together with the hero becomes inevitable, their manner as well as language should remain undistorted.

So far as the use of rasa is concerned, Bharata is of the opinion that all the rasas may be used in the Prakaraṇa, though Dhanaṃjaya is in favour of the use of Erotic and Heroic Sentiments mainly. Like Nāṭaka, the number of Acts should be normally from five to ten and Introductory Scenes should be introduced in order to compress the events in the play. The name of the Prakaraṇa should be normally but not necessarily derived from the hero or heroine or both. The following are the examples of Prakaraṇas :

(*i*) Śūdraka's *Mṛcchakaṭika*, (*ii*) Bhavabhūti's *Mālatimādhava*, (*iii*) Ashvaghosha's *Cāriputraprakaraṇa*, (*iv*) Uddaṇḍin or Uddaṇḍanātha, *Mallikāmāruta*, (*v*) Rāmacandra's *Kaumudimitrānanda* and (*vi*) Rāmabhadra Muni's *Prabuddaranhineya*.

Nāṭikā

Though the discussion of Nāṭikā does not come within the scope of our work, as it is mainly concerned with the classification of ten kinds of drama only, it deserves our notice simply on account of the fact that it continued to be composed till the end of the 18th century and it combines certain features of both the Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa. There are some scholars who consider the inclusion of Nāṭikā as an interpolation, though Keith emphatically denies it.

Referring to the origin and nature of Nāṭikā Bharata has stated :

> Different in origin from the two (types of plays) the Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa, its plot should be invented, the Hero should be a king, and it should be based on (an incident relating to) music or affairs of the harem. And it contains an abundance of affairs of the harem. And it contains an abundance of female characters, has four Acts, graceful gestures as its soul ; well arranged constituents, many dances, songs and racitations, and love's enjoyment are its chief features.[43]

The hero of the Nāṭikā should be a renowned king, self-controlled and light-hearted (dhīralalita). Its principal sentiment is Erotic. Though it is normally expected to have four acts, it may have even one, two or three. Corresponding to the four acts, it should have four sub-divisions of the gay style. Its dramatic personae are the hero, his queen, the female messenger and the attendants. The following are its chief examples :

(*i*) Bhāsa's *Pratijñā-Yaugandharāyaṇa*, (*ii*) Harṣa's *Ranāvalī* and *Priyadarśikā*, (*iii*) Rājaśekhara's *Viddhaśālabhañjika* (*iv*) Bilhaṇa's *Kerṇasundarī*, (*v*) Madana's *Pārijātamañjari* or *Vijayaśri* and (*vi*) Mathurādāsa's *Vṛṣabhānuja*.

Though the plot, character and the situation in the Nāṭikā are identical with the Nāṭaka, its form gradually degenerated into mere imitation on account of the lack of real dramatic genius. It ultimately lost its creativity and life-force and it confined itself to mere entertainment with the help of song and dance.

(3) Samavakāra

The first play that Bharata produced is known as Samavakāra. It is so-called as various themes are scattered abou (samavakiryante) it. A.B. Keith[44] considers it to be a supre-natural drama. Referring to the chief characteristics of Samavakāra Bharata has stated :

> It should have the (exploits of) gods and Asuras as its subject-matter and one of them as its well-known and

> exalted Hero, and it is to consist of three Acts (presenting) the three kinds of deception, the three kinds of excitement or the three kinds of love. (Besides this) it should have as many as twelve dramatics personae and require a duration (lit. length) of eighteen Nādikās (for its performance).[45]

Samavakāra derives its theme from some mythological story related with gods and Asuras. Its hero should be some well-known mythological figure. The number of the heroes should be twelve, each striving for attaining a separate object. It is evident from the obtaining of Lakshmi and the like by Vasudeo and others in the churning of the ocean. Its predominant rasa is heroic though other rasas may also be used. It consists of three Acts, each Act having different durations. The limitation of time has been imposed on it so that it may not be too long. Each Samavakāra takes the time of eighteen Nādikās (one Nādikā is=24 minutes ; eighteen Nādikās is=seven hours and twelve minutes) for its presentation. The first Act should take twelve, the second four and the third two Nādikās only. Each Act should have different topics loosely related to one another. There should be no vimarsa sandhi, no Bindu and Praveśaka in Samavakāra. All the styles except the graceful may be used and the metres used in it are of the complex kind. The uṣṇih, Kutila and Anuṣṭubh metres are most appropriate.

In Samavakāra each act should exhibit one type of Excitement (vidrava), or Deception (kapaṭa) and love. Since there are three acts in Samavakāra, the play is expected to have three different types of excitement, deception and love. Referring to the three kinds of excitement Bharata says :

> Excitement (vidrava) is known to be of three kinds, such as being due to battle, flood (lit. water), storm (lit. wind) and fire, or to a big elephant at large, or the siege of a city.[46]

The three kinds of excitement are expected to result from (*i*) a natural agent such as the outbreak of fire, a hurricane, or a

flood ; (*ii*) by a furious animal such as elephant ; (*iii*) by a battle or the siege of a city. Though Bharata includes battle in in the first category, its inclusion in the third category appears to be more natural.

Commenting on the three kinds of deception Bharata stated :

> Deception (kapaṭa) is known to be of three kinds, such as being due to a devised plan, accident or that (practised) by the enemy. It creates joy or sorrow (to persons).[47]

The deception is produced by (*i*) a devised plan, (*ii*) by accident or by a supernatural agent and (*iii*) by the enemy. Regarding three kinds of love Bharata points out :

> In this connection (lit. here) three kinds of love to be presented through different actions are : that in relation to duty (dharma), that actuated by material gain (artha) and that actuated by passion (kāma).[48]

The three kinds of love are (*i*) the legitimate (*ii*) the interested and (*iii*) the voluptuous. The denouement in Samavakāra leads to the termination of hostilities.

Since no old speciment of Samavakāra except that of *Amrtamanthan*, the churning of the ocean by Brāhmaṇa, is available to us, it is certain that it was not a fully developed form of drama. M. Ghosh has rightly stated that it was only "a dramatic spectacle based on a mythological story"[49]. That is why it could not compete with full-fledged plays of Kālidāsa, Bhāsa and Bhavabhūti. Though in the middle of the 13th century Vatsarāja composed a Samavakāra known as *Samudramanthan*, it could not impress the people on account of its artificiality. Bhāsa's *Pañcayātra* may be considered to be the best speciment of Samavakāra, but it does not conform strictly to the Bharatan principles.

(4) Ihāmṛga

It is called ihāmṛga as in this type of play the hero pursues (īhate) a maiden who is as difficult to attain as a gazelle (mṛga). It is a play of intrigue where the hero is either a god or an illustrious mortal and the cause of conflict is the attainment of the divine lady which is a very difficult task. All kinds of confusion and tension are seen in the drama but the crucial conflict involving death is averted on one pretext or the other. Commenting on this type of play Bharata has stated :

> It (Ihāmṛga) has as its dramatis personae divine males who are implicated in fights about divine females. It should be constructed with a well-arranged plot and should be convincing. It is to abound in vehement (uddhata) Heroes and to have its construction dependent on feminine anger which is to give rise to commotion (saṃkṣobha), excitement (vidrava) and angry conflict (saṃpheta)...(In the Ihāmṛga) when persons intent on killing are on the point of killing, (the impending) battle should be avoided on some pretext.[50]

Ihāmṛga normally consists of four Acts and possesses three junctures. Here the main object of discord is the celestial woman who is equally liked by two rival characters. She, however, refuses to love one of them who is bent on obtaining her against her will even by carrying her off or some such means. This leads to the point where the war may begin but it is somehow or the other averted in the drama. The heroine thus is the bone of contention in this type of drama and its prevailing sentiments are love and mirth. The following are the plays of this type available to us :

(*i*) Vatsarāja's *Rukmiṇīharaṇa*, (*ii*) Kṛṣṇamicra's *Vījavijaya* (*iii*) Kṛṣna Avadhūta's *Sarvavinodanāṭaka*.

(5) Ḍima

Though the origin of this word Ḍima is not known to us, Dhanika, the commentator on *Daśarūpa* explains its origin from

the root 'dim', to wound. It is considered to be equivalent to *samghāta* meaning thereby 'injuring'. It is the representation of terrific events, as is evident from Vatsaraja's *Tripuradāha.*

Dima is a kind of play whose plot is properly constructed and whose hero is a well-known legendary figure, as Bharata has remarked. "The Dima should be constructed with a well-known plot and its Hero should be well-known and of the exalted (udātta) type.[51] In this type of play the playwright may use all the Sentiments except the Comic and the Erotic though its principal Sentiment is Furious (Raudra). It has sixteen characters which include gods, demi-gods, gandharvās, yakṣās, mahoragas, demons, rākṣasas, bhūtas, pretās, piśācas who are all of noble and haughty nature. It consists of four Acts and four junctures only without having any introductory scene, though the late *Manmathonmathana* of Rāma is an exception to this. Commenting upon what type of incident should be included in it, Bharata points out that it should include "incidents such as an earthquake, fall of meteors, an eclipse of the sun or the moon, fighting in battle and personal combat, and angry conflict"[52] which enhance the horror of the spectacle. He further says that it "should abound in deceit and jugglery and should include energetic activity of many persons, and dissention (bheda) among themselves..."[53] It should make use of the Grand and the Energetic Styles. In the absence of adequate material, it may be a popular form of entertainment, but is never recognized as a fullfledged drama. The *Tripuradāha* of Vatsarāja is the only Dima which is referred to by Dhanaṃjaya and Viśvanātha, though references of other two plays of this type-venkaṭavarada's *Kṛṣṇavijaya* and Rāma's *Manmathonmathan* are also available.

(6) Vyāyoga

The vyāyoga is, as its name indicates, a military spectacle. It is so called as here the protagonists are violently opposed to each other (vyāyujyante). Its theme is to be derived from a well known legendary story and its hero should be either a god or a royal sage or a man of high rank. It is a dramatic representa-

tion of only one act and it takes into account 'battle, personal combat, challenge and angry conflict'. The action of the drama should not extend over a day. The 'exciting Sentiments' like the Vīra, Raudra, Bibhatsa, Adbhuta, Karuṇa and Bhayānaka should be made the basis of this play. A woman should not be the cause of conflict in this type of drama. The vengeance that Paraśurāma takes after the death of his father, is a suitable subject for the vyāyoga. All the Styles except the graceful and all the articulations except *garbha* and *vimarśa* should be used. Sylvan Levi says that its "tone is exclusively heroic, without any erotic ornamentation"[54].

Bhāsa's *Madhyama-vyāyoga* is an old and the best example of this type of drama. His other play *Dūtaghatotkaca* is also a specimen of the same variety. Though the vyayogas continued to be written till the 14th century, they lack the charm and freshness of the early play. In the 12th century Prahalādana-deva's *Pārthaparākrama* and Vatsarāja's *Kirātarjunīya* and in the 14th century Viśvanātha's *Saugandhikāharaṇa*, Kāñcana Paṇḍita's *Dhanaṁjayavijaya* and Rāmachandra's *Nirbhayabhīma* were written but they don't reveal the earlier dramatic genius.

(7) Utaṛṣṭikāṅka or Aṅka

It is known as utsṛṣṭikāṅka rather than merely aṅka for the purpose of distinguishing it from an act (aṅka) of a normal drama. It is an one-act play having a well-known plot but developed with the help of the poet's imagination. Here the playwright should make use of human rather than divine characters. Referring to the chief characteristics of this type of drama Bharata has stated :

> The Utsṛṣṭikāṅka should abound in the Pathetic Sentiment ; it will treat women's lamentations and despondent utterances at a time when battle and violent fighting have ceased ; it should include bewildered movements (of mourners), and it must be devoid of the Grand, the Energetic and the Graceful Styles and its plot should relate to one's fall (lit. end of the rise).[55]

Its plot displays the downfall of one of the contending characters. Its dominant Sentiment is pathetic and its style verbal. The first and the last junctures alone should be used in this type of drama. The description of battles and fights should be folowed by the lamentations of women which should not, however, be shown on the stage.

Bhāsa is considered to be the first and the best writer of this type of drama. His *Urubhaṅga* is certainly the best and the most powerful example. It is regarded as a kind of one-act tragedy. Viśvanātha gives another example of *Sarmiṣṭhāyayāti* which does not, however, fully conform to the normal rules of this type of drama.

(8) Prahasaṇa

Prahasana is, says M. Ghosh, "a farce or a play in which the Comic Sentiment predominates..."[56] It is very appealing to the popular taste. The playwright invents the theme with his own imagination, the theme being related with the tricks and quarrels of low characters. It consists of only one act and the first and the last junctures are to be used. Bharata and Rāmachandra and Gunachandra divide Prahasana into two categories : (*i*) Śuddha (pure) and Saṅkīrna (mixed). Referring to the first type of Prahasana Bharata states :

> The Prahasana is known, as pure (suddha) when it contains comic disputations by Śaiva gurus (bhagavat), ascetics, Bhikṣus, Srotriya Brahmins and others and abounds in jucular remarks by persons of low class ; and all this gives uniformly to the plot a realistic picture of the language and the conduct of all these in passages describing their special Psychological States.[57]

Bharata refers to the chief characteristics of second type of Prahasana in the following lines :

> That Prahasana is called mixed in which courtezans, servants, eunuchs, vitas, and Dhūrtas and unchaste women

appear with their immodest appearance, dress and movements.[58]

Dhanamjaya, however, divides Prahasana into three categories :—

(*i*) pure (śuddha), (*ii*) impure (vikrata) and (*iii*) mixed (miśra or saṁkīrṇa), the next two categories being combined into one by Bharata.

The main objective of Prahasana is to evoke laughter by choosing some popular topic of scandal, incident of hypocrisy or the vices of riches and sensuality. Though Bharata prescribes the use of only one act, later theorists suggested the possibility of two acts also. There is only one character in some of the Prahasanas such as *Dhūrtacarita* and a band of rogues in others such as *Laṭakamelaka*. Whereas the early Prahasanas are powerful in taste and appeal, the later Prahasanas are monotonous in theme as well as treatment. The following are the well-known Prahasanas placed roughly in chronological order :

(*i*) Mahendra-vikrama—Varman—*Mattavilāsa*—620 A.D.

(*ii*) Baudhayāna Kavi	*Bhagavadajjukīya* —	
(*iii*) Vatsarāja	*Hāsyacūḍāmaṇi* —	
(*iv*) Saṅkhadhar Kavirāja —	*Laṭakamelaka*	—12th Cen. A.D.
(*v*) Jyotiriśvara —	*Dhūrtasamāgama*	—15th ,,
(*vi*) Jagadīśvara —	*Hāsyarnava*	—date uncertain
(*vii*) Sāmarāja Dikṣita —	*Dhūrtanartaka*	—17th century

(9) Bhāṇa

It is a kind of monologue having only one act. Its theme is derived from love, war, fraud and intrigue etc. It is not taken from myth or legend but created by the poet's own imagination. It is a kind of play where a shrewd and clever parasite (viṭa or Dhūtra) describes the voguesh exploits undertaken either by himself or by some one else. Referring to the chief characteristics of Bhāṇa Bharata has stated :

> The Bhāṇa is to be acted by a single character, and it is of two kinds : that (with one's) recounting of one's own feelings, and that (with) describing some one else's acts. (The Bhāṇa which is to include) some body else's words addressed to oneself, should be acted by means of replies in course of conversations with an imaginary person (ākāśabhāṣita) along with the (suitable) movements of the limbs. The Bhāṇa should include characters of Dhūrtas and viṭas and treat their different conditions, and it is always to consist of one Act, and should include many incidents which are to be acted by a Dhūrta or a viṭa.[59]

The language of Bhāṇa should always be polished and its dramatic performance should begin and end with song and music. Its predominant Sentiments are heroic and erotic and it uses only the first and last junctures and also the ten subdivisions of the gentle Dance (lāsya). Here the playwright uses a single character who goes on describing his own adventures of experience unaided. The device *Ākāṣabhāṣita* (speaking in the air) is adopted by the character for narrating his own experiences. The action of the drama lies in the manner of narration.

The four Bhāṇas which are available to us, had been published under the title *Caturbhāṇi.* They are as follows (*i*) Vararuci's *Ubhayābhisārikā*, (*ii*) Sūdraka's *Padma Prābhṛtaka*, (*iii*) Iśvaradatta's *Dhūrta-viṭa-samvāda* and (*iv*) Śyamilaka's *Pāda-tāḍitaka.* They are very old specimens of this type of drama and represent the Bhāṇa type from the beginning up to circa 100 A.D. Though the Bhāṇa should be normally monotonous and insipid by its very nature, the four Bhāṇas meniotned

above, says B. Bhattacharya, "exhibit novelty and variety of their own and speak eloquently of the great dramatic genius of their authors"[60]. They show the Bhāṇa variety at the peak of its perfection.

After *Chaturbhāṇi* the next specimen of Bhāṇa is the *Karpūracarita* of Vatsarāja which roughly belongs to the end of the 12th or the beginning of the 13th century. When we come to the 14th and 15th countries, we find *Śṛṅgārabhusaṇa* of Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bhāṇa which clearly reveals the decadence of the Bhāṇa type. The later Bhāṇas are of course vulgar and monotonous. The sense of keen satire has been replaced by the coarse vulgarity.

Though Bhāṇas were written from 8th to 18th century, the early Bhāṇas known as *Caturbhāṇi* are of the best type. Bhāṇas is of course the medium of attack over the social evils. But whereas the attack in Prahasana is shallow, in Bhāṇa it is serious and dignified. Bhāṇa may be considered to be the Mono acting in many respects in the Western sense of the term.

(10) Vīthi

This type of play is known as vīthi which means either 'road' or 'series of subdivisions'. The play is infact "like a road leading straight to the goal".[61]. It is a love story having comic dialogues, quibble, jest and wistful misconstructions. It is a short one-Act play and may have one, two or threec haracters. It may include any of the three types of characters—superior, middling or inferior. Any of the Sentiments may be used but its predominant Sentiment is erotic. It uses only the first and the last junctures and it is normally composed in the graceful style. The Vīthi is of thirteen types, as Bharata has stated :

> The Thirteen types of the Vīthi are : Accidental Interpretation (udghatyaka), Transference (avalagita), Ominous Significance (avaspandita), Incoherent Chatter (Asatpralapa), Compliment (prapanca), Enigma (nali = nalika), Repartee, (vakkeli), outvying (abhivala), Deception (chala), Declaration (vyahara), Crushing (mṛdava),

> Three men's Talk (trigatā), and Undue combination of words (gaṇḍa),[62]

From 116 to 129 in chapter XX of his *NŚ* Bharata explains these thirteen types in detail and further comments :

> If in a play any of these thirteen types with clear meanings occur and they possess all the characters, Sentiments and Psychological States prescribed for them by the Śāstra, it is called the Vīthī[53],

There are two specimens of Vīthi available to us — (*i*) Bhāsa's *Dūtavākya* and (*ii*) *Karṇabhāra*. Viśvanātha speaks of another Vīthi—*Mālvikā* which is not of course *Mālvikāgnimitra*. Rāmachandra mentions a Vīthi in *Indulekhā* which has been lost.

III

Let us first take up Aristotle's concept of tragedy as a form of drama and try to find out whether is any one of Bharata's ten types of drama which comes very close to it. Aristotelian concept of tragedy has much in common with Bharata's concept of Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa, though many Indian commentators like Prof. Baldeo Upadhyaya and G.K. Bhat are of the opinion that no tragedy has ever been written in Sanskrit drama. The very concept of tragedy, they say, is alien to our Indian philosophy, as we never conceive of an unhappy ending of human life. Life is of course a continuous process of birth and death till it attains salvation. Death is only a temporary phase in the continuous life of man. Moreover we believe that God is just and impartial and hence good will ultimately prosper and evil destroyed. If a man suffers, he suffers on account of the misdeeds or sins committed by him in his previous life. Suffering is a means to the test of man's character and his integrity. There is nothing disastrous in it.

Our first dramaturgist Bharata was deeply rooted in our Indian philosophy and religion. He considered his *NŚ* to be the fifth Veda. He never thought of drama either to be a tale of sorrow or to be a story of pleasure exclusively. His

nāṭaka is a fine combination of the two as it reveals the sorrow as well as pleasure in proper prospective. There is no unhappy ending in Sanskrit nāṭakas and that is why most of the Indian commentators firmly assert that no tragedy has been written in Sanskrit drama. What we feel is that they have misunderstood the concept of tragedy, atleast the Aristotelian concept of tragedy. A.C. Bradley's book on *Shakespearean Trageay* has created some confusion regarding Aristotelian theory of tragedy. Some critics consider Bradley's views on tragedy to be the Aristotelian concept of tragedy though Bradley has categorically stated in the Preface itself, that he does not intend to study Shakespeare's tragedies in the light of Aristotelian theory. Bradley's book gives an impression that unhappy ending is an essential requirement of tragedy, though when we scrutinize Aristotle's *Poetics* meticulously, we find that Aristotle nowhere mentions that. While discussing plot-construction in chapters XIII and XIV of his *Poetics* Aristotle clearly says that a drama with an unhappy ending may be moving to the spectators on the stage but unhappy ending is certainly not an indispensable element of tragedy. When he refers to the construction of a complex fortunate plot and considers the plot of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* as the best one, it is quite obvious that the unhappy ending is not an essential requirement of tragedy as *Iphigenia in Tauris* ends with the reunion of Iphigenia with her long lost brother Orestes. It is evident from the following statement of Aristotle :

> The action may be done consciously and with knowledge of the persons, in the manner of the older poets. It is thus too that Euripides makes Medea slay her children. Or, again, the deed of horror may be done, but done in ignorance, and the tie of kinship or friendship be discovered afterwards. The Oedipus of Sophocles is an example...Again, there is a third case,—to be about to act with knowledge of the persons but then not to act. The fourth case is > when some one is about to do as irreparable deed through ignorance and makes the discovery before it is done...The last case is the best, an when in the Cresphontes Merope is about to slay her son,

> but recognizing who is, spares his life. So in the Iphigenia, the sister recognizes the brother just in time. Again in the Halle, the son recognizes the mother when on the point of giving her up.[64]

Aristotle considers the last type of plot to be the best plot in tragedy where recognition takes place before the fatal act is committed. This type of tragedy ends either with reunion or reconciliation. He cites examples from three plays—*Cresphontes, Iphigenia in Tauris* and *Halle* which ultimately come to a happy ending.

While defining what tragedy is, Aristotle has very clearly stated that "Tragedy, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a certain magnitude."[65] It means that the seriousness of action that is to be imitated, is the most significant and indispensable characteristic of tragedy. Now the question is : Do we feel that Sanskrit drama is lacking in seriousness of theme and content ? Does Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarita* not reveal the seriousness of issue at stake ? Has it been written just to evoke laughter by exposing the follies and foibles of different characters in the drama ? Certainly not. Regarding the second requirement that the action should be complete i.e., should have a beginning, a middle and an end, it would be enough to say that most of the Sanskrit plays fully conform to it and are the ideal examples of it. So for as the magnitude of drama is concerned, Sanskrit nāṭakas are neither too big nor too small in size. They have the proper magnitude and are capable of arousing our interest and sustaining it till the end of the drama. If this is so, why cannot we consider some of the Sanskrit plays to be the fine examples of Aristotelian concept of tragedy. Aristotle nowhere considers unhappy ending or ending with the death of the hero to be an essential requirement of tragedy. Even happy ending is not an obstacle to the seriousness of drama which is certainly the most fundamental requirement of tragedy. If we judge sanskrit plays from this point of view, numerous examples may be cited. We may take, for example, the Sanskrit nāṭaka *Mudrārākṣasa* where we meet with the happy ending. When the noble Candanadāsa

who had annoyed Chānakya by giving shelter to the family of his friend Rākṣasa, is to be executed, Rākṣasa arrives and accepts all the terms and conditions which might save the life of his friend. In the next famous nāṭaka *Venisaṃhāra* we see how a character intends to kill his own brother but withdraws in time after recognition. Yudhisthir fails to recognize his own brother Bhīmasena and mistakes him for Duryodhana as he is besmeared with blood. He intends to kill him but then Bhīma speaks in time and the nāṭaka comes to a happy ending. In the greatest of the Prakaraṇas *Mṛcchakatika* we find the similar situation. Here we see how the innocent Cārudatta has been sentenced to death for the mistaken murder of Vasantasena. The fatal ending, however, is averted just in time which it is discovered that Vasantasena is alive. P.L. Bhargavas has, therefore, rightly stated that there "can be no greater travesty of truth than to use the word comedy for the Sanskrit Nāṭaka or Prakaraṇa"[66].

All the Sanskrit plays which end happily, cannot be considered to be comedies in the Aristotelian sense of the term. Aristotle clearly suggests that comedy imitates characters which are inferior to the common people or of a lower type. When we scrutinize the Sanskrit plays from this point of view, do we feel that the characters of the Sanskrit drama are of the lower type of the trivial sort of people ? Certainly not. Who can say that Rāma and Sītā in Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarita* or Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā in Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* are trivial or ludicrous sort of people ? If we are clear on this issue that tragedy imitates the action of the noble and exalted people and it does not necessarily lead to an unhappy ending, we may have no hesitation in accepting this fact that there are so many Sanskrit plays which are very close to the Aristotelian concept of tragedy.

There is, however, one subtle but significant difference between the two theorists. Though Aristotle does not consider the death of the hero as an essential ingredient of tragedy, he does not prohibit its display on the stage at the same time. Bharata, on the contrary, forbids war and death on the stage.

He does so simply because the Indian hero is a model of ideal virtues, cannot ultimately meet with utter disaster and death. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule in Sanskrit drama. In the plays of Bhāsa death-scene has been displayed—Daśaratha's death in *Pratimā* and Duryodhana's in *Ūrubhaṅga*. In *Abhisekhanāṭakam* the scene of Bāli's murder has been shown. Mental suffering has been shown in the best possible manner in *Uttararāmacarita* and *Abhijñānaśakuntalam* also contains many scenes of Śakuntalā's acute suffering.

So far as the concept of comedy is concerned, Aristotle unfortunately has said very little about it. However one thing is very clear from what he has said, that it is not similar to Bharata's concept of nāṭaka and prakaraṇa. It is rather very close in spirit to Bharata's concept of Prahasana and Bhāṇa. Like them it abounds in comic sentiment (hāsya rasa) and evokes laughter. It is writtem in order to arouse the sentiment of laughter by ridiculously distorting the sentiment of love and by presenting a caricatured view of life. It temporarily displays the dominance of matter over form which is finally demolished to the utter discomfiture of the persons concerned. The sentiment of laughter is predominant in the Prahasana like the *Latakamelakam* and the *Hasyarnava-Prahasanam* and the Bhāṇas like the *Sringār-Sarvasya-Bhāṇ* and the *Sringār-Sudhākar-Bhāṇa*.

Comedy is identical with Prahasana and Bhāṇa in another sense also. Characters in both are of inferior and ludicrous type. They are mainly the corrupt monks of different seets, wicked persons at religious places, people of high pretensions and snobberies. Their actions and behaviour are on the lower, degraded level of life. Their pretence or the empty boasts of learning are exposed to ridicule and caricature. Here we find a striking similarity between our Prahasanas and the Greek comedies of Aristophanes. Both of them try to expose the corruption of the society and thereby eradicate it. Aristophanes in his comedy *The Frogs* ridicules the emotional and intellectual corruption of his age which has resulted on account of Sophistic philosophy. So is the case with Sri Sankhadhar's prahasana *Latakāmelakam* which exposes the hypocrisy of scholars, doctors, monks and other respected people of society.

The structure of comedy, however, was modified in the age of Shakespeare. It became rich and highly diversified and is certainly superior to our Sanskrit Prahasanas.

So far as the other forms of Sanskrit drama are concerned, there is very little similarity between them and the Western forms of drama. They were devised merely as forms of public entertainment. They were very crude in theme as well as stage representation. Most of the stories were based on gods, demons and devils. There was very little scope for imaginative composition. Even the episodes were not properly arranged and the continuity of theme maintained in those forms of drama.

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7

Language of Drama

When plot and character have been conceived by the dramatist, there is an urgent need of the language for the expresion of his views. Both the theorists consider language to be an element of drama and devote some of their chapters for its explication. The present chapter discusses their views on the language of drama, though they are not very systematic on this issue.

I

Aristotle considers diction to be one of the six elkments of tragedy. From his point of view it is the fourth step in the processing of dramatic creation, whereas from the point of view of the reader or spectator it is the first. It is however, to be admitted that diction is a significant element of drama from either point of view. Hence Aristotle discusses it in detail in three long chapters of his *Poetics i.e.* chapter XX to chapter XXII.

Diction is certainly the fundamental requirement of all literary genres. It is a formal feature of drama on which its structure is verbally expressed. It is inseparable from other elements of drama. Eva Schaper has rightly stated that "whatever is being said, told or verbally expressed be analysable in respect of linguistic means of expression and formal word patterns"[1]. It is the means through which the imitative activity which is the core of literary productions including tragedy, reveals itself.

Aristotle defines diction as "the expression of the meaning in words"[2] It is in fact the verbal expression of thought and

includes all phases of the use of languge, whether in prose or verse. Referring to the significance of language, Aristotle in his famous definition of tragedy has said :

> Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is sarious, complete and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play [3]

By 'language embellished' he means the language that assimilates rhythm, harmony and song together. By 'the several kinds in separate parts' he means that some parts are rendered through the medium of verse alone, others are rendered with the help of the song. Language is one the important means of producing the effect upon the sudience.

In the later half of chapter XIX and the whole of chapter XX Aristotle discusses language from a highly technical point of view. He discusses 'the turns given to the language when spoken' and the various component parts of language such as the letter, syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, inflexion, sentence or phrase. Here he is not concerned only with the use of words in drama but with the words as such. It is certainly the area of a grammarian and a linguist. That is why Else deleted it from his discussion of *Poetics*.

In chapters XXI and XXII of *Poetics* Aristotle, however, discusses such aspects of poetic diction as are of relevance to us. Chapter XXI concentrates on those methods by which words are used to enhance the appeal of a work of art. Words may be simple, compound, triple, quadruple or multiple in form. Aristotle further says :

> Every word is either current, or strange, or metaphorical, or ornamental, or newly coined, or lengthened, or contracted, or altered.[4]

By the 'current' word Aristotle means the word which people in general use in their speech or writing at a given time. It means

calling a spade 'a spade' on which Wordsworth, at least in his theory, insisted. "Strange' word refers to the word taken from other dialects. The same word may be current for one class of people but strange to the other set of people and vice versa. Writers are fond of using words and phrases from different languages in order to add elegance to their works.

Aristotle's discussion of metaphor contributes much to the understanding of the nature of figurative language. Metaphor is one of the artistic devices used for the elevation of language. Its main function is to perceive similarities in dissimilarities which is of course a mark of genius. Aristotle defines it as follows :

> Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion.[5]

Metaphor refers to the use of words in a figurative rather than a literal sense. Aristotle's coprehensive discussion of metaphor may not be appealing to the modern readers, it was highly fascination to the writers of the seventeenth century who, says Hardison, "elaborated it into an enormous and complex mechanism for inventing poetic imagery...In the twentieth century, the section has proved interesting to those "new critics" who treat imagery as the central element in poetry."[6] The impact of metaphor lies in the revelation of similarities and the interaction of resemblance and diversity.

Aristotle further refers to the use of ornamental words in place of the common words for enhancing the effect of language. If a writer uses the word *benighted* for *ignorant* or *ethereal* for *heavenly* and the like, it means that he is using the ornamental words for beautifying the expression. A newly-coined word is the word which has never been in use. It is adopted by the writer himself with a new meaning and a novel context. The coining of the word is technically known as neologism. It is used as a device for supplying the deficiency of language. In English there are some 'made up' words such as

Coca-cola and *univac* which have no etymological meaning. In order to enrich their native vocabulary the English writers coined so many new terms from French and Latin origin during the Renaissance period. The words like *Semantics, Omnibus, psychoanalysis* and the like are the modern example of neologisms. Aristotle himself gives two examples in this regard *i.e.*, 'sprouters' for 'horns' and 'supplicator' for 'priest'.

Regarding the use of the lengthened word Aristotle says that a word is said to be lengthened out when its own short vowel is exchanged for a longer one or when an extra syllable is inserted. It is done in order to fit a metrical pattern. There are numerous examples of the addition of syllables in English language i.e. *belov.d* for *belov'd* ; *daffodiles* for *daffodils. Prosthesis epenthesis* and *praparalepsis* are the classical examples of lengthening. A word may be contracted or curtailed by removing some part of it. The following examples are sufficient to substantiate it—*heaven* for *heaven, even* for *evening, morn* for *morning*. An altered word is retained and the other part recast. We may take, for example, the term used by John Donne—*interinanimate* which is an altered word. The word *inanimate* is a standard word but when we add the prefix *inter*, it not only lengthens the word but also gives a new meaning.

Referring to the 'perfection of style' or perfection of diction Aristotle says :

> The perfection of style is to be clear without being mean. The clearest style is that which uses only current or proper words; at the same time it is mean : witness the poetry of Cleophon and of Sthenelus. That diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised above the commonplace which employs unusual words. By unusual, I mean strange (or rare) words, metaphorical, lengthened,—anything, in short, that differs from the normal idiom. Yet a style wholly composed of such words is either a riddle or a jargon; a riddle, if it consists of metaphors ; a jargon, if it consists of strange (or rare) words.[8]

Aristotle suggests that there are two fundamental requirements of a perfect language—Clarity as well as distinction, which apparently appear to be contradictory. If the poet wants to remain clear to the readers, he should use current and common words of the language. He should not, however, try to be 'mean' in the sense of 'base' or 'crude'. He should rather use such language which is close to the usage of ordinary speech. A similar statement occurs in *Rhetoric* also.

> Style to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do. It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation.[9]

Though Aristotle prohibits 'undue elevation' of style, he is certainly in favour of the proper elevation of language, as it differentiates the language of poetry from the language of prose. Poetic language needs elevation, the kind of elevation which can be attained by the use of the strange, metaphorical, ornamental or newly coined words. The use of unusual words makes the language highly elevated as is evident from the speech of Lincoln who used to say 'Four score and seven' instead of 'Eighty seven years ago'.

If the poet uses the current and popular words in order to retain the clarity of expression, there is always the possibility that the language would become mean and prosaic. In order to justify this point of view Aristotle cites the examples of two poets—Cleophon and Sthenelus who sought clarity by using the current and familiar words and consequently produced a mean style. Though we are not in a position to evaluate their works on account of their non-availability, Aristotle's point is very clear on this issue. The language of prose may be mean but certainly not the language of poetry.

If the poet wants to make a lofty and distinguished expression, he should use unusual words—strange, metaphorical or modified. But the style which is exclusively composed of such words, is bound to be either a riddle or a jargon. By 'riddle' Aristotle refers to the use of metaphors which sometimes puzzle

and confuse the readers. Metaphors in fact "express true facts under impossible combinations", which requires an extra effort to understand its *implication*. The command over the use of metaphors, however, cannot be acquired from others. It is the mark of genius and displays the poet's capacity for an insight into unapprehended similitude. Aristotle gives a well-known example of the riddle : 'A man I saw, who on another man had glued the bronze by aid of fire'. This riddle refers to the man using a bronze bleeding cup that was held tight to the punctured limb, heated to expand the air and then allowed to cool so that it became attached ('welded') by the resulting vacuum. Regarding the metaphorical implication of this riddle Hardison has pointed out that here "two metaphors of the genus-species type are involved. The bronze bleeding cup is called "bronze" (genus for species), and attaching process is called "welding" (species for species)"[10]. Like riddle jargon too creates difficulty for the readers as it makes the language unintelligible to them on account of the excessive use of the strange words.

Aristotle, keeping in view the Greek ideal of the golden mean, recommends that a proper infusion of the common as well as unusual words be made so that the language may maintain clarity as well as distinction. Extremity in either direction is to be avoided at any cost, as the excessive use of the common words would make the language mean and of the unusual words highly ridiculous. He, therefore, suggests :

> A certain infusion, therefore, of these elements is necessary to style ; for the strange (or rare) word, the metaphorical, the ornamental, and the other kinds above mentioned, will raise it above the commonplace and mean while the use of proper words will make it perspicuous. But nothing contributes more to produce a clearness of diction that is remote from commonness than the lengthening, contraction, and alteration of words. For by deviating in exceptional cases from the normal idiom, the language will gain distinction ; while, at the same time, the partial conformity with usage will give perspicuity[11].

The judicious mixture of ordinary and strange expressions will keep the language free from being either prosaic or pedantic. The poet may attain clarity through the use of familiar words a distinction through the use of strange, metaphorical and other derivatives from custom. The criticism of the use of this type of language is, therefore, not based on sound logic and the statement of Eucleides (an unknown poet) that it is easy to be a poet if one can lengthen syllables at will, is not very convincing. It appears that Eucleides had written a parody by making an excessive use of licencious style which might naturally have produced a ludicrous effect on the readers. Aristotle, however, is very specifc on this issue and emphatically states :

> To employ such license at all obtrusively is, no doubt, grotesque ; but in any mode of poetic diction there must be moderation. Even metaphors, strange (or rare) words, or any similar forms of speech, would produce the like effect if used without propriety and with the express purpose of being ludicrous.[12]

Moderation in style is the most fundamental requirement for effective expression. Intemperate use of unusual words produces the same absurd effect as the excessive use of lengthened or shortened words. Language infact should be appropriate to the character who is using it. There should be harmonious integration of the language with the context in which it is being used. "It is", says Hardison, "the equivalent of the requirements that character and thought be "appropriate" and the incidents of a plot be related by necessity and/or probability"[13]. It is a fact that the appropriate substitution of a common word by a strange or unusual word or vice versa increases the beauty and elegance of language. In is evident from Euripides' substitution of a common word "eats" by an unusual word "feasts upon". Substitution of an unusual word by a common word can be seen in the following examples :

(*i*) 'Setting a stool unseemly and table small' into 'setting a shabby stool and little table'.

(*ii*) 'Sleep that knits up the unravelled sleeve of care' into 'sleep that relaxes the nervous tension'.

We may make similar other experiments from Shakespear, Milton or other English writers and will reach the same conclusion. Therefore Ariphrades' criticism of the tragedy writers on the ground that they used such phrases which could not be employed in ordinary speech, appears to be injudicious, as the use of such phrases gives distinction to the style.

Before discussing the appropriate use of language for the various literary genres, Aristotle points out that the greatest and the most significant thing in literature is the command of metaphor. Like the melody in the throat of a powarful singer, it is an inborn gift and cannot be learnt from others or taught to others. It implies an intuitive perception of the resemblances and requires an exceptional skill for detecting the similarity in dissimilars. F.L. Lucas has rightly stated that "It is seldom realised how much of the art of poetry consists in the somewhat childish pleasure of glimpsing and implying simply that one thing is like another, in revealing unseen similarities between the unlikeliest things in the vast, tumbled treasure-chest of the universe".[14] Metaphor infact expresses the ideas which cannot be expressed with the help of the ordinary language. It is evident from the following lines from Shakespeare's *Othello*, v. ii. :

O Spartan dog,
More fell than anguish, hunger or the sea,
Look on the tragic loading of this bed ;
This is thy work.

The concentrated anguish and hatred of Lodovico against the heinous crime of Iago could not have been expressed in a more powerful manner than the use of the metaphor—'Spartan dog'.

Aristotle now discusses the relation between the poetic language and the different genres of literature. In his opinion the compound words are best adopted to dithyrambs (full-dress lyrics or odes). Compound words are the words which are, says Aristotle, "composed either of a significant and non significant element (though within the whole word no element is

significant), or of elements that are both significant"[15]. Compound words are suitable to the complex metres of dithyrambs and it would be difficult to use them in simple metres. Strange and rare words are to be preferred in haroic poetry, though all the varieties are serviceable in it. It is evident from the works of Homer and Virgil. Milton also seems to have followed Aristotle's suggestion, as his his epics-*Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained* are full of such words which have been derived from Latin roots and are used in that context. Dectylic hexameter is normally usen in heroic poetry on account of its weightiness and magnitude.

Metaphorical language is most conducive to the iambic verse of drama, as it is very close to the ordinary life. Strange and compound words should not be used in iambic verse, which reproduces familiar speech. The metaphorical language is the best language in the sense that it is closest to the ordinary life and can be used even in prose. Metaphor normally uses the common words but makes the language distinguished. Iambic metre is most appropriate for tragic and comic dialogues. The tragic and comic dramatist should therefore use metaphorical language as it is capable of maintaining a proper balance between clarity and distinction. Aristotle further says that ornamental words may also be used in iambic metre in order to "elevate the diction of tragedy without doing serious violence to the innate capacities of the iambic meter"[16]. Epic and lyric may use language of any age or time but the drama cannot afford to do so, as it dies if it deviates too far from its audience.

II

Bharata in *NŚ* is mainly concerned with the discussion of what type of language is to be used in a particular context in the drama, what kind of metrical and figurative form is to be adopted in order to heighten the charm of the language, which style is to be preferred in a specific context in the drama. Moreover, as M. Ghosh has stated, "there should be adopted other means to get the maximum benefit from the speeches for furthering the representation of the character"[17].

Though there are frequent references to the use of language in other chapters of Bharata's *NŚ*, Bharata has devoted four chapters exclusively to its elaborate discussion, namely, 'Diction' (Vāgabhinaya), 'Rules on the use of Languages' (bhāṣāvidhānam), 'Modes of Address and Introduction' (Kākusvaravyañjakaḥ), and 'styles' (vṛttivikalpaḥ). In chapter XVII he deals elaborately with thirty-six embellishments (lakṣanas), ten guṇas, four figures of speech (alaṅkāras) and ten faults (doṣas). In general the first three aspects are the essential attributes of literary creations and help us in ornamenting the theme of the drama. The faults, on the contrary, are to be got rid of, as they minimise the charm and elegance of drama.

In Bharata's opinion the thirty-six embellishments[18] of a fine dramatic composition (kāvya) are as follows : Ornateness, (bhūṣaṇa), compactness (akṣara-saṃghāta), Brillinance (śobhā) Parallelism (udāharaṇa), Causation (hetu), Hesitation (saṃsya), Favourable (dṛṣṭānta), Discovery (prāpti), Fancy (abhiprāya) Unfavourable Precedent (nidarśana), Additional Explantation (Nirukta), Persuation (siddhi), Distinction (viśesaṇa), Accusation of virtue (guṇātipāta). Excellence (juṇātiśaya), Inference from Similitude (tulyatarka), Multiplex Predication (padoccaya), Apt Description (diṣṭa), Pointed Utterance upadiṣta), Inversion (viparyaya) Slip of Tongue (bhraṃśa) Mediation (anunaya), Series of Offers (mālā), Clever Manner (dākṣiṇya), Censure (garhaṇa), Presumption (arthā-patti), Celebrity (prasiddhi), Interrogation (pṛcchā), Identity (sārūpya), Indirect Expression of One's Desire (manoratha), Wit (leśa), Concealment (samkṣobha) Enumeration of Merits (guṇa-kīrtana) Semi-uttered Expression (anuktasiddhi) and Compliment (priyavacana—priyokti)". What Bharata meant by these dramatic embellishments is still not very clear. We are not sure whether they have been suggested merely as decorative parts of dramatic structure or they are capable of giving beautiful turns to the emotional state also. "It is probable", says G.K. Bhat, "that Bharata was thinking of beautiful turns of expression which would adorn the dramatic dialogue, as well as of an exqusiite rendering of emotional states through suggestive words or actions ; naturally both are sure to heighten the reader's and

spectator's feeling of enjoyment"[19] These thirty six excellent points in fact beautify and embelish the play if used properly according to the Sentiment introduced in it.

Bharata further gives an account of four ornaments of the drama (nāṭakālaṁkāra) which should be used by the playwright in his play. Dhanaṃjaya, however, ignores them in his *Daśarūpaka* on the ground that since they belong to poetics in general, they should be treated in detail in the text-books of that science. Since a complete and detailed account of the nāṭakālaṃkāras goods beyond the scope of the present study, a brief account of what Bharata has said on this issue will suffice.

As we know, Bharata was the first critic to use the term alaṁkāra in the context of the embellishments of drama. In its technical sense it refers to those factors which enhance the beauty of poetry and lead to its artistic perfection. Bharata recommends the use of the following four alaṃkaras (figures of speech) which are most suited to the drama.

(*i*) Simile (upamā)
(*ii*) Metaphor (rūpaka)
(*iii*) Condensed Expression (dīpaka).
(*iv*) Alliteration (yamaka).

(*i*) **Simile** (Upamā)

Simile refers to the comparison between two objects based on the similarity of features or attributes. In the opinion of Bharata there are five kinds of simile— (*a*) Prasaṃśā (simile of Praise), (*b*) Nindā (censure), (*c*) Kalpitā (conceit), (*d*) Sadṛsī (Uniqueness), (*e*) Kiñcitasadṛśī (partial likeness). The following is a fine example of the kalpitā upamā (imaginary simile)— "Elephants exuding ichor and moving slowly with gracefulness look like the mobile mountains".

(*ii*) **Metaphor** (rūpaka)

Metaphor is a shortened comparison which unites the two objects in such a manner that their distinction disappears. Bharata gives the following example of metaphor :

"Lake-women (vāpistriyo) with their lotus faces, *kumud*-smiles, open and beautiful nīlotpala-eyes and swans cackling around, seem to be calling one another"[20].

(*iii*) *Dīpaka* (Illuminator or Condensed Expression)

It is the figure of speech which uses but one verb in order to express the connection between a series of subjects and objects. Bharata illustrates it by the following example—

"In that region (lit. there) fullness (lit. want of emptiness) was always effected by swans in the lakes, by flowers in the trees, intoxicated bees in the lotuses, and by friendly groups of men and women in the gardens and the parks"[21].

(*iv*) **Yamaka** (Alliteration)

Bharata explains 'Yamaka' as an embellishment born out of the repetition of vowels and consonants forming different words and meanings. Here the beauty of expression lies in the repetition, either of a syllable or a word in the beginning or end of a foot or of all the feet. Bharata has quoted the following stanza in order to illustrate it :

Yamāyāmāś—candravatīnāṃ dravatīnām vyaktāvyaktā sāra-janīnām rajanīnām phulle phulle sa—bhramare vā' bhramare vā rāmā' rāmā vismayate ca amayata ca[22].

(The length of hours of the moonlit nights, passing swiftly in the company of women are scarcely perceived. Flowers having blown whether with or without bees, the lady looks at them admiringly, and a beautiful smile).

There are ten varieties of yamak which are as follows :

(*i*) Pādāntayamaka, (*ii*) Kāñciyamaka), (*iii*) Samudgayamaka ; (*iv*) Chakravālayamaka, (*v*) Vikrāntayamaka, (*vi*) Samdaṣ tāyamaka, (*vii*) Pādāiyamaka, (*viii*) Āmreditayamaka (*ix*) Caturvyavasitayamaka, and (*x*) Mālāyamaka.

It is a remarkable fact that the number of figures of speech fixed only four by Bharata, went up to around one hundred by the end of the 17th century. Now the question is : what is the reason that Bharata suggested only four figures of speech to be used in the drama and what is its relevance now-a-days ? Bharata infact wanted to suggest such simple and commonly understood figures of speech which might be interesting and appealing to the audience. The more complex types of figures of speech may be fruitfully used in other literary forms but not in the drama which is meant to be staged for the common audience. The playwright should use such figure of speech which may enhance its appeal and make it powerful. B. Bhattacharya has rightly stated that "Drama should never be taken marely as a means to make a display of one's mastery of rhetoric[23].

In addition to these figures of speech Bharata recommends that the following ten merits (guṇs) should also be observed by the playwright while writing a drama :

(*i*) Ślesa (Synthesis) (*ii*) Prasāda (Perspicuity) (*iii*) Samatā (Smoothness, (*iv*) Samādhi (concentration), Mādhurya (Sweetness), (*vi*) Ojas (Grandeur), (*vii*) Saukumārya (Softness or Agreeableness), (*viii*) Artha-vyakti (Clarity of Expression or Directness of Expression), (*ix*) Udātta (Exaltedness, (*x*) Kānti (loveliness. These ten guṇas are characterised, says Bharata, "by sweetness and depth of meaning"[24].

Bharata also refers to the ten faults (doṣas)[25] which should be avoided by the playwrights. They are as follows (*i*) Gūḍhārtha (circumlocution), (*ii*) Arthāntara (Superfluous Expression), (*iii*) Arthanīna (want of significance), (*iv*) Bhinnārtha (Defective significance), (*v*) Ekārtha (Tautology), (*vi*) Abhiluptārtha (want of Synthesis), (*vii*) Nyāyādapeta (Logical Defect), (*viii*) Viṣama (Metrical Defect), (*ix*) Visandhi (Hiatus), (*x*) Śabdacyuta (Slang). After describing the figures of speech, merits and demerits of a poetical composition Bharata describes their application to different sentiments. In the Erotic Sentiment two figures of speech, namely, metaphors and illuminations are

normally used and its favourite metre is *āryā*. The Haroic Sentiment prefers light syllables and makes use of similes and metaphors. The metres *jagati, atijagati* and *saṃskṛti* are to be used if the dialogues are brisk and lively. To metre *utkṛti* is most suitable for depicting the scenes of battle and violence. The Odious and Pathetic Sentiments mostly use long syllables and the suitable metres for the Pathetic Sentiment are *śakvārī* and *atidhṛti*. The Furious and the Marvellous Sentiments use the ārya metre and also favour light syllables, similes and metaphors.

Bharata is of the opinion that the playwright should use sweet and agreeable words in the drama so that the play may appear to be as beautiful as the lotus-lake adorned with swans. Commenting further on the suitability of drama Bharata says that "A play abounding in agreeable sounds and senses, containing no obscure and difficult words, intelligible to country-people including clever speeches fit to be interpreted with (lit. fit for) dances, developing Sentiments by many (characters) and having suitable Segments (sandhi) and their (proper) union, becomes in this world fit for presentation to spectators"[26].

Use of Languages and Dialects

Though it is difficult to decide the exact nature of the language to be used by different characters in the drama, Bharata has laid down certain rules for it. Since the language of the drama reflects the linguistic condition of the society as well as the characters' social standing, it is essential to discuss what Bharata has said on this issue. In chapter XVIII Bharata discusses in detail the four kinds of languages and their sub-divisions in which Recitation is to be either, of the refined (saṃskṛta), or of the vulgar (prākṛta) kind. These four kinds of languages are as follows (*i*) The Superhuman Language) (atibhāṣā), (*ii*) the Noble Language (ārya-bhāṣā), (*iii*) The Common Language (jātibhāṣā), and (*iv*) The Animal Language (yonyantarī-bhāṣā). The superhuman languge, says Bharata, is to be used by the gods and the Noble language by the kings. They possess the quality of refinement and were used at that

time all over the civilized world. In the opinion of M. Ghosh the superhuman language and the Noble language were most probably the dialects of the pure Indo-Āryan speech. The common language has various forms and possesses many words of Barbarian (mleccha) origin which seem to be none other than vocables of the Dravidian and the Austric languages. The Animal language originates from the animals and birds of various species and it follows the conventional practice. Dr. Ghosh, however, points out that "Neither the NŚ nor any extant drama gives us any specimen of the conventional language of lower animals, which is to be used in the stage"[27].

Bharata is of the opinion that the chaste and polished Sanskrit should be normally used as the language of drama. However sometimes Prākrit may also be used as all the characters in the drama cannot be expected to have the same social status. All the four types of heroes—dhīrodhata (self-controlled and vehement), dhīrodāta (self-controlled and extalted), dhīralalita (self-controlled and light hearted), and dhīrapraśānta (self-controlled and calm) should use Sanskrit as the medium of expression. However they may use Prākrt also if such occasions arise. As Arjun uses Prākṛt when he is disguised as Brahannalā.

Referring to the various types of character who can use Sanskrit for expressing their views Bharata says :

> ...to itinerent recluses, sages, Buddhists, pure Strotriyas, and others who have received instruction (in the Vedas) and wear cosumes suitable to their position, should be assigned Sanskritic Recitation. Sanskrit Recitation is to be assigned to queens, courtezans, female artists to suit special times and situations in which they may speak. For the pleasure of all kinds of people, and in connection with the practice of arts, the courtezans are to be assigned Sanskritic Recitation which can be easily managed. For learning the practice of arts and for amusing the king the female artist has been prescribed to use Sanskrit recitation in dramatic works.[28]

Dr. Ghosh is of the opinion that an example of the female artist using Sanskrit is not available in Sanskrit drama but Vasantasena in *Mrcch IV* may be cited as an example of a courtezan speaking Sanskrit.

Bharata, on the other hand, forbids the use of Sanskrit by persons in disguise, Jain monks, ascetics, religious mendicants, jugglers, women, children and persons possessed of spirits of a low order. He also does not advise the use of Sanskrit by a superior person if he is intoxicated with authority or wealth or is overwhelmed with poverty. Bharata, I feel, made these suggestions in order to make the dramatic presentation realistic and hence appealing to the spectators. Characters in the drama should appear to be life-like not only in their dress but speech also. "Different types of characters belonging to different social strata", says B. Bhattacharya "are not to speak in the same tongue. The dramatist must give them such language as befits them and their situations in life".[29] An interesting example of the change of language may be seen in Act II of *Mudrārākṣasa* Here Virādhagupta speaks Prākrit when he is disguished as a snake-charmer but resorts to usual Sanskrit in asides.

Bharata in his *NŚ* has enumerated the following seven major dialects—*Māgadhī*, *Āvanti*, *Prācyā*, *Śaurasenī*, *Ardhamāgadhī*, *Bāhlikā* and *Dākśinātya* which are to be employed by the playwright according to the nature of the characters. Examples of Māgadhī, Śaurasenī and Ardhamāgadhī are easily available but other types of dialects seem to be non-existent. In addition to these he refers to so many other minor dialects such as the speeches Śakāra, Ābhīras, Caṇḍālas, Śabaras, Dramiḍas, Oḍras and the lowly speech of the foresters. When there is no guideline available to the usage of the dialects he recommends that popular usage should provide the basis for it. Dr. B. Bhattacharya has rightly stated that "The dramatist should observe minutely the forms of speech used in different places and by different types of people and in introducing a character in his drama he must conform to the use of that particular form of speech that is natural"[30].

In connection with the conventional use of speech Bharata has referred to the various devices which are known as speaking to the sky (ākāśa vacana-monologue) Soliloquy (ātmagata) Confidence (apavāritaka) and Personal Address (janāntika). Speaking to the sky is a kind of talk with an imaginary person who is beyond the stage. It is a device to provide sufficient information to the audience regarding the happenings of the immediate present. The playwright also reports the simultaneous occurrences without the help of other characters on the stage. The soliloquy enables the playwright in revealing the inner feelings and emotions of (hṛdayasthaṁvacaḥ) of a particular character. It is a very useful device and is frequently used in all kinds of plays. The remaining two types of speech-confidence and personal Address are intended to disclose some secret information by one to the other in the presence of many. For these two devices Bharata suggests a particular gesture of hand—the Tripataka *i.e.* three outstretched fingers, which denotes the exclusion of those who are not supposed to listen to the confidential conversation.

Like dramatic irony in the Western plays Bharata suggests the use of Episode-indications (Patākāsthānakas or sthānas) which, says Bhattacharya, "add a peculiar charm to the plot by their suggestive power"[31]. They convey meaning at two levels—one in its own definite context and other at the deeper level regarding some future events in the play. The best example may be seen in the very first Act of *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* where king Duṣyanta is seen chasing a deer. In the mean while hermits appear before the king and request him not to pierce the tender deer with his thunder-like arrows. The meaning of their request operates at two levels—it apparently refers to the hunting of the deer but suggestively it refers to the love-arrows of the king which may prove fatal to the innocent Śakuntalā. It is appealing to the readers and throws some light on the future course of events. Since such information is not supplied directly but through episode-indications, it is highly delightful to the readers as well as the spectators. It displays the remarkable skill and competence of the playwright.

Bharata is also in favour of the use of prose and verse together in the plays for effective presentation. Too much dependence on the long prose passages weakens the effect and proves tiresome to the spectators. For the proper use of verse in drama he framed certain rules regarding the suitability of particular metres to different Sentiments. Dr Ghosh has rightly stated that "In this regard playwrights anticipated the great Shakespeare who in his immortal plays made all sorts of experiments in metre"[32].

Four Stylistic Modes (Vṛttis)

In chapter XXII of *NŚ* Bharata mentions four stylistic modes (vṛttis) of dramatic representation which enhances the beauty of drama. These are as follows :

1. **Bhāratī** (Verbal)—It makes use of grand diction and is employed by the male characters only. It uses sound as its basis and is applicable to all the Sentiments, specially to the Pathetic and the Marvellous Sentiments.

2. **Sāttvatī** (Grand)—This is the style which is "endowed with the quality of the spirit (sattva), the *Nyāyas* proper metres, has exhuberance of joy and suppression of the state of sorrow"[33]. Here the grandeur of diction and the depth of emotion are combined together. It can be properly used in the sentiments of heroism wonder and fury, and sometimes in the pathetic and erotic sentiments also. Virtue, compassion, courage, self-sacrifice and righteousness are its main concerns. It can be seen sometimes in the form of challenge (utthāpaka) as in Act V of *Mahāvīracarita* Vālin challenges Rāma or in the form of change of action as is evident from Paraśurāma offering to embrace Rāma, though he had come to overthrow him.

3. **Kaiśiki** (Graceful)—It is more appealing mainly on account of charming costumes, song and dance. Its theme is love and its predominant sentiments are erotic and comic. It takes into account the mistaken identity which evokes pleasure and laughter. It is evident from Nāgānanda where the Viṭa mistakes Vidūṣaka for a woman due to his misleading garments or in

the *Mālvikāgnimitra* where Nipunikā drops a stick on the vidūṣaka which he takes to be a snake and is terrified.

4. **Ārabhatī** (Energetic)—It is most appropriate for a drama of action. Its main sentiments are the Terrible, Odious and Furious. It deals with magic, conjuration, conflicts, rage, fury and underhand devices. It may be seen in *Mālatīmādhava* where two persons—Madhava and Aghoraghaṇṭa—end by fighting or in *Priyadarśika* where there is attack on Vindhyaketu.

These stylistic modes are basically concerned with the actual representation of drama on the stage. Hence they are of much use to the actors and the producers of the drama rather than the playwrights. Even then, as G.K. Bhat has rightly stated, "since the performance is to be made from the script of the play, they are also a dramatist' concern. Unless the dramatist has provided appropriate incidents, events and emotions and has used appropriate literary style and diction for delineating them, the effort of the producer or actor to use a particular mode is apt to be meaningless"[34].

Referring to the origin of these four stylistic modes (Vṛttis) Bharata has narrated a long legendary story. It is related with the killing of the twin demonas, Madhu and Kaiṭabh by Lord Viṣṇu. The exchange of words before the actual fighting took place constituted the verbal style, violent emotion led to the birth of the Grand style, the girding up of his loins to face the enemy created the Graceful style and the real fighting led to the Energetic style. On the basis of this incident Bharata has "fixed the definitions of the four style on the basis of words (bhāratī), the temperament (sāttvatī), the preparation (Kaiśikī) and the gestures (ārabhaṭi) of Lord Viṣṇu"[35]. Bharata further points out that these four stylistic modes—the verbal, the Grand, the Graceful and the Energetic are derived from the Rgveda, the Yaurjveda, the Sāmaveda and the Atharvaveda respectively.

Like the four Stylistic modes (Vṛttis) Bharata also mentions four local usages (Pravṛttis) which should be taken into account

by the producers as well as the playwrights. They are as follows :—(*i*) *Āvantī* (four countries such as Vidiśā, Saurāṣṭra and Mālva etc.) (*ii*) *Dākṣiṇātya* (for Southern countries only) (*iii*) *Pāñcālī* (for countries near the Himalayas or the northern bank of Ganga) and (*iv*) Oḍra-Māgadhī (for Añga, Vañga, Kaliñga etc.) He wants to suggest that the playwright should be properly acquainted with the language, dress, manners customs and traditions of the region to which the characters belong. It makes the play natural, realistic and hence appealing to the readers.

In Chapter XIX Bharata discusses modes of address and into-nation. It shows his power of perception and analysis. He discusses it in such minute details that nothing has been left to the imagination of the playwright or producer. There is, however, nothing mandatory about his views on diction. It is a kind of recommendatory direction rather than a compulsive theorization. It reveals Bharta's practical insight and his acute observation. It helps the playwright in his composition of a good work of art and the producer a successful work of art on the stage.

III

When we make a comparative study between Aristotle and Bharata in connection with their views on the diction and language of drama, we find that there are similarities as well as differences between the two theorists. Regarding the perfection of style Aristotle stated that the language of drama should be neither too metaphorical and strange nor too mean. There should rather be a 'certain interfusion' between the ornamental and commonplace words. The excessive use of figurative and ornamental words would either make the language a 'riddle' or a 'jargon'. Similarly the use of only common or current words would make the language mean and unimpressive.

Bharata is of the opinion that different characters should use different types of languages for expressing different emotions. They should either use Sanskrit or Prakrit according to their status in society. In order to make language 'chaste' and

'polished' Bharata mentions thirty six lakṣaṇas, ten guṇas, four figures of speech, four vṛttis and four pravṛttis. His analysis of language is of course very exhaustive.

In order to bring about richness and variation Aristotle suggests that the words should either be familiar or strange or ornamental, or newly-coined, or lengthened, or contracted or altered. Though Aristotle is silent about the use of various dialects in Greek language, his above mentioned devices are capable of achieving newness and effectiveness in the language. Bharata, on the other hand, talks of seven major and other minor dialects which should be used according to the nature of different characters. Bharata's reference to four vṛttis and four pravṛttis gives the impression that like Aristotle, he is not concerned with the verbal aspect only. He takes into account the entire histrionic process—mental, physical and verbal. He says that the playwright should try to use the language, habits, dress, manners and customs of the different regions of the country in order to make the language lively and realistic.

Aristotle puts emphasis on the use of metaphor and points out that it is the most significant of the artistic devices used by the dramatist for enriching the language. And Bharata refers to four figures of speech (alaṁkāras) such as simili (upamā), Metaphor (rūpaka), Condensed Expression (dīpaka) and alliteration (yamaka) which in his opinion are essential for the embellishment of diction in a drama. Aristotle goes into greater detail while classifying metaphor and defines it as 'the application of an alien name by transference either (*i*) from genus to species or (*ii*) from species to genus, or (*iii*) species to species or (*iv*) by analogy. Bharata does not classify it at length but defines and exemplifies all the four figures of speech.

While Aristotle has just referred to the significance of rythm and song in drama, Bharata has thoroughly examined and explained these elements. So far as the use of verse in drama is concerned, both are in favour of its use but not alone. Use of diction in a drama refers to the use of verse as well as prose Whereas Aristotle is of the opinion that the modes of

address and intonation belong to the field of Elocution and hence need not be discussed here, Bharata has written one full chapter (ch XIX) in connection with the modes of address and intonation in order to provide a proper guideline to the playwrights as well as the producers. This shows Bharata's practical insight and his capacity for keen observation. However sometimes his excessive divisions and classifications appear to be needless and confusing.

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8

Conclusion

It is evident from the preceding discussions that *Poetics* and *NŚ* are monumental works in the field of dramatic theory in the West and Indian sub-continent respectively. Their impact is wide and far-reaching. However their relevance or validity has sometimes been questioned in our modern times. Modern life has become so complex and complicated that it has led to the growth of stresses and strains, tensions and turmoils in various walks of life. It seems to have brought about a complete upheaval of human values. Constantly changing interests have consequently posed a serious problem to the theorists as well as the creative writers. Now the problem is : how far Aristotle and Bharata have stood the test of time and have retained their relevance and usability for the contemporary writers.

After all we have to accept this truth that in spite of the fact that tensions and turmoils have affected human life deeply, human emotions have remained more or less unchanged. Life and death, joy and sorrow, love and separation, soul and God are still the significant issues of universal interest. As long as literature is written on the basis of human feelings and emotions, the theories of Aristotle and Bharata can never be completely irrelevant and outdated. Since they were rational philosophers, their theories were not based on the extant plays only. They had rather arrived at their definition through the process of ruthless analysis based on the methods of induction and deduction.

Let us first take up the nature and function of drama and see how far their views are relevant even in our times. So far

as the nature of drama is concerned, both the theorists believe that it is an imitation of human life or human action. 'Imitation' here does not mean merely a photographic presentation of reality but rather a re-creation or a re-presentation of human life with all its varieties and manifestations. There has been no addition or alteration in their concept of imitation so far. Referring to the function of drama Aristotle uses the term 'catharsis' and Bharata rasa-realisation. Though different interpretations have been given and various theories suggested in order to explain the term 'catharsis', the Aristotelian use of the term has remained a landmark in the history of Western aesthetics. Similarly Bharata's definition of rasa and its classification into eight forms has remained unmodified, though there has been a long line of critics and commentators who have written books and articles on Bharata's theory of rasa. Both the theorists are of the opinion that drama should provide instruction with delight. It should purge the baser and disturbing elements of human emotions and lead the spectators to a higher plane of existence resulting in the mood of mental and spiritual poise.

Regarding the structure of drama, there are similarities as well as differences between Aristotle and Bharata. So far as the sources of drama are concerned, both the theorists believe that the theme of drama may be derived either from history or tradition or the poet's own creative imagination. In connection with the three unities of drama both of them are clearly in favour of the unity of action only. Aristotelian classification of plot into simple and complex ones, however, is not found in Bharata's *NŚ*. Whereas Aristotle refers to the specific points like hamartia, reversal and recognition in tragedy, Bharata explains the various stages of drama from the beginning to the climax and denouement.

Both the theorists have laid emphasis upon the significance of plot. In their opinion it is not the story or the character but the construction of the story with its logical development that is more important in the drama. Aristotle, however, is more emphatic about the supremacy of plot and goes to the

extent of saying that there cannot be a tragedy without action though there may be one without character. He has given so many arguments in order to justify his stand. In his opinion if there is no action in the drama, nothing would happen on the stage and there will be no difference between the beginning and the end of the drama. The play without action would not be able to provide any basis for the systematic arrangement of episodes. Moreover, action is the significant differentiating factor between tragedy and comedy. It the writer imitates actions of noble men, it is tragedy, if he imitates the actions of trivial sort of people, it is comedy, as is evident from his discussion in chapter IV of his *Poetics*. Aristotle further makes it clear by his illustration from painting. He compares the bare chalk outline of painting with the plot, and different colours with the different characters of drama. Even the most beautiful colours, placed in utter confusion, can not give as much pleasure as the systematic outline of a portrait. It is in fact the plot that gives meaning and dramatic value to the ethos.

Plot is the soul, the animating principle of tragedy. If plot is not effective in the drama, merely a number of speeches or soliloquies cannot make the drama forceful on the stage. Ten great soliloquies taken from different plays of Shakespeare may be extremely delightful to the readers but they cannot be considered to be a powerful drama or even drama. Characters in drama exist only within the framework of the drama and have no outside existence. Moreover, the two significant stages in the construction of a complex plot, that is, reversal (peripeteia) and recognition (anagnorisis) are the most powerful means of producing the tragic effect. Aristotle gives plot supremacy over character as it is the most significant element of tragedy both from the point of view of imitation as well as of catharsis. Hence it is not wrong to say that the plot is the pivot round which the whole system revolves.

The supremacy of plot over character, however, has been challenged by some critics, especially the romantic and the modern critics such as Butcher and Lucas. They have shifted their emphasis from plot to character on account of the rise of

the drama of soul-analysis through reverie and soliloquey. In the opinion of the well-known Hindi critic Dr. Nagendra too, greater emphasis has been laid on the delineation of character in the plays of Marlowe, Shakespeare, Dryden, Goethe, Ibsen, Materlink and Shaw. In addition to this, A.C. Bradley and A. Nicoll have devoted greater space to the delineation of character rather than the plot. It is in fact easier to construct the plot than to delineate the character with all its subtleties and manifestations. Plot without character and thought has no artistic significance. The characters of Shylock and Falstaff in the plays of Shakespeare further testify to this fact that characters sometimes assume such an importance and even independence that they gain supremacy over the plot.

Aristotle laid greater emphasis upon the plot simply because his theory was based on the extant Greek tragedies which were governed by the predetermined end. They were mostly derived from such myths whose beginning and end were already known to the readers. There was not much scope for any modification in their outline. The traditional account had to be accepted by the Greek playwrights with only slight modifications here and there. Hence the scope for subtle delineation of character was highly restricted by the limited choice of the subject-Matter.

The modern drama, however, has placed us into such a world where new layers of inner life are being explored by the plywrights. They are now trying to explore the psychological complexes and reveal the *dark region of the* 'unconscious'. Even the idiosyncracies of human nature have drawn the attention of the playwrights. Character delineation in its enexhaustible variety has become the main motive of our dramatists today. Plot is therefore used as a mechanism in order to illustrate the inner working of the mind of the character. Hence the play is nothing but the 'will or emotion in action'. Plot is not capable of overpowering the character as it is just the medium through which the inexhaustible potentiality of human psyche is revealed. Dryden was right when he stated that had Aristotle seen our literature, he would have changed his mind.

We should, however, adopt a balanced stand without tilting to the either side. We may in fact derive some pleasure even from a 'conversational' play where there is little or no plot, but the peculiar pleasure of tragedy cannot be produced in the absence of the close-knit structure of the play. It is really very difficult to decide which comes first-plot or character, the egg or the chicken. Plot is in fact nothing but the illustration of character and character is nothing but the determination of plot. Both are in turn the outcome of the other. The relative importance of plot and character, of course, varies from time to time and nation to nation.

It would be pertinent here to draw the attention of the readers to some of the limitations from which Aristotle's *Poetics* suffers. Aristotle considers Sophocles' well-known play *Oedipus the king* to be an ideal model for every aspect of plot construction such as hamartia, reversal and recognition. So for as hamartia is c ncerned, it is undoubtedly clear that there is not much of an hamartia in the character of Oedipus. His end is predetermined and the best possible efforts might not have been able to divert the course of his inevitable fatal end. There were of course better examples available in the Greek plays and Aristotle might have cited Ajax or Neoptolomus as the best examples of hamartia. So far as Aristotle's concept of recognition is concerned, it was strictly confined to the discovery of a character's physical identity. Shakespeare, however, enlarged the scope of recognition which was not only physical but mental also. Recognition now meant discovery of the relationship between the self and the universe or the hero's awareness of his own limitations. Hamlet ultimately recognizes that he alone cannot act the things right or Macbeth realises in the end that life is nothing but a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying.

In his poetics Aristotle puts emphasis on the architectonic unity of plot. All the scenes and episodes are to be causally inter-related and must contribute to the growth of the central plot. In Shakespeare's plays, however, the comic is freely mixed up with the tragic and sometimes the parallel themes

run in the main plot as well as the sub-plot in order to provide an ironic commentary on the theme of the play. In Aristotle's theory of plot there is no scope for the inclusion of sub-plot or the underplot on the pattern of parallel themes, as any incident that does not directly contribute to the development of the plot, is superfluous and episodic which is the worst type of plot. Shakespeare's plays on the other hand, provide numerous examples of parallel themes in the main plot and the sub-plot. *King Lear* the main issue before Shakespeare is the issue of parent-child relationship and for this purpose Shakespear picks up two identical stories. In the main plot there is King Lear, a wrong-headed King, who disinherits his lovely child Cordelia and distributes the property of the state between his two daughters—Goneril and Regan. Similarly in the sub-plot there is the story of the Earl of Gloucester who misunderstands his legitimate son Edgar and favours the flattering son Edmund. In *Hamlet* too parallel themes regarding the hero's concern with revenge have been provided through Hamlet and Claudious in the main-plot and Laertes and Fortinbras in the sub-plot. Such parallel themes do not diffuse the issue of the drama but rather heighten and intensify it. Though Aristotle had clearly stated that there should be no blending of the comic scenes with tragic ones, we find sufficient blending of the two elements in Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* and some of the plays of Shakespeare which provide ironic commentary on the theme of the drama.

Like Aristotle Bharata also discusses plot and character with great subtlety and insight, but he does not try to show the supremacy of either. In his opinion the plot and the character are not separable. Both rather contribute to the realisation of rasa which is the soul of the drama. It is also the main objective of the playwright and gives delight to the spectators. Rasa-realisation leads human beings to a blissful state of mind which is free from the tension and turmoil of the world.

Both Aristotle and Bharata recognize the dominant status of the hero in the drama. They are identical in their views regarding his origin and social status. Aristotle preferred to choose the hero of the drama from a few selected aristocratic families such as Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Thyestes, Telephus

and others Bharata too was of the opinion that the hero of the drama should be a celebrated royal character of exalted nature derived from the well-known Indian myths and legands such as Rāmāyan, Mahābhārata and Bṛhaṭkathā etc. Aristotelian classification of three possible types of characters such as 'better than we are', 'worse than we are' and 'just as we are' easily corresponds to Bharata's division of three categories of characters-superior, middling and inferior. Bharata's recognition of the four types of character such as *dhīrodātta*, *dhīralalita*, *dhīrapraśānta* and *dhīroddhata* shows the unlimited scope of the hero at the disposal of the playwright Similar instances can be seen in the Greek plays also such as in the character of Oedipus, Ajax, Antigone and Roaba etc. There is, however, one fundamental difference between the two theorists. Whereas Aristotle believes that the hero of the drama should not be pre-eminently virtuous, there is no such restriction regarding the hero in Sanskrit drama. The hero, in our drama, on the contrary, should be a men of aminent status and may be free from any flaw in his character. The Indian concept of flaw-less character as the hero of the drama may appear to be 'intellectually weak' and 'undramatic' to the Western critics ; but it is very powerful and stimulating to the Indian spectators.

The Aristotelian requirement of harmartia in the character the hero may be more distinctly seen in the Elizabethan targedies. It is evident from the character of Dr. Faustus, Hamlet, Antony, Othello and King Lear etc. Regarding the status of the hero, the Aristotelian concept, however, underwent a sea change in the social tragedies of Ibsen and Galsworthy. The hero of the drama was no longer a man of high status but acquired an eminent status through his ceaseless efforts. The taste of the modern and has changed and he is now willing to visualise the tension and turmoil in the heart of the common man. The common man who is prepared to lay down his life, in order to achieve something noble and remarkable no matter what his station in life, is as appropriate to be the hero of a tragedy as the king or the queen was in ancient and medieval time. Today the struggle of the common man to rise higher and higher can elevate and exalt us as easily as the struggle of Oedipus or the dilemma

of Hamlet to find himself. The status-bound nobility of the hero has now been replaced by the innate nobility in the character of the hero. The Aristotelian belief that the hero of the drama cannot be perfectly good and virtuous, was not acceptable to Shaw in his *Saint Joan* and Eliot in his *Murder in the Cathedral.* On the basis of these plays we may derive the conclusion that the hero of the drama may be a blameless character also. It is very much akin to Bharata's concept of the hero. Some of Aristotle's other observations regarding his concept of hero are also not acceptable to the modern readers. Aristotle considers women inferior to men as tragic protagonists and slaves as wholly worthless follows. It appears to be quite surprising as we know that there were so many women protagonists available in Greek tragedies such as Antigone, Electra, Hecuba, Helen and Media even in the days of Aristotle. We fall to understand why Aristotle ignored these female protagonists and gave them an inferior status.

Referring to the types of drama, Aristotle mentions only tragedy and comedy whereas Bharata mentions ten types of drama. Aristotelian concept of tragedy has much in common with the Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa of Bharata and his idea of comedy corresponds to the Bhana and Prahasana of Bharata. Bharata's other types of drama have no parallels in Aristotle's *Poetics.* They appear to have been written merely for stage-entertainment and lack proper development. They were intended to entertain the people by mimicking the stories taken from the myths and legends. The Nāṭaka is certainly the most developed and dignified form of drama. Bharata's division of drama into ten types does not appear to have any scientific basis for its classification except that they are suitable dramatic structures to be conveniently used by the playwrights. Some generalisations, however, can be made on the basis of their definitions. If the theme of love is to be presented, it should be presented through Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa ; if social satire is to be staged, it should be through *bhāna* and *prahasana.* If fight between rival groups is to be the theme of drama, *dima*, *vyāyoga* and *samavakāra* are the best forms of drama.

There has been a good deal of controversy over the issue of resemblance between the Aristotelian concept of tragedy and some of the famous Sanskrit plays. The 'happy ending' of Sanskrit plays has led some of the Indian critics to the conclusion that there is no similarity between the tragedy and the Sanskrit plays. They believe that tragedy means 'unhappy ending' and that is why they have translated 'tragedy' in Hindi as 'dukhāntaṭ nāaka', whereas our impression is that tragedy is a serious type of drama and does not necessarily end unihappily. It is in fact a tale of suffering either physical or mental resulting from the protagonist's firm determination to fight against the forces which are hostile to him. Aristotle himself considers Euripide's *Iphigenia in Tauris* to be an ideal tragedy, as in his opinion the best plot in tragedy is the complex-fortunate plot where the tragic deed is contemplated but the revelation takes place before an irreparable damage is done. Iphigenia is fully prepared to sacrifice the life of her own brother Orestes but before the tragic deed takes place, she recognizes her brother and spares his life. In the tragedy *Electra* also there is a happy ending predicted for Orestes and Electra by the end of the drama. In *Poetics* Aristotle has clearly stated that the tragedy with unhappy ending is no doubt deeply moving but the tragedy with happy ending is most satisfying to our human emotions. The ending in Shakespear's great tragedy *King Lear* was so horrible that Nahun Tate in the seventeenth century changed it into a happy ending. By the end of the drama Cordelia is shown triumphant and married to Edgar, the virtuous son of Gloucester. Now the question is : Is Shakespear's *King Lear* with happy ending not able to serve the purpose for which it had been written ? It is in fact able to provide us a real insight into the nature of evil and the forces responsible for human suffering, which appears to be the main motive of Shakespear. We may further elucidate it through Shakespeare's next great tragedy *Hamlet*. If a slight modification is introduced at the end of the drama *i.e.* Hamlet is able to kill his uncle Cladius but himself survives, will then Shakespear's *Hamlet* cease to be a tragedy simply because the play ends with the survival of the hero and the death of the villain ? Certainly not. We may thus reach the conclusion that the unhappy ending is certainly not an essential requirement of tragedy.

Now the point is that if there may be a tragedy with happy ending, we should have no hesitation in considering some of our Sanskrit plays to be the most powerful tragedies in the Aristotatelian sense of the term. Let us take, for example, Bhāsa's *Pratimānāṭakam* and Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacaritam*. The Karuṇa rasa predominates in Bhāsa's *Pratimānāṭakam* where the tragic tone operates from the beginning up to the end of the Sixth Act. The death of Daśaratha, caused by his own wife Kaikeyi, is in fact very moving. However the happy ending takes place with the reversal of the situation in Act VII when Rāma becomes the King of Ayodhya to the delight of all. Similarly in Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacaritam* who will not pity the mental agony of Sitā ? Who will not be moved by the self-mortification of Rāma and the painful cry of Lakshman who shouts at the departure of Sita and exclaims : 'Revered Valmiki, save ! help ! Is this the motive of thy poetry ! The play, however, comes to the happy ending when the miracle takes place and Rāma is united to his wife Sitā. We cannot in fact find better examples of the agony of spiritual conflict than in Daśaratha and Rāma in *Pratimānāṭakam* and *Uttararāma-caritam* respectively. The wounds from the enemy may be borne but the unexpected wounds caused by one's Kith and Kin become very painful and even intolerable.

Greak and Sanskrit plays are very similar regarding the role of inscrutable Fate in drama. In *Pratimānātakam* the acute mental suffering of King Daśaratha becomes intolerable and Kanchuki, a Brahmin family servant, exclaims : 'Alas ! what a tragic sorrow ! Such a great soul has to undergo such mortification. Certainly the course of Fate is irresistible'. Similarly in *Uttararāmacharitam* too Sitā who happens to be the wife of Lord Rāma, is banished to the forest even after her trial had taken place. Reacting to her fate Tamasa states : 'It is the decree of your Destiny'. The importance of Fate can be seen even in Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* where due to the loss of the ring King Duṣyanta fails to recognize Śakuntalā which leads her to a good deal of mental agony. The unpredictable, inscrutable and irrevocable nature of human Destiny is of course very painful and pitiable. A similar instance can be seen

in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* where Oedipus is not able to divert the course of Destiny in spite of his best possible efforts.

Hegel has broadened the base of Aristotle by suggesting that there is not always a clash between good and evil but sometimes there is a clash between two goods also. He gives two examples from the Greek plays. The first example is Sophocles's play *Antigone* where a clash between two equally justifiable claims has been shown leading to the utter destruction of both the sides. Antigone is insisting on her duty as a sister towards her brother whereas Creon is sticking to his responsibility for protesting the law of the State. The clash now becomes inevitable, as the tragic conflict arises even from the denial of the exclusive claims. The other example is Aeschylus's *Oresteia* where Clytemnestra kills her own husband Agamemnon. Now Apollo asks Orestes to kill the mother. The sacred bond of father demands something which the equally sacred bond of mother does not permit him to do. Similar instance can be seen in Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacaritam* where Rāma suffers from spiritual conflict between his duty towards Sītā as a husband and his sense of responsibility towards his subjects as a king. It is really very difficult to accept the one and ignore the other. The denial of any claim would to mental suffering which is almost inevitable. We may very easily say that Iago, Cladius and Macbeth have evil intentions but how can we say that the act of Orestes or Antigone's violation of the rule of the State or Creon's insistence on protecting the law of the State or Rāma's banishment of Sītā to the forest even after her trial, springs from the evil design ? When there is a clash between good and evil, the choice is very clear and simple. But whenever there is a clash between two goods, the choice becomes very complicated and confusing, though its impact remains very powerful and moving.

In spite of these similarities between the western and the Sanskrit plays, the there are some fundamental differences also. Whereas the Western drama is heroic, the Sanskrit drama is idealistic in tone. Whereas Western drama deals in dialectics,

Sanskrit drama dwells upon the human emotions. Whereas Western drama is intellectual in content, Sanskrit drama is psychological or spiritual. The fundamental aim of Sanskrit drama is to achieve spiritual equilibrium, balance between the opposites, sense of fulfilment even at the centre of violent upheaval. Normally there is no such conflict in the soul of the Indian hero as we see in the Greek hero Oedipus or the Shakespearean hero Hamlet. Even if the conflict arises in the heart of the hero, he is able to take a decision at once and act on it immediately, as we see in the character of Rāma in Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacaritam*.

It is a peculiar thing in Sanskrit drama that no problem play has ever been written by the Sanskrit playwrights on the pattern of Ibsen, Shaw or Galsworthy, as in our Indian philosophy there is only one problem in human life, that is, the maintenance of equilibrium and the celebration of poise. It has been amply exemplified both in the conception of plot and the execution of its detail. They are so much preoccupied with the equlibrium of life that they experience no uneasiness over the cruelty of real life or the working of the World. They never question the fabric of Indian society nor do they ever try to solve the riddles of human life. Conflict between the opposite sexes, a major issue in the Western drama, is completely lacking in the Sanskrit plays. Heroines in Sanskrit plays are mostly the privileged members of the harem and they never question or challenge the rights and privileges of their husbands. Śakuntalā of *Abhijnānśākuntalam* or Sītā of *Uttarāmacaritam*, though extremely insulted and humiliated by their husbands, can never be a Medea or Clytemnestra or Lady Macbeth or Cleopatra of the Western drama. It is in fact a reflection of the distinction of our cultural background.

Though solution has been provided by the Sanskrit plays also, it seems to have been achieved in collaboration with the supernatural forces. Hence A.B. Keith has gone to the extent of saying that they are lacking in logical growth and dramatic qualities. We, however, fail to agree with the views of Keith. Sanskrit plays may not be convincing and appealing to a set of

Western audience but they are very moving to the Indian spectators who believe in the supremacy of the Almighty and the supernatural forces. They are convinced that there is a Divinity that shapes our destiny. Everything cannot be explained with the poor tool of logic. If the play is to be logically convincing, how can we explain the presence of ghost in *Hamlet* or witches in *Macbeth* ? Should be we than come to the conclusion that Shakespeare's powerful plays *Hamlet* and *Macbeth* are no longer moving to the modern spectators on account of the presence of the supernatural forces in them ? Certainly not. Aristotle gives a clear hint to this effect when he says that 'probable improbabilities' are to be preferred to the 'improbable probabilities'.

There is another significant difference between Aristotle and Bharata in connection with their views on the spectacle of drama. Though Aristotle mentions spectacle as one of the six elements of tragedy and feels that it is one of the most significant factors differentiating tragedy from the epic, he considers it to be the least important element of drama. In his opinion the impact of tragedy may be felt in a better way even by the very structure and the systematic development of incidents in the drama. Aristotle is concerned with the very essence of tragedy rather than with its presentation on the stage. Bharata, on the other hand, is fully acquainted with the visual impact of drama and discusses the utility of spectacle on the stage in greater depth and detail. It is really very surprising why Aristotle has ignored the significance of spectacle is drama. How could he miss the ironical contrast and its touching impact while visualising Sophocle's play *Oedipus the King* ? There was on the one hand old, blind prophet Tiresias and on the other the intelligent, powerful and youthful King Oedipus but as events took turn, it was clearly proved that Tiresis could foresee the feature but Oedipus could not and proved himself to be an utter failure in spite of his best efforts. Who can say that Oedipus, tearing out his eyes on the stage, was not more deeply moving than he could have been if it had been just narrated ? It is undoubtedly true that the visual aspect of the drama adds a new dimension to its appeal to the spectators.

Both Aristotle and Bharata have given due importance to the discussion of language in drama. Whereas Aristotle has devoted three and a half chapters to the discussion of the various aspects of language, Bharata has written four chapters in his *NŚ* four its elaborate analysis. They have discussed language as the medium of expression and confined themselves to the discussion of its grammatical, technical and figurative features. They have not explored the possibility of language as the cluster of images and verbal patterns which may have a direct impact on the central issue of the drama.

It is thus clear from the preceding discussion that Aristotle and Bharata are the poineers in the field of a systematic study of dramatic theory. Their works are still very useful and fundamental to our understanding of the true nature of drama. Modern criticism is still based on them and has not so far been able to evolve an independent theory of its own. It does not, however, mean that the modern theorists and playwrights should strictly adhere to the principles of theorists. They should rather try to modify or amend the theory wherever it has become irrelevant. Aristotle's theory is too limited in its scope and sometimes even biased, whereas Bharata's theory of drama is at certain points too technical and exhaustive to be practically useful to the modern writers. The modern theorists should pick up their own subject-matter and evolve their own concept of hero, suffering and evil in order to reflect the changing conditions of human life and society. The theories of Aristotle and Bharata may be taken as guiding outlines and not as a dead weight on their creative impulse.

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